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Preface 
Auditing Symposium VIII was made possible by the generous financial 
support provided by the Touche Ross Foundation. The 1986 symposium was 
the eighth of  the series of  biennial auditing symposia held at the University of 
Kansas. The origination, development and growth of  the symposia can be 
directly traced to and identified  with Howard Stettler who retired from  the 
faculty  of  the University of  Kansas in May of  1984. Howard was the chairman 
for  the first  symposium in 1972 and served as chairman or co-chairman for  the 
following  six symposiums. Our job as co-chairmen was made substantially 
easier by following  the format  so meticulously developed and implemented by 
Howard over the past 14 years. 
Topics for  the symposium and individuals to serve as presenters and 
discussants were selected by us after  extensive consultations with members of 
the faculty  at the University of  Kansas and professionals  in the auditing area at 
other universities and in practice. We are indebted to our colleagues in the 
accounting area at the University of  Kansas, Francis Bush, Harold Cook, Mike 
Ettredge, Emeka Ofobike,  Wiley Mitchell, Art Thomas and Chet Vanatta, for 
their able assistance in planning the symposium and accommodating the many 
guests to our campus. 
Holding steadfast  to tradition, the first  paper presented at the symposium 
was devoted to the historical coverage of  auditing. The primary criteria used to 
select topics for  the other papers was current interest and relevancy to the 
profession.  When an academician was selected as the presenter, a practitioner 
was selected as the discussant and vice versa. All papers, except for  the paper 
presented during the evening after  dinner, were distributed in advance. 
Because of  the opportunity for  advance preparation by all participants, the 
presenter was allowed only ten minutes to make summary remarks and 
observations about the paper. After  the discussant's comments, which gen-
erally were limited to 20 minutes, an hour was available for  open discussion. As 
expected, the opportunity for  leading academicians and practitioners in the 
auditing area to interact in discussion and debate with respect to many of  the 
major issues confronted  by the profession  provided for  lively discussion and 
debate. Unfortunately,  it has not been feasible  to record and reproduce these 
discussions for  the benefit  of  others. 
About fifty  invited practitioners and academicians participated in the two-
day symposium, and those individuals are listed prior to the contents page. 
Many observers such as doctoral graduate students, faculty  members from 
accounting and other disciplines, and practitioners in the area attended parts of 
the symposium as observers. For those who might like an opportunity to 
participate in the discussions at a future  symposium, we would be pleased to 
receive an indication of  your interest. 
The proceedings of  each of  the symposia except the first  are still in print 
and may be purchased from 
KANSAS UNION BOOKSTORE 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045 
Proceedings are shipped only on a prepaid basis. The prepaid price covers 
mailing costs with the exception of  orders outside of  the United States and 
Canada, in which case an additional $2.00 should be included for  surface 
transportation. The papers included in each of  the available proceedings, the 
authors of  those papers, and the prepaid price of  each volume from  the Kansas 
Union Bookstore are given below for  the benefit  of  those who may wish to 
refer  to a paper in one of  the previous volumes. 
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"Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree" 
Accountants' Legal Liability— 
A Historical Perspective 
Paul J. Ostling* 
Arthur Young & Co. 
I. Introduction 
It is difficult  these days to read a week's worth of  newspaper financial 
sections and business magazines without finding  an article, sometimes lurid, 
discussing the role and liabilities of  the public auditor. Those within the 
profession  often  view this attention as an undeserved, new development. 
Certainly the frequency,  scope, and magnitude of  civil suits against auditors 
have grown. There has, however, always been a close connection between the 
legal liabilities imposed upon auditors and the standards adopted by the 
profession—as  well as its perceived scope and responsibilities of  practice. 
This paper describes some present and recent legal challenges facing  the 
profession,  their historical perspective, and predictions as to possible future 
developments. Taken in perspective, current attacks on the profession  may be 
no more than a maturation and reevaluation of  the auditor's standards and role. 
As the investor community becomes more sophisticated in its appreciation of 
the limitations in the auditor's role pursuant to generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS), and better understands the "gray areas" where generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) permit more than one treatment of 
certain financial  transactions, a credibility gap looms. To reduce the gap, the 
courts and legislators are attempting to regulate the profession  and impose 
more "watchdog" responsibilities. Because of  the gap, insurance companies 
and bright young graduates, fearful,  respectively, of  large legal judgments and 
less rewarding career opportunities may avoid the accounting profession. 
Counter-productive activities of  the professionals  themselves and their 
representative associations may be complicating this trend. Nearly predatory 
competition drives the price of  audit services downward at the very same time 
that the attendant risks are skyrocketing. Legislative "overseers" lambast the 
profession,  often  inaccurately and unjustifiably,  but the associations often  seem 
timid by comparison in their response. Public auditors must act quickly and 
affirmatively  to resolve these conflicts  in order to assure the future  growth and 
profitability  of  the profession. 
* The views expressed herein are those of  the author individually. 
II. Development of  Standards and Liabilities 
It is now settled that the role and responsibilities of  the public auditor 
include the supply of  accurate financial  information  to facilitate  the function  of 
the free  markets, including the securities markets. This was not always 
accepted by the profession  as such. Indeed, our predecessors in practice 
initially viewed their audience as including only their direct, paying clients. 
Auditors vociferously  resisted the expansion of  their role and responsibilities, 
and changes were frequently  the result of  litigation losses and/or government 
intervention. 
A. Our United  Kingdom  Roots 
While there are reports of  "auditors" having counting responsibilities 
during biblical times, the analysis of  the evolution of  accountants' legal liabilities 
must commence in the United Kingdom. It comes as no great surprise to even 
the less scholarly students of  the profession  that the modern auditing 
profession  as we know it evolved in England and Scotland. 
— Laws permitting the formation  of  corporate entities (whose ownership was 
represented by and transferable  through stock) and the concept of  "limited 
liability" (that a shareholder is liable to the extent of  his capital invested in 
purchasing stock, but is not "personally liable") were passed there during the 
1840's and 1850's. The Joint Stock Companies Act of  18441 required that a 
"full  and fair''  balance sheet be sent to shareholders before  their meetings and 
filed  with the Registrar of  Companies. Auditors (who were to be non-office-
holding stock-holders) were required to be appointed to report on the balance 
sheet. There were no meaningful  legal requirements or standards as to the 
form  or content of  the balance sheets or the manner of  the conduct of  the 
auditors' reviews. There were no enforcement  provisions relating to the 
content or the filing  of  the balance sheet with the Registrar of  Companies. The 
1844 Act should not be thought of  as anything approaching our own federal  or 
state securities laws. 
Because the balance sheets were standardless and the "audits" were a 
perfunctory  checking of  support for  disbursements there was little faith  by 
third parties in either the fullness  or fairness  of  the balance sheets.2 The 
balance sheet requirement was dropped in 1856,3 and the matter of  accounting 
and auditing was left  up to the corporations themselves. It was not until 1900 
that all registrants under the Companies Act were again required to have 
annual audits conducted. In 1907, they were again required to file  their balance 
sheets.4 
In the fifty-year  interim, however, certain industry-specific  requirements 
were enacted. During the late 1860's railroad companies were required to 
publish their accounts; during the 1870's banks were required to audit their 
accounts and gas companies to publish theirs; and in the early 1880's electrical 
companies were to publish their accounts. These industries were regarded as 
special because of  the public trust in their operations, or the speculative nature 
of  their early operations. In the meantime, the accounting profession  was 
beginning to organize and establish standards. In Scotland, the Society of 
Accountants in Edinburgh was granted a royal charter in 1854. In England, a 
charter was granted to The Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England and 
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Wales in 1880. Two other associations were formed  in Scotland, and in England 
the Society of  Incorporated Accountants and Auditors was formed  in 1885. In 
both Scotland and England these groups agreed upon uniform  examinations for 
new members (designated chartered accountant or C.A.) as well as appren-
ticeship programs.5 
The British audit during the 1880's evolved as having the primary goal of 
uncovering fraud.  Detailed bookkeeping-type examinations reviewed the num-
bers in the books of  account. Courses in study evolved in auditing, and a 
textbook was prepared. Customs developed for  the preparation of  the auditors' 
"certification".  The Scots and English auditors had acquired some status and 
had established some commonly accepted auditing and accounting "standards" 
by 1900, when all registered companies were required to have audits 
conducted. For example, the use of  the term "certificate"  to describe the 
report, and the representation that financial  statements "present fairly"  were 
English customs. This is not to say, however, that auditors' "legal liabilities" 
had been yet fully  examined. 
For the most part the manner of  report and the procedures applied were 
determined by the corporation's articles of  incorporation and the engagement 
contract between the auditor and the client. In most cases the company's 
articles required that the balance sheet be "full  and fair"  and prepared to 
display the "true and correct" picture of  the company's "state of  affairs." 
This requirement was based upon the model articles of  incorporation appended 
to the 1856 Companies Act.6 The earliest reported losing cases involving 
auditors arose in England prior to 1900, and focused  upon whether the 
auditor's certificate  had adequately communicated the "state of  affairs"  of  the 
company.7 
In the case of  Leeds  Estate,  the auditor's certificate  for  seven years, 1874 
through 1880, said: 
I certify  that I have examined the above accounts and find  them to be a 
true copy of  those [shown] in the books of  the company. 
While escaping damages because that statute of  limitations had run, the 
auditor was found  guilty of  negligence to its client for  failing  to actually go 
behind the numbers presented by management to ascertain their accuracy. 
In In  re London  the auditor's 1892 certificate  said: 
We have examined the . . . balance-sheet and compared it with the 
books of  the company; and we certify  that it is a correct summary of  the 
accounts therein recorded. The value of  the assets as [shown] on the 
balance-sheet is dependent upon their realization. 
Again the auditor was found  liable for  negligence in breaching its duty to its 
clients—the shareholders—because the Court felt  the words "subject to 
realization" was not a qualification  which adequately communicated the com-
pany's true state of  affairs. 
Thus, by 1900, some rudimentary legal reporting requirements had been 
imposed upon their clients, and the court had just begun to impose a legal duty 
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upon auditors to carry out an audit in accordance with their engagement 
contracts. The duty was a narrow one by today's standards, but the auditors 
gave those clients some level of  comfort  with regard to detecting fraud  which 
was on the clients' books. To be sure, the primary purposes and benefits  from 
the audit were to assist the client's management in monitoring its financial 
matters, ward off  defalcations,  and secure financial  support from  bankers. 
B. Migration  to America 
In 1776, America was essentially an agrarian society. While the revolution 
removed the yoke of  British governmental rule, the financial  connections which 
had already been formed  by British financiers  provided much of  the capital for 
the American industrial revolution. American states passed laws permitting the 
formation  of  corporations. The industrial revolution, corporate growth, and 
British investment all led to the birth of  the accounting profession  in America— 
but as a child of  the United Kingdom practice. 
Individuals, such as Arthur Young, came to America in growing numbers 
during the 1880's and 1890's to look after  the interests of  English investors, 
and then began their own practices here—evolving into firms  of  accountants. 
English firms,  such as Price Waterhouse & Co., sent agents of  the firm  to the 
United States to conduct examinations on behalf  of  English investors. By 1900, 
Price Waterhouse's activities were significant  enough here that Arthur Lowes 
Dickenson came to manage them. A young English auditor on his staff  at the 
time, George O. May, succeeded Dickenson as senior partner in America in 
1911, remained in the post until 1940, and had an incredible influence  upon the 
manner of  practice and the development of  standards in America. An American 
of  the day, Colonel Robert Montgomery, was also an early leader in establishing 
the American practice. He was a CPA, a lawyer, a military figure,  a Columbia 
University professor,  and president of  the associations which eventually 
became the AICPA. In 1905, he edited the first  American textbook on auditing 
(called, simply Auditing)  which was, naturally, an adaptation of  the leading 
English text of  the day. 
In 1896, New York was the first  state to pass a law designating the 
professional  title of  Certified  Public Accountant. Other states quickly followed. 
Likewise, uniform  tests for  CPAs were developed early in this century. 
Through this period, however, the American practice, in terms of  procedures 
and process, was little more than an extension of  the Scots and English 
methodologies. Indeed, most of  the leading U.S. firms  were led by Scots and 
Englishmen until the early 1960's. For at least the first  quarter of  the century, 
the bulk of  audit "staffmen"  were imported from  the United Kingdom. Thus, 
as in England, the focus  in America was initially upon auditing as a report to 
management rather than as a review of  management's report to investors and 
lenders of  its own stewardship. Much of  the development of  the auditor's legal 
liabilities over the past 53 years has focused  on this change in the audit's 
emphasis to a review of  the managment's financial  report to third-party users 
of  financial  information. 
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C.  Early  Development  of  Standards  in America 
Pressure for  a change in emphasis in the purpose of  financial  reporting and 
auditing began early in this century. Before  the great stock market crash of 
1929, ownership of  stocks and bonds became more than a game for  the 
wealthy. Many small, individual purchasers—relatively unsophisticated and in 
large measure financing  their purchases with borrowed money—entered the 
stock market. Investors wanted more and more accurate financial  information, 
and critics wanted more standardization of  accounting and reporting practices. 
The new investing audience was more interested "in the income statement and 
less in the balance sheet."8 Despite this need for  more standardization, 
practices varied substantially on subjects such as depreciation and reporting of 
income statements. Critics of  the profession  complained of  the lack of 
standardization, the inadequacy of  financial  information,  and the manipulative 
practices which abounded.9 
Three developments between 1916 and 1934 went far  in the United States 
to formulate  standards and define  the duties and liabilities of  auditors. In 1916 
the Secretary of  Commerce (William Redfield),  the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) requested the American Institute 
of  Accountants (AIA) to prepare a memorandum on balance sheet audits. Since 
many of  the audits conducted had been balance sheet audits done without actual 
observation of  inventories and assets, they were concerned about the integrity 
of  financial  information  of  the day. 
The AIA committee, which included George May and Robert Montgomery, 
adopted a Price Waterhouse internal memorandum entitled Memorandum  on 
Balance Sheet  Audits.  This memorandum was approved and accepted by the 
FTC and the FRB and published initially in 1917 in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. It was revised and republished several times before  1930. The AIA 
itself  revised the memorandum and published it in 1936 as Examination of 
Financial  Statements  by Independent  Public Accountants.  While this effort 
resulted in some standardization and definition  of  the auditor's role, it still did 
not require observation or testing of  inventories or the confirmation  of 
receivables. It would be left  to a major scandal for  that to occur. 
The second major occurrence in the development of  standards began from 
a 1927 AIA initiative, when it approached, but was turned down by the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), to jointly develop financial  reporting require-
ments for  NYSE registrants. After  the 1929 crash, the NYSE reversed itself 
and asked for  the AIA's help in developing accounting principles. George May 
was called into service yet again to chair two separate committees to cooperate 
with exchanges and develop accounting principles. 
May's committees did not support the adoption of  a set of  specific 
directives of  accounting treatment, but suggested in 1932 "very broad limits 
[of  accounting treatments within which reporting companies would make] 
disclosure of  the methods employed and consistency in their application from 
year to year. " 1 0 In 1933 the NYSE required all new registrants to have audited 
annual financial  reports, but made no requirements for  disclosure of  accounting 
methods. May's committees published a pamphlet in 1934 called "Audits of 
Corporate Accounts" and recommended a new form  of  audit report which used 
the words: "fairly  present, in accordance with accepted principles of  account-
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ing consistently maintained." In 1940 the reference  to "accepted principles of 
accounting" became "generally accepted accounting principles." From 1934 
on, the profession  recommended that companies choose accounting methods 
"within very broad limits" and identify  them in the financial  statements. Thus 
the concept of  GAAP was born—with the built-in flexibilities  upon which many 
of  today's critics harp. 
The third major occurrence in the period was the enactment of  the 
Securities Act of  193311 and the Securities Exchange Act of  1934.12 Before 
these enactments, no laws in the U.S. required audited financial  statements for 
"public companies." When initially passed, the Securities Act was enforced  by 
the FTC, which quickly published regulations for  the determination of  inde-
pendence of  auditors and uniform  accounting rules. The Securities Act requires 
registration of  new securities via a registration "statement" including financial 
statements certified  by an independent accountant. The 1933 Act imposes 
significant  legal liabilities upon experts identified  in the registration statements 
for  false  statements in the portions of  the report as to which they are experts. 
It also prohibits fraud  in connection with the sale of  new securities. 
The 1934 Act is an overlay beyond the 1933 Act which created the SEC to 
enforce  both Acts. It prohibits false  statements in connection with the sale of 
securities, and was particularly significant  in its impact upon public auditors in 
the context of  private securities fraud  suits. The 1933 and 1934 Acts and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder clearly established concrete standards, 
roles, and liabilities for  American auditors. 
D. The  Agony of  Defeat 
The late 1930's marked the beginning of  litigation in the United States 
which had direct impact upon the duties and liabilities of  auditors. This paper 
cannot relate all  cases which have historical significance,  but several have had 
"landmark" results upon the profession. 
1. Testing Inventories and Assets 
The McKesson  & Robbins case is the most significant  "early" auditing case 
in America. Philip Musica, alias Frank Donald Coster, was a con man. His first 
scrape with American justice in 1909 resulted in conviction and a prison 
sentence for  bribing customs officials  and preparing fraudulent  invoices and 
customs documents. Within three years of  leaving prison, he was caught for 
bilking twenty-two banks on loans obtained with collateral he did not own. He 
spent three years in prison and was placed on probation. 
In 1920, Musica claimed to be in the drug business but was actually a 
prohibition bootlegger. In 1923, he became the sole owner of  Girard & 
Company, a manufacturer  of  drugs. Despite being sole owner, he hired Price 
Waterhouse to conduct audits. He studied auditing procedures and noted that 
auditors did not observe physical inventories unless requested to do so. In 
1926, with financial  support from  bankers, he purchased McKesson & Robbins 
which was merged with his company. 
In December 1938, Musica was confronted  by his treasurer and director 
who had uncovered fraud,  waste, mismanagement and inclusion of  fictitious 
inventories and assets exceeding $10 million. A receiver was appointed by a 
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federal  judge, and that same day the ever present George May of  Price 
Waterhouse met with the company's executives and assured them that, as far 
as he knew, the books were in order. Eleven days later Musica committed 
suicide. Investigation revealed that on stated assets of  over $87 million, $10 
million in inventory and $9 million of  receivables were fictitious. 
Price Waterhouse settled the trustee's claim by refunding  $522,402.29 
representing five  years' audit fees.  The SEC commenced an investigation 
which exposed the lack of  agreement among auditors as to what the appropriate 
audit procedures were with regard to inventories and receivables. In the wake 
of  the scandal, but before  the SEC could issue its final  report, the AIA 
established a committee in January 1939, to examine audit procedures. In 
October 1939, the AIA issued its Committee on Auditing Procedures' 
Statement  on Auditing  Procedure  No.  1: Extensions of  Auditing  Procedure, 
which required observation and testing of  physical inventory and confirmation 
of  receivables. 
The SEC's report, which was issued in 194013 contained the following: 
• Price Waterhouse was found  to be derelict in failing  to follow 
procedures which a diligent auditor would have used in the circum-
stances, and which were called for  in the authoritative works on 
auditing (e.g.,  Montgomery, Auditing  Theory  and  Practice  (1934), p. 
157 and 182). 
• While auditors claimed not to be insurers of  financial  health, "discov-
ery of  gross overstatement in the accounts is a major purpose of  an 
audit " 
• Management's activities are within the scope of  an audit, so auditors 
should be elected by shareholders. 
• The profession  did well to publish SAP No. 1, but it should also 
distinguish between auditing "standards" and "procedures." 
• Regulation S-X was amended so that the auditor's report states 
whether the audit was made in accordance with appropriate GAAS. 
The profession  responded by having the AIA Committee on Auditing 
Procedure prepare a statement defining  audit standards. In 1947, the AIA 
published a brochure incorporating the Committee's memorandum "Tentative 
Statement of  Auditing Standards—Their Generally Accepted Significance  and 
Scope." We now know this as Statement  on Auditing  Standards  No.  1. The 
statement distinguished between standards (which deal with "quality of 
performance  and objectives to be attained") and procedures (which "relate to 
acts to be performed").  While over the years the interpretations have been 
amended from  time to time, the three original auditing standards ("General 
Standards," "Standards of  Field Work" and "Standards of  Reporting") 
remain the same. 
The McKesson  & Robbins case is a graphic illustration of  how scandal and 
litigation can result directly in long-term advances in the definition  of  a 
profession's  role, standards, and legal liabilities. Since this case resulted 
directly in SAP NO. 1 and SAS No. 1, it is difficult  to find  a more seminal 
example. 
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2. Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass "Go" 
Perhaps the most image-shattering cases for  the profession  have been 
those which resulted in criminal convictions for  independent auditors. Recently, 
in connection with a federal  investigation and indictments relating to a major 
financial  scandal, a picture of  a Big Eight partner being led to his arraignment in 
handcuffs  appeared on page 1 of  the New  York  Times  Business Section. More 
recently, a managing partner of  a Florida practice office  of  a major accounting 
firm  pleaded guilty to several counts of  fraud  and criminal securities conduct, 
including taking a payment from  ESM Securities and giving a clean opinion in 
the face  of  fictitious  collateral securing millions of  dollars of  ESM's securities 
transactions. In the same case, the company's lawyer (the son-in-law of  ESM's 
major benefactor)  committed suicide. The lurid headlines created by these 
criminal financial  scandals have a far-reaching  impact upon the public's 
perception of  and respect (or lack thereof)  for  the profession. 
Three such criminal cases have had far-reaching  impact upon the profes-
sion's self-image  and its view of  the attendant duties and liabilities. In 1968, a 
senior partner, a junior partner, and a senior associate of  Lybrand, Ross Bros. 
& Montgomery were convicted (after  a jury trial) of  mail fraud  and securities 
fraud  for  certifying  the 1962 financial  statements of  Continental Vending 
Corporation. The main defense  was that the financial  statements were in 
compliance with GAAP. The trial court held, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for  the Second Circuit affirmed 14 that compliance with GAAP was not a 
complete defense  against a charge of  criminally certifying  a false  and misleading 
financial  statement, and that auditors must report major management miscon-
duct. 
The Second Circuit took its task of  passing on criminal liability of 
professionals  quite seriously: 
While every criminal conviction is important to the defendant,  there is a 
special poignancy and a corresponding responsibility on reviewing 
judges when, as here, the defendants  have been men of  blameless lives 
and respected members of  a learned profession.  . . . 
In a widely quoted passage, the court enunciated an accountant's legal 
responsibility to investigate management dishonesty: 
[I]t simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to disclose 
what he knows when he has reason to believe that, to a material extent, 
a corporation is being operated not to carry out its business in the 
interest of  all the stockholders but for  the private benefit  of  its 
president. For a court to say that all this is immaterial as a matter of  law 
if  only such loans are thought to be collectible would be to say that 
independent accountants have no responsibility to reveal known dishon-
esty by a high corporate officer.  If  certification  does not at least imply 
that the corporation has not been looted by insiders so far  as the 
accountants know, or, if  it has been, that the diversion has been made 
good beyond peradventure (or adequately reserved against) and effec-
tive steps taken to prevent a recurrence, it would mean nothing, and 
the reliance placed on it by the public would be a snare and a 
dilution. . . . 
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The defendants  were fined  and placed on probation. In 1972, President 
Nixon pardoned them. 
In 1974, a partner and an audit supervisor were convicted after  a jury trial 
for  criminal violations of  the securities law by making false  statements in a 1969 
proxy statement for  National Student Marketing (NSM). On appeal, the 
conviction of  the partner was affirmed,  while the supervisor's was reversed.15 
The partner was sentenced to imprisonment for  one year and fined  $10,000. 
The jail sentence was suspended to 60 days. 
The charges centered upon NSM's policy of  recognizing revenue which 
was selected by the partner and based upon the percentage-of-completion 
method. NSM was recognizing revenue when it allegedly received "commit-
ments" on fixed-fee  contracts to participate in marketing programs developed 
by NSM which were aimed at the "youth market." NSM's utilization of  the 
method, and its decisions as to when it had "commitments" (i.e.  recognizing 
revenue on "unbilled accounts receivable") resulted in overstating "net 
sales" by approximately $1 million and reporting "net earnings" of  $702,270 in 
its 1968 Annual Report when there were in fact  no earnings at all. NSM 
experienced an incredible stock price rise (from  $6 to $80 in less than two 
years) and used the stock to make a series of  acquisitions. 
After  selecting the percentage-of-completion  method for  NSM's 1968 
financial  statements, the partner instructed the supervisor to check on the 
commitments. The supervisor did so, but in a haphazard manner by telephone. 
No written verifications  were sought or received. The partner permitted NSM 
to include $1.7 million of  such commitments as unbilled receivables for  1968 
and this in turn permitted NSM to show a profit  instead of  a loss. The footnotes 
to the annual report's financial  statements did not disclose the "flimsy"  nature 
of  the commitments. 
Within five  months of  the publication of  the 1968 financial  statements, NSM 
had to write off"  $1 million of  the $1.7 million of  commitments. When the 
auditors learned of  the circumstances of  the write-off  and the periods they 
related to, they netted the reduced earnings against a favorable  extraordinary 
tax item instead of  reducing earnings and sales for  the prior period. Thus, the 
auditors helped to conceal the actual write-off  of  profits.  NSM then published 
the Proxy Statement for  the nine months following  1968 without disclosing the 
problems with the earlier period. 
The Second Circuit noted that the partner's action in allowing bookings on 
commitments for  1968 "was contrary to sound accounting practice,"16 and 
after  discovering the bogus nature of  them "[h]onesty should have impelled 
[him] to disclose" the problems in the updated footnotes  in the Proxy 
Statement. The Second Circuit then enunciated what is now called the 
"suspicious inquiry doctrine." 
Shortly after  the Natelli  conviction, three independent auditors were 
convicted in the aftermath  of  the Equity Funding Corporation of  America 
securities scandal. The three were the partner in charge and two audit 
managers of  Wolfson,  Weiner, Ratloff  & Lapin which had been merged into 
Seidman and Seidman in 1972. After  a jury trial, the three were convicted of 
multiple counts of  securities fraud  and filing  false  SEC documents. The 
conviction was upheld on appeal.17 The Equity Funding scandal, which involved 
widespread use of  computers to perpetrate a massive fraud  and the spectacle 
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of  issuing new insurance policies to dead people to make Equity Funding's 
growth track look continuous, was perhaps the most publicized securities 
scandal of  the 1960's and 1970's. Books have been written about the case. 
Careers of  attorneys were made while careers of  investment advisors and 
accountants were destroyed. 
These cases, and cases like them, should stand as a beacon for  the 
profession  signifying  a line beyond which one cannot go for  one's client. 
Moreover, they clearly demonstrate that auditors are not exempt from  criminal 
liability. 
3. Expanding Liability to Clients—The "Adverse Interest" 
Analysis 
Even as criticism of  the accounting profession  by governmental represen-
tatives, investors, customers of  failed  banks and financial  services institutions, 
and the courts grows, the profession's  own clients are expanding the auditor's 
responsibilities and liabilities. The financial  statements of  a company are, legally 
and under the accounting literature, management's reports of  the company's 
financial  transactions. It often  comes as a rude awakening then, when, after  the 
client's officers  and directors have set accounting policy, prepared the financial 
statements, and represented them to be true and accurate to the auditor, the 
corporate client  disclaims responsibility for  the active fraud  of  its own officers 
and directors, and sues the auditor for  negligence in failing  to discover and/or 
disclose that fraud.  There was a time when clients were unable to make these 
suits stick, but those days are gone. 
The early cases concerning the allocation of  blame for  financial  dishonesty 
between the client and the auditor often  arose where employees made 
defalcations  of  the client's assets. The issue was generally addressed from  the 
perspective of  whether the client should bear responsibility for  failure  to 
properly supervise its employee, or whether the auditor should bear the loss 
for  negligence in not detecting the employee's dishonesty. Under ancient 
common law theories of  "agency" or respondeat  superior the principal/ 
employer is responsible for  the negligent or wrongful  acts committed in the 
course of  the agent/employee's employment. When the employee actually 
steals from  his employer, the courts have ruled the illegal deed to be outside 
the "scope of  employment" (i.e.,  it is "adverse" to the "interests" of  the 
employer), and held the agency/respondeat  superior doctrines inapplicable to 
place the blame on the employer. Rather, in these cases the courts generally 
adopted the old contributory negligence standard. Under this approach, even if 
the auditor were negligent in detecting the fraud,  there would be no liability for 
the loss where the client was "contributorially negligent" and thus could have 
avoided the loss by the exercise of  reasonable care in supervising its own 
employee.18 Even in these cases, auditors were sometimes found  in "breach of 
contract" and had to return their fees  to the client. 
This standard, which was the most favorable  for  auditors, began to be 
reduced when courts overlaid a requirement that the auditor would not avoid 
liability unless the client's contributing negligence somehow contributed to the 
auditor's inability to detect the employee's fraud. 19 In such cases, the courts 
acknowledged a belief  that part of  the function  of  the audit was "detecting 
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defalcations  which the [company's] negligence ha[d] made possible. . . ." 
Thus, there was no automatic defense  for  the auditor just because the client's 
negligence in supervising the errant employee permitted the loss to occur, but 
there was a defense  when the client's negligence permitted the auditor's 
negligence or somehow undercut the auditor's  ability to perform  its job. 
The tightening of  the noose around auditors began in a series of  cases 
which adopted a variant of  the "adverse interest" analysis. First, in Shapiro  v. 
Glekel, 20 the court utilizing the modified  negligence test described above 
refused  to dismiss a case against the auditors of  Beck Industries. Beck had 
become a conglomerate by acquiring numerous companies in the 1960's. The 
president and chairman of  Beck's executive board had fraudulently  prepared 
financial  statements which overstated assets and revenues. These inflated 
statements helped keep Beck's stock price high, and the stock and fraudulent 
statements were used in the acquisitions. Beck went bankrupt. The trustee for 
the estate sued the auditors on behalf  of  Beck arguing that the "outside" 
directors would never have authorized the aggressive acquisition program had 
they known Beck's true financial  condition. 
The court found  that however negligent or unlawful  the conduct of  Beck's 
officers  had been, it had not prevented the auditors from  performing  their 
audit. In analyzing the case it is difficult  to see how the actions of  the president 
and his cohorts were not on behalf  of  Beck and in the scope of  employment. 
They did not steal from  Beck per se, rather they launched a scheme which 
aggrandized the company and allowed it to acquire new assets (although surely 
their own stock holdings and positions were benefited  as well). If  the auditors 
were able to utilize the respondeat  superior argument, they would certainly have 
been able to avoid or significantly  cushion liability. 
To date the courts have refused  to permit auditors to use such arguments. 
A prime example is In  re Investors  Funding  Corp., 21 where the company's 
officers'  attempted bribes led directly to the company's failure.  In suing the 
auditors after  the company failed,  the trustee claimed that the officers'  fraud 
and mismanagement would not have continued "but for"  the auditor's actions. 
The auditor staked its defense  on the claim that it was a victim of  the officers' 
fraud,  and not responsible  for  it. The court referred  to the principles of 
respondeat  superior and observed that the adverse interest test (which lets the 
employer off  the hook when the employee's acts are "adverse" to the 
employer") does not apply when the employee is acting at least partly for  the 
employer's benefit  "even though the agent's primary interest is inimical to that 
of  the principal." 
Nevertheless, the court refused  to dismiss the trustee's case and found 
that the officers'  scheme to keep the company afloat  was not even partly for  the 
benefit  of  the company. It accepted the trustee's allegations that the officers' 
false  financial  statements prolonged the company's "artificial  solvency," and 
this was "predominantly antagonistic" to the company's interests. The court 
held that this benefited  only the officers  and not the company. 
Auditors have had a bright moment in the interim, such as in a case where 
the court found  a company's officers  had turned the company into "an engine 
of  theft  against outsiders" and refused  to permit recovery on behalf  of  the 
company against its auditors.22 But for  the most part, the courts have refused 
to follow  such logic, and refuse  to saddle a client with the fraudulent  or even 
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criminal acts of  its own officers  and directors, and do permit recovery against 
auditors.23 
An interesting irony has developed with regard to the auditor's legal 
liabilities as opposed to those of  the officers  and directors of  America's larger 
public companies. The former  have come to be regarded as having a higher 
standard of  diligence and care—they are the "watchdogs"24—than the officers 
and directors of  their clients who have the underlying duty to honestly and 
faithfully  account to the public for  their stewardship. Auditors have not been 
permitted to avoid the acts of  their own employees who have been found  to 
have had fraudulent  intent (even where no partners have such intent) again, 
because the special duties of  auditors require them to be even more vigilant in 
monitoring their employees.25 
In essence, the courts have permitted corporations whose downfall  is 
attributable to their own leaders to disclaim responsibility because the leaders' 
acts were so wrongful  as to be "ultra  vires"—even  though the corporation may 
have been aggrandized, incurred increased assets, and grown in share price as 
a result of  those acts before  the acts were discovered. The very shareholders 
and creditors of  the corporations have then been permitted to collect millions of 
dollars in damages from  auditors and their insurers to pay for  the ensuing drop 
in share price, the debts, and the shortfalls  created by the wrongdoers. On the 
contrary, the courts have not permitted auditing firms  to escape liability where 
the acts of  partners or junior auditors are clearly and undeniably contrary to the 
audit firms'  overall interests and their own published policies and procedures.26 
Has the pendulum swung too far?  Should corporations, their shareholders and 
creditors (who frequently  have significant  corporate governance power through 
debt covenants and agreements) share in the responsibility for  ensuring that 
their corporate leaders prepare and release accurate financial  statements? 
III. Expansion of  the "Protected" Class 
The subject of  the expansion of  class of  those who will be permitted to bring 
suit against the auditor always begins with a discussion of  Ultramares  Corp.  v. 
Touche, 27 even though Ultramares  was not the first  case to restrict the class of 
those entitled to sue an auditor.28 In Ultramares,  Touche, Niven & Co. was 
retained to prepare and report on the balance sheet of  Fred Stern & Co. as of 
December 31, 1923, as they had done for  three prior years. Fred Stern 
financed  his company through extensive borrowings, and Touche knew how 
Stern financed  the company. Touche was aware that Stern would show its 
certified  balance sheet to creditors. Touche supplied Stern with 32 copies of 
the balance sheet, each as a counterpart original. There was, however, no 
specific  agreement with Touche as to who would see the balance sheets or how 
many times they might be used. There was no identification  of  Ultramares, no 
communication between Touche and Ultramares, and Ultramares had not been 
a Stern creditor in earlier years. The subject of  who would look at the balance 
sheet was left  indefinite. 
The audit was finished  and a net worth of  more than $1 million was indicated 
in the balance sheet. Touche issued a clean opinion. The books had been 
falsified,  and Stern was actually insolvent. Ultramares saw the balance sheet 
and extended substantial credit to Stern before  discovery of  the insolvency. It 
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sued Touche claiming the audit was negligent or fraudulent.  There was no 
indication of  fraudulent  intent ("scienter") and the trial judge dismissed the 
fraud  claim, but the jury found  Touche negligent. The judge granted Touche a 
dismissal judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Division re-
versed the judge's holding and held Touche negligent. 
On appeal, New York's highest court reversed and found  for  Touche. In an 
eloquent opinion the famous  Judge Cardozo rejected "the assault on the citadel 
of  privity." "Privity" is the close relationship which exists between parties to 
a contract. Cardozo was concerned to prevent the expansion of  liability for 
"negligent words" from  growing to duplicate an action in fraud  in the absence 
of  the "indispensable element" of  scienter. In this sense he was four  decades 
ahead of  the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ernst  & Ernst  v. 
Hochfelder. 29 
Dispensing with the issue of  fraud  since there was none, Cardozo turned to 
negligence. He held that auditors cannot be liable for  negligence to third parties 
where the auditor could only foresee  the third-party plaintiff  in a general way. 
This was the case where plaintiff's  loans to the audit client were within a "wide 
range of  transactions in which a certificate  of  audit might be expected to play a 
part." Cardozo refused  to unnecessarily enlarge the class of  third parties 
which might sue auditors: 
If  liability for  negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure 
to detect a theft  or forgery  beneath the cover of  deceptive entries, may 
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for  an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of  a business 
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether 
a flaw  may not exist in the implication of  a duty that exposes to these 
consequences. 
Judge Cardozo made it clear that he had no intention of  "emancipating" 
auditors from  liability. He simply would not extend it to an "indefinite''  group of 
third parties in the absence of  more than mere negligence. Much of  what has 
happened in the auditor's legal liability during the last fifty  years can be viewed 
as ebbs and flows  in the application of  the privity doctrine. 
A. Privity  and Unaudited  Financial  Statements 
Conflicting  opinions as to the range of  accountants' liability have led courts 
to issue confusing  decisions where unaudited statements are involved. In a 
number of  cases, auditors have been found  liable to their client  for  non-audit 
work,30 and to the public in actions by the SEC or criminal authorities.31 In 
Natelli,  supra, the court adopted what has come to be referred  to as the 
"suspicious inquiry" standard in connection with accountants involved in 
preparing unaudited financial  statements. The auditor has a duty to investigate 
figures  known by him to be suspicious, and to insist upon corrections in 
published reports, even though no audit is conducted. 
In cases involving nonaudited statements, the courts frequently  frame  the 
critical issue as the question of  extending accountants' liability to third parties 
who are not in privity. One line of  case law continues to accept the Ultramares 
approach, while other courts take issue with Ultramares  and generally rely on 
the Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  (Restatement) standard in assessing the 
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extent of  the accountants' liability. Section 552 of  the Restatement rejects 
Ultramares  to the extent that privity is the sole definitional  criterion of  duty. 
The Restatement standard for  negligent misrepresentation seems to be 
"knowing reliance" rather than "reasonable foreseeability,"  the latter being 
the hallmark of  the negligence determination in other areas of  tort law. Courts 
using this analysis to find  liability focus  on whether the accountant knew the 
third party would rely upon the financial  statement. 
In Bonhiver v. Graff, 32 the Minnesota Supreme Court found  an accountant 
liable to a third party, a receiver of  an insurance company, for  failing  to discover 
an embezzlement during a write-up engagement that was never completed. 
The court based its decision on the fact  that the accountant had audited the firm 
in a prior year and was aware of  its poor financial  condition. When the 
accountant personally showed his workpapers and figures  to state examiners 
who relied on such data, such knowledge on the defendants'  part "rendered 
them liable for  their negligence" in the preparation of  those workpapers. For 
authority, the court analogized to the Natelli  case. For additional authority 
Restatement § 552 was applied. 
A classic example of  the Restatement reasoning is in Ryan v. Kanne. 33 
There, the Iowa Supreme Court dealt a blow to the concept of  privity, 
increasing considerably the accountant's potential liability to third parties. 
Kanne owned and operated certain businesses, including lumber companies, 
which had incurred considerable indebtedness. He sought the services of  an 
accountant at the insistence of  the officers  of  a creditor. The accountants were 
to determine the true amount of  the accounts payable. The accountant 
submitted financal  statements clearly marked "unaudited," but an accompany-
ing letter described certain confirmation  procedures which the accountants had 
undertaken to verify  the accuracy of  their figures.  When Kanne Lumber and 
Supply, Inc. was incorporated and took over the assets and liabilities of  Kanne's 
lumber business, it discovered that the accounts payable were incorrect. 
The Ryan court looked to Rusch Factors,  Inc.  v. Levin,34 as establishing the 
guiding principle to be followed  for  determining auditor responsibility in this 
context. In Rusch Factors,  which involved a certified  financial  statement, the 
federal  district court expressed considerable doubt about the wisdom of 
Ultramares: 
Why should an innocent party be forced  to carry the weighty burden of 
an accountants' professional  malpractice? Isn't the risk of  loss more 
easily distributed and fairly  spread by impositing [sic] it on the 
accounting profession,  which can pass the cost of  insuring against the 
risk on to its customers, who can in turn pass the costs on to the entire 
consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of  foreseeability  elevate the 
cautionary techniques of  the accounting profession? 
The Ryan court concluded that "the test to be adopted is whether the third 
party to whom the accountant owes a duty of  care is actually foreseen  and a 
member of  a limited class of  persons contemplated." Recovery for  negligence 
is limited "to persons for  whose benefit  and guidance the accountant knows the 
information  is intended." The court approved the more liberal Restatement 
position but declined to say whether liability should extend to all foreseeable 
third parties. 
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Despite the fact  that the statements were clearly labeled "unaudited," the 
court was unwilling to accept the accounting profession's  concept of  unaudited 
services, a rejection which was probably attributable to the court's perception 
of  the public expectation of  accountant responsibility in both audit and nonaudit 
engagements. 
Recently in Seedkem,  Inc.  v. Safranek, 35 an Indiana corporate creditor 
brought a diversity action against a CPA who was a resident of  Nebraska. The 
plaintiff  claimed that financial  documents prepared for  the debtor were 
"recklessly and wantonly prepared" and the accountant knew that the 
unaudited, inaccurate statements failed  to conform  with generally accepted 
accounting principles. The court rejected the accountant's motion for  summary 
judgment on strict Ultramares  privity grounds because the case at hand was 
"qualitatively distinguishable," and because "in light of  the overwhelming and 
subsequent erosion of  the viability of  the Ultramares  decision, it is not so 
readily apparent that the state courts . . . of  Indiana and Nebraska would cling 
to the outmoded and restrictive doctrine of  privity as a precondition to a finding 
of  accountant's liability." 
The court quoted Ryan and noted that the state courts of  Indiana and 
Nebraska might choose to follow  § 552 of  the Restatement as both have 
followed  the Restatement's positions in other areas. 
A second case which relied on the Ryan rationale was Spherex,  Inc.  v. 
Alexander  Grant & CO.36 General Home Products (GHP) engaged Alexander 
Grant to prepare an unaudited  financial  statement for  a twelve-month period 
based on financial  information  provided by GHP. Copies of  this statement were 
submitted by GHP to Spherex to obtain credit. When Spherex subsequently 
sustained a financial  loss in its dealing with GHP and sued Alexander Grant, the 
latter contended that its liability did not extend to a third party creditor not in 
privity. 
The court began its analysis by noting that it had previously expressed 
disfavor  of  the privity doctrine in personal injury cases: "Our reluctance to 
apply the privity rule has extended to allowing a proper plaintiff  to recover for 
mere financial  loss resulting from  the negligent performance  of  services." 
Furthermore, the court noted a resemblance of  this case to cases involving 
contract law in that the duty owed by Alexander Grant to Spherex was "not 
entirely dissimilar to the duty we have held a promisor owes to an intended 
third-party beneficiary."  Next, the court analyzed the evolution of  the 
Ultramares  holding and its privity requirement. According to the New 
Hampshire court's observation, "judges have not hesitated to permit recovery 
where the plaintiff's  identity was specifically  known to the negligent defend-
ant." The reason for  this, the court stated, was that judges are seeking to link 
the privity doctrine with Cardozo's "social utility" rationale of  protecting 
professions  from  the specter of  unlimited liability to a virtually limitless class of 
plaintiffs.  The real question, said the court, is whether the defendant  has some 
special reason to anticipate the reliance of  the plaintiff. 
According to the Spherex  court, the second reason for  distinguishing the 
Ultramares  opinion is that it is "a relic of  a bygone economic era." Both the 
sophistication of  modern accounting procedures and the accountant's central 
role in the financing  and investment industry are a far  cry from  the fledgling 
profession  in need of  judicial protection that existed at the time of  Ultramares. 
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Under this court's theory, if  the choice is between the reliant third party and 
the CPA, the accountant should bear the burdens of  legal responsibility. The 
court buttressed this reasoning by drawing an analogy between an accountant 
and a manufacturer  under product liability law. Both are ' 'in the best position to 
regulate the effects  of  [their] conduct by controlling the degree of  care 
exercised during the performance  of  [their] professional  duties." The court 
concluded that the Restatement harmonizes the accountant's contemporary 
role and his potential liability, and "represents a reasoned approach to the issue 
of  professional  liability for  negligent misrepresentation.'' 
B. Potential  Widespread  Liability  to Third  Parties 
In Citizens  State  Bank v. Timm,  Schmidt  & Co.,37 the issue was phrased as 
a broad question: "May an accountant be held liable for  the negligent 
preparation of  an audit report to a third party not in privity who relies on the 
report?" The court answered in the affirmative,  based on the principles of 
Wisconsin negligence law. The defendant  accountants in this case regularly 
prepared financial  statements for  their client CFA. In November 1975, Citizens 
Bank made a loan to CFA after  reviewing the statements Timm had prepared. 
In early 1977, during the course of  preparing CFA's financial  statement for  the 
previous year, Timm's employees discovered that the 1974 and 1975 state-
ments contained a number of  material errors totalling over $400,000. Once 
informed  of  these errors, the bank called its loan, resulting in CFA going into 
receivership and dissolving. 
The court characterized the issue as one of  first  impression in the state of 
Wisconsin. For authority, the court turned to sources such as Rusch Factors, 
Ryan, and the Restatement § 552. The court also analogized to a Wisconsin 
state case involving an attorney who was held liable to a beneficiary  not in 
privity for  the attorney's negligence in supervising the execution of  a will. The 
court observed that the imposition of  liability would make attorneys and 
accountants more careful  in the execution of  their responsibilities: 
Unless liability is imposed, third parties who rely upon the accuracy of 
the financial  statements will not be protected. Unless an accountant can 
be held liable to a relying third party, this negligence will go undeterred. 
This "public policy" rationale was the main argument on which the court 
"hangs its hat." But there were "additional policy reasons to allow the 
imposition of  liability." The court feared  that if  relying third parties, such as 
creditors, were not allowed to recover, the cost of  credit to the general public 
would increase. Accountants, on the other hand, might spread the risk through 
the use of  liability insurance. The court concluded that accountants' liability to 
third parties should be determined under (and limited by) the accepted 
principles of  Wisconsin state negligence law: 
According to these principles, a finding  of  non-liability will be made only 
if  there is a strong public policy requiring such a finding.  . . . Liability 
will be imposed on these accountants for  the foreseeable  injuries 
resulting from  their negligent acts unless, under the facts  of  this 
particular case, as a matter of  policy to be decided by the court, 
recovery is denied on grounds of  public policy. 
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In Rosenblum, Inc.  v. Adler, 38 the New Jersey Supreme Court determined 
on appeal from  a motion for  partial summary judgment that public policy did not 
preclude the imposition of  liablity on accountants to third parties not in privity. 
The plaintiff-shareholders  acquired stock in Giant Store Corporation, allegedly 
relying on the correctness of  the audits done by defendants  Touche Ross. 
Unfortunately,  Giant had manipulated its books by falsely  recording assets it did 
not own and omitting substantial amounts of  accounts payable so the financial 
information  that Touche had certified  in the 1971 and 1972 statements was 
incorrect. 
While the New Jersey court obviously strained to be methodical and 
comprehensive, the reasoning of  the opinion is tenuous at many points. The 
court engaged in a two-step process to determine the accountant's liability in 
this situation. "First, we shall consider whether, in the absence of  privity, an 
action for  negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for  economic loss 
against the provider of  a service.'' The case law in New Jersey is split on this 
issue, according to the court. However, the court did note that the requirement 
of  privity was long ago discarded in product liability cases based on negligence. 
After  a review of  the decisions demonstrating that negligent representations 
referring  to products may be the basis of  liability irrespective of  privity, the 
court answered the question it had posed: 
Why should a claim of  negligent misrepresentation be barred in the 
absence of  privity when no such limit is imposed where the plaintiff's 
claim also sounds in tort, but is based on liability for  defects  in products 
arising out of  a negligent misrepresentation? If  recovery for  defective 
products may include economic loss, why should such loss not be 
compensable if  caused by negligent misrepresentation? The maker of 
the product and the person making a written representation with intent 
that it be relied upon are, respectively, impliedly holding out that the 
product is reasonably fit,  suitable and safe  and that the representation is 
reasonably sufficient,  suitable and accurate. The fundamental  issue is 
whether there should be any duty to respond in damages for  economic 
loss owed to a foreseeable  user neither in privity with the declarant nor 
intended by the declarant to be the user of  the statement or opinion. 
The second question which the court framed  was: "what duty [should] the 
auditor . . . bear to best serve the public interest in light of  the role of  the 
auditor in today's economy?" Whether a duty exists, asserted the court, is 
ultimately a question of  fairness.  The judicial analysis that must be made 
"involves a weighing of  the relationship of  the parties, the nature of  the risk, 
and the public interest in the proposed solution." 
The court appraised the fairness  of  imposing a duty by first  reviewing the 
auditing function  of  an accountant, concentrating on how it has changed and 
developed over the years. For example: "It is now well recognized that the 
audited statements are made for  the use of  third parties who have no 
contractual relationship with the auditor. Moreover, it is common knowledge 
that companies use audits for  many proper business purposes. . . . " And: 
"The auditor's function  has expanded from  that of  a watch-dog for  manage-
ment to an independent evaluator of  the adequacy and fairness  of  financial 
statements issued by management to stockholders, creditors, and others." 
The court added that despite expanded liability, accountants have been able to 
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obtain insurance to cover these risks, leading them to believe that auditors 
should be able to "purchase malpractice insurance policies that cover their 
negligent acts leading to misstatements relied upon by persons who receive the 
audit from  the company pursuant to a proper business purpose." 
When the court tacked on to the previous discussion the ideas that the 
imposition of  a duty to foreseeable  users will "cause accounting firms  to 
engage in more thorough reviews" and the extent of  financial  exposure already 
has certain "built-in limits" to protect auditors from  too much liability, the fate 
of  the defendant  was sealed. The policy arguments made in Rusch Factors  Inc., 
that the accountant can more easily carry the burden of  liability were repeated 
here, but the New Jersey court did add its own philosophy: "it is just and 
rational judicial policy that the same criteria govern the imposition of  negligence 
liability, regardless of  the context in which it arises." The court believed that 
the investor and the general public will benefit  in the long run when the liability 
of  the CPA for  negligent misrepresentation is measured by the foreseeability 
standard. 
In applying the above analysis to the facts  at hand, the court looked first  to 
see whether the entity for  whom the audit was being made (Giant) used it for  a 
"proper business purpose." Acccording to the opinion, the defendants  should 
reasonably expect that their client would distribute the financial  statements 
pursuant to matters relating to its business, particularly given that there was no 
limitation in the accountants' opinion. The second requirement for  finding 
liability is justifiable  reliance. "Having inserted the audit in that economic 
stream" the defendants  should be responsible for  "their careless misrepre-
sentations to parties who justifiably  relied upon their expert opinions." 
Rosenblum is a frightening  spectre for  the profession.  At the same time as 
auditors are unable to secure reasonable insurance coverage, courts assume 
the fact  of  that coverage and extend liability even further. 39 
C.  The  Ultramares  Court  Speaks Again 
The New York Court of  Appeals had an opportunity to revisit the privity 
issue a little less than a year ago in Credit  Alliance Corporation  v. Arthur 
Andersen  & Co.,40 which considered two different  appeals by two different 
accounting firms.  In the Andersen  case, plaintiff  Credit Alliance and others 
were major financial  services companies which financed  the purchase of  capital 
equipment through installment sales or leasing agreements. They provided 
financing  to L.B. Smith (Smith), a "capital intensive enterprise that regularly 
required financing."  Plaintiff  began to insist in 1978 that Smith provide audited 
financial  statements as a pre-condition to further  loans. Smith provided its 
consolidated financial  statements for  the years 1976 and 1977 examined and 
reported upon by Andersen. In reliance on the statements, plaintiff  provided 
substantial loans to Smith. Plaintiff  continued to receive, rely, and lend on 
Smith's financial  statements in 1979. Smith petitioned for  bankruptcy in 1980 
while in default  to plaintiff  on several million dollars of  debt. 
Plaintiff  sued Andersen alleging negligence and fraud,  claiming Andersen 
knew or should have known that Smith was showing the statements to it for  the 
purpose of  obtaining loans. Andersen's motion to dismiss the negligence claim 
on privity grounds was denied in the lower court. The Appellate Division 
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affirmed,  finding  plaintiff  fit  into a narrow New York exception to the privity rule 
because the plaintiff  was a member of  the "limited class" entitled to rely on 
Andersen's report. The Court of  Appeals reversed the decision in favor  of 
Andersen. 
In the second case, European American Bank (EAB) sued the firm  of 
Strauhs & Kaye (S&K) because it made large loans to Majestic Electro 
(Majestic) beginning in 1979, allegedly in reliance upon interim and year-end 
financial  statements reported upon by S&K. S&K allegedly overstated Ma-
jestic's inventory and accounts receivable and did not disclose Majestic's poor 
internal controls. Majestic went into bankruptcy in 1983 after  defaulting  on the 
loans to EAB. EAB sued S&K, alleging negligence in auditing and that S&K 
was familiar  with the EAB-Majestic lending relationship and lending agree-
ments, including the fact  that EAB was receiving and relying upon the S&K 
audited financial  statements. Indeed, there were allegations that S&K and EAB 
representatives had been in direct oral and written communication during the 
entire course of  the lending relationship. On S&K's motion in the lower court, 
the complaint was dismissed for  lack of  privity. The Appellate Division reversed 
citing the direct communication between S&K and EAB—using a Restatement 
§ 552 approach—and observing that S&K specifically  knew EAB was relying on 
the financial  statements. The Court of  Appeals affirmed  in S&K's case. 
The Court of  Appeals reviewed the Ultramares  case and its rationale and 
reaffirmed  it as expounded upon. The court observed that some relationships 
are "so close as to approach privity" and that would be a sufficient  predicate 
for  finding  liability, thus the result in the EAB portion of  the case. The Court of 
Appeals focused  on the fact  that in Ultramares  the accountants only knew 
"generally" that third parties would see the report, and nothing had been said 
between auditor and client about who would see the reports "or the extent or 
number of  transactions in which they would be used." The court distinguished 
this situation from  one where the facts  bespeak "an affirmative  assumption of  a 
duty of  care to a specific  party, for  a specific  purpose, regardless of  whether 
there was a contractual relationship." It found  the Andersen case to fit  the 
Ultramares  type of  fact  pattern, while the S&K case fit  the latter situation. 
The Court of  Appeals set forth  a test for  guidance in determining whether 
auditors should be held liable to those not in privity: 
Before  accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncontractual 
parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial  reports, 
certain prerequisites must be satisfied:  (1) the accountants must have 
been aware that the financial  reports were to be used for  a particular 
purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance  of  which a known party or 
parties was intended to rely; and (3) some conduct on the part of  the 
accountants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the 
accountants' understanding of  that party or parties' reliance. 
The court observed that different  states had adopted different  standards in 
addressing the privity issue. Some like New Jersey and Wisconsin had thrown 
it out and extended liability to any third party who could be foreseen  to rely on 
the financial  statements. Others, like Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, Colorado 
and Kansas follow  a strict Ultramares  privity test. Still others use the 
Restatement approach. The New York Court of  Appeals explanation of  what 
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Ultramares  means and how liability may extend to third parties in appropriate 
factual  circumstances is certainly a reasonable, well-thought-out and refreshing 
consideration of  the issue. It is also another end of  the historical thread linking 
the development of  today's standards to the earlier precedents. 
IV. Where We Are Headed 
This paper has considered the historical development of  several facets  of 
auditor's responsibilities, standards and liabilities; the interplay between 
litigation, legislation and professional  standards; the broadening of  the auditor's 
responsibilities to its client even in the face  of  management's criminal 
activities; the overlay of  potential criminal liability to those who close their eyes 
to suspicious developments and attempt blindly to follow  GAAP; and, the 
incredible expansion of  third parties who have been held entitled to rely on 
financial  statements and to sue the auditor. It remains to consider what the 
future  may hold. It would be impossible to consider all ramifications  outside the 
context of  a textbook or a novel. 
In the ESM litigation referred  to supra, Alexander Grant is being sued for 
millions of  dollars in damages by numerous customers of  ESM including various 
municipalities from  around the country. The allegations of  the suits incorporate 
the expected common law negligence and fraud  claims, and securities law 
violations. They go further  and allege violations of  the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),41 that Alexander Grant participated 
with others through a "pattern of  racketeering activity" to use ESM as an 
enterprise to commit criminal acts. If  successful  in proving a RICO case, 
damages to which the plaintiffs  would be entitled would be trebled and could 
theoretically approach $1 billion. While the allegations of  ESM present a rather 
wide departure from  appropriate auditing and accounting standards, the 
spectre of  RICO liability for  auditors in connection with "garden variety 
securities fraud"  cases looms ahead. 
RICO was originally drafted  to stem the inroads by organized crime into 
legitimate businesses. It provides a civil suit remedy and has become a favorite 
of  the plaintiffs'  bar. Last summer accountants were hoping for  relief  when the 
Supreme Court decided Sedima  S.P.R.L.  v. Imrex  Co.42 Unfortunately,  the 
Court refused  to read RICO narrowly and ruled that its civil provisions could be 
applied to virtually all commercial disputes. Justice White acknowledged the 
problem, but observed that the cure "must lie with Congress." Congress, 
however, has shown no serious intention to amend RICO. Certainly, on the 
heels of  the ESM scandal and the media attention given to the E.F. Hutton 
overdrafting  system, the public has not indicated that it favors  a narrowing of 
RICO's targets to accept "legitimate businessmen" such as auditors. 
Even the foreign  judicial systems and lending agencies have caught the 
fever.  In an Australian case, Cambridge  Credit  Corp.  v. Hutcheson,  the auditors 
were found  liable for  a negligent audit and the plaintiff  was awarded approxi-
mately $100 million (an amount exceeding the audit firm's  assets as well as 
those of  its individual partners). In recent lawsuits in New York a foreign 
government, England, and at least ninety other plaintiffs  have sued Arthur 
Andersen in several federal  actions as a result of  the collapse of  John 
DeLorean's automobile venture. The suits allege securities violations as well 
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as RICO causes of  action, and request $270 million in damages to be trebled to 
nearly $800 million. The British government invested $120 million to finance 
DeLorean's Belfast,  Ireland factory. 
Andersen issued a clean opinion for  DeLorean Motor Company. The 
plaintiffs  allege that some of  their money was diverted through a Swiss bank 
account of  GPD Services, Inc. (a Panamanian company) to DeLorean's 
personal account. They claim as well that Andersen had ample knowledge of 
questionable transactions between GPD and DeLorean's company. The plain-
tiffs  suggest that Andersen workpapers indicate an awareness of  problems 
which should have brought the Natelli  "suspicious inquiry doctrine" into 
play.43 
Dramatic, albeit not quite as dramatic, mega-suits have evolved against 
auditors as a result of  the Penn Square National Bank and Drysdale Govern-
ment Securities scandals. The number of  such lawsuits is not likely to decline in 
the near future,  thus making it more difficult  for  auditors to obtain insurance. 
At the same time as these suits appear, our legislators in Washington 
continue to examine the conflict-of-interest  standards and other alleged 
deficiencies  of  the profession.  Representative John Dingell (D. Mich.) is 
chairman of  a House oversight subcommittee before  which witnesses have 
criticized the peer review system, the SEC's laxity in overseeing the 
profession,  and the fact  that audit client's management hire, fire,  and pay the 
auditor. The latter criticism allegedly makes auditors reluctant to report 
objectively on their client's financial  statements and/or to blow the whistle 
where appropriate. In addition, certain accounting treatments which are 
justifiable  under GAAP have been questioned. Dingell and some of  his 
witnesses are unhappy with the flexibility  afforded  under GAAP for  various 
methods of  depreciation, costing of  inventory, as well as for  alleged inconsis-
tency of  disclosure for  various accounting treatments. The subcommittee has 
been troubled by the issuance of  clean opinions just prior to financial  debacles 
which have made front  page news. 
The Dingell subcommittee required the Big Eight accounting firms  to 
submit detailed disclosure reports relating to litigation losses as well as to 
internal matters. As of  yet, Dingell shows no lack of  continued interest in 
pursuing the oversight hearings. Not even Washington insiders are sure where 
the subcommittee will end up. The ultimate questions, of  course, are: Will 
there be some form  of  more direct government regulation of  the practice? Will 
auditors be permitted to continue to practice in the scope of  practice which is 
currently enjoyed? Will more dramatic corporate governance mechanisms 
become the rule? 
Whatever the results of  the trends, the pattern is a continuum of  what has 
been happening in the profession  for  more than 80 years. The financial 
community's demand for  accurate financial  information  has grown, not abated. 
Auditors created a business for  themselves over the past 130 years of  fulfilling 
the marketplace's financial  information  needs. Indeed, the CPA's license is a 
franchise  to attest with respect to the market's financial  statements. That 
marketplace, as well as the regulators responsible for  oversight, had been 
allocating greater and greater responsibility—with attendant legal liability—to 
the profession.  In many cases the expansion was based upon a now obsolete 
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premise that the auditor could, in turn, assess that liability broadly through fee 
structure and insurance coverage. 
As the profession  faces  this challenge, several actions seem imperative. 
The profession  must reflect  upon standards which are unclear, ambiguous, or 
insufficient.  The wide  flexibility  favored  by George May is simply so out of  favor 
in several critical areas that it needs to at least be reexamined. The profession 
must be even more vigilant in applying the suspicious inquiry doctrine. Several 
more major financial  scandals where clean reports have been issued will only 
spur on the regulators and the plaintiffs'  bar. The profession  and its represen-
tatives must be media-conscious and take initiative to get its message to the 
public. It should perhaps explain the billions of  dollars of  financial  transactions 
which are successfully  audited year-in-and-year-out. It should lobby and 
communicate about the problems associated with RICO and the current use of 
the adverse interest analysis. But, the profession  is far  from  fatally  diseased. If 
history repeats itself,  it will make the appropriate accommodations and move 
forward. 
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Discussant's Response to 
" 'Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree' 
Accountants' Legal Liability— 
A Historical Perspective" 
Thomas A. Gavin 
The University of  Tennessee at Chattanooga 
Paul has done an excellent job of  developing the history of  accountants' 
legal liability. The message of  the paper is enhanced by his introduction of  some 
of  the cast of  characters who have helped shape the development of  the 
subject—from  the likes of  George May of  Price Waterhouse to Philip Musica, 
alias Frank Donald Coster, of  McKesson & Robbin's. 
My discussion of  the content of  Paul's paper will not address the factual 
settings which underlie the "landmark'' cases presented nor will it address the 
general description of  the all too well known tightening of  accountants' liability. 
Rather, my comments will be restricted to expanding some topics discussed by 
Paul and possibly taking issue with respect to a few. 
Whose Duty to Whom?—Some General Observations 
The author presents the expansion of  the role and responsibilities of  the 
public auditor as one resisted and fought  aggressively by auditors. Further-
more, he notes that "changes were frequently  the result of  litigation losses 
and/or government intervention.'' 
One might respond that the first  of  these observations is accurate but a 
realistic occurrance due in part to a rather young profession  trying to find  its 
way to maturity while at the same time attempting to avoid the risks that might 
abate the maturation process. The second comment about change resulting 
from  litigation could apply to many disciplines. Practicing professionals  do not 
allocate resources to develop procedures to prevent problems unless signifi-
cant problems exist or critical problems are perceived as imminent. Some 
might criticize this rather sympathetic response by stating that the accounting 
profession  has done too little too late. The Moss-Metcalf  and Dingell commit-
tees might be among those critics. 
Professionalism 
I believe the examination of  the legal liability of  accountants cannot be 
viewed as a single issue but must be couched in terms of  the degree or extent 
to which we view accounting as a profession.  The degree of  professionalization 
of  any occupation depends on how many of  the following  characteristics, and 
how much of  each, it possesses: 
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a) General, systematic knowledge. 
b) Authority over clients. 
c) Community rather than self-interest;  symbolic rather than monetary 
rewards. 
d) Self-control. 
e) Recognition by the public and law of  professional  status. 
f)  A distinctive culture. 
Eliot Friedson, on the other hand, contends that the sole defining  characteristic 
of  a profession  is its convincing of  the public and the state of  its right to self-
control over work-related matters (Ritzer, 1972). Students of  accounting 
history would have no problem seeing the relationship between all or part of 
these two definitions  of  a profession  and their own accounting profession. 
A State of  Change 
A seesawing relationship does exist between the development by CPAs of 
professional  auditing standards and the liabilities of  CPAs as public auditors to 
their clients and the public. This seesawing seems quite appropriate given the 
dynamic nature of  both the accounting profession  and our society's social-
economic structure. Organizations and institutions, including professions,  are 
expected to be responsive to the changing needs of  the society in which they 
operate. Unobservant, rigid, and less responsive organizations and professions 
go the way of  the dinosaur. 
Our mission should be to carry on a continuing dialogue with the users of 
our products and services in a positive, nonadversarial way. Unfortunately, 
much of  our profession's  highly publicized communication with users has been 
through their representatives, Moss-Metcalf  and more recently Dignell, and 
the judicial system. More has been written on the users' lack of  understanding 
of  accountants' products and service than has been written to address and 
overcome the problem. 
Sharing the Blame 
The author raises two issues about the responsibility of  employers for  the 
acts of  employees. The first  relates to adverse interest analysis. The second 
relates to the double standard held by the courts; CPA firms  appear to be held 
to a higher standard of  supervision for  their employees than do clients in 
supervising their employees. 
Fraud  or Poor Quality  Control 
Originally, the employer was responsible for  the acts of  his employee 
(agency theory—respondeat supervisor) when the latter acted beyond the 
scope of  employment (adverse to the interest of  the employer) if  the employer 
was "contributorily negligent" because of  failure  to avoid the loss by not 
exercising reasonable care in supervising employee(s). This standard was 
diluted by the "modified  contributory negligence test" which narrowed the 
employer's exposure to liability. The employer now must somehow contribute 
to the auditor's inability to detect the employee's fraud. 
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I would like to make two comments in response to what Paul has said about 
adverse interest analysis. First, as much attention as employees' fraud 
receives and as devastating as it is on employers (clients), the CPA firms,  and 
the shareholders, fraudulent  activities by employees account for  only a small 
percentage of  the accountants' liability problems. St. Pierre and Anderson 
undertook a study which showed that of  334 errors found  in 129 law cases 
examined, only 13 percent related to client (employee) fraud  while 33 percent 
and 15 percent related to problems interpreting accounting principles and 
auditing standards, respectively (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984). 
Second, the GAO recently issued a report stating that CPAs did not 
satisfactorily  comply with standards on 34 percent of  the governmental audits 
they performed,  and more than half  of  the unsatisfactory  audits had severe 
violations of  standards. Two prominent problems identified  were insufficient 
audit work in testing compliance with governmental laws and regulations and 
the evaluation of  internal accounting controls. Smaller CPA firms  had greater 
problems in complying with standards (GAO, 1986). One might conclude from 
the above discussion that CPAs have a problem with the professional  character-
istic of  "self-control"  as mentioned earlier in my remarks. 
Spotlight  on Management  and the Board 
Let's assume that material employee fraud,  regardless of  the small 
frequency  cited above, induces a state of  trauma for  the client, the public 
auditor, investors and creditors. Are we, as accountants, to accept the courts' 
shifting  of  burden to accountants with the formulation  of  the modified  contrib-
utory negligence test? I think not! Clearly, the courts and users have fallen  into 
the expectation gap, the area where perceived levels of  responsibility for  such 
things as fraud  detection and compilation and review services exceed the 
auditors' actual responsibility as expressed in professional  standards and 
determined by reasonable cost-benefit  considerations. We must educate all 
user groups including primary users such as investors and creditors, as well as 
the secondary user groups composed of  individuals in the judicial and legislative 
branches of  government. 
I do agree with the author that the courts have gone too far  in holding 
auditors more responsible than the client's management and board for  an 
employee's action that is clearly beyond the scope of  legal and reasonable 
business practice. Of  the four  most commonly identified  management functions 
of  planning, organizing, directing, and controlling, the courts seem to be 
overlooking the last of  the four  functions.  Broadly stated, controlling is the 
process by which managers determine whether organizational objectives are 
achieved and whether actual operations are consistent with plans. 
The four  management functions  are interrelated and should not be viewed 
as separate or discrete. All management functions  may be viewed within the 
context of  control systems with the following  objectives (IIA, 1978): 
1. reliability and integrity of  information; 
2. compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws and regulations; 
3. safeguarding  of  assets; 
4. economical and efficient  use of  resources; and 
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5. accomplishment of  established objectives and goals for  operations 
and programs. 
One might assume that the more effectively  these control objectives are 
achieved, the better the firm's  managment. 
Our socio-economic structure often  permits an inbalance, for  a certain 
period of  time, before  adjustments are subsequently induced to return to what 
society views as an equilibrium. Forces have been at work for  more than ten 
years to induce changes to check the undesirable behavior of  corporate 
managements and boards. These changes include: 
1. passage of  the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of  1977; 
2. adoption of  audit committees by many corporate boards; 
3. introduction and/or enhancement of  the internal audit function  in 
corporations; and 
4. the collapse of  the "good old boys" boardroom environment. 
Collectively, these four  changes have had, and will continue to have, a 
dramatic influence  on improving corporate accountability. An additional poten-
tial influence,  but one that has yet to produce benefits  because its work is not 
completed, is the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
Recently, the Commission's chairman, James C. Treadway suggested a 
mandatory expanded role for  internal auditors in some circumstances (IAA, 
1986). 
The items in the two previous paragraphs have heightened the independ-
ence and, in a general professional  sense, the authority of  the public auditor 
over the client. As a result, CPAs now have a stronger degree of  professional-
ism. 
Supervision  of  Staff 
Turning to Paul's comment on the double standard of  the court, i.e., CPA 
firms  appear to be held to a higher standard of  supervision for  their employees 
than do clients in supervising their employees. My response is: why not? 
Professionals  should be held to a higher level of  care than non-professionals. 
Firms that are members of  the AICPA Division of  CPA Firms are obligated 
to adhere to quality control standards promulgated by the institute. Quality 
control standards, among other things, call for  establishing policies and 
procedures for  supervising the work of  firm  personnel. Seven of  the nine 
elements of  quality control relate directly to firm  personnel (AICPA, 1986). 
The fact  that the profession  has taken such a step attests to the fact  that the 
profession  has attempted to meet its responsibility to society. Unfortunately, 
membership in the division is not mandatory for  all firms. 
A Matter of  Perspective 
Any discussion about expanding the classes of  plaintiffs  who should be 
permitted to be successful  in their suit against the auditor is always explosive. 
Discussants generally have a hard time balancing their own economic interests 
with the general social good. 
The courts, social commentators, and critics have had a hard time applying 
existing responsibility models to the accounting profession.  What other 
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profession  gets paid by the party with whom they contracted while the benefits 
of  that relationship flow,  in many cases, to their parties, aptly coined by Judge 
Cardoza, "an indeterminate class"? The courts have had difficulty  reconciling 
the amount of  the public auditor's responsibility with the amount of  loss 
suffered  by potentially great numbers of  people the public auditor himself 
admittedly intends the product of  his attest function  to serve. At the extreme, a 
judge, unfamiliar  with all of  the variables in play, might, after  reading Statement 
of  Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (FASB, 1978) think that public policy 
dictates that liability for  ordinary negligence be imposed on accountants for 
foreseeable  injuries resulting from  their negligent acts. 
The question is, are society's expectations realistic? Let's explore H. 
Rosenblum, Inc.  v. Adler,  one example that reflects  society's expectations 
through the pen of  the judge who wrote the opinion1. Although the author first 
discusses Citizens  State  Bank v. Timm,  Schmidt  & Co., Rosenblum, Inc.  v. 
Adler  is the initial case to hold accountants liable for  ordinary negligence to 
foreseeable  third parties. On the surface,  the logic underlying the New Jersey 
Supreme Court decision appears sound. However, it is flawed.  The author 
recounts the court's two-step process to determine the accountant's liability. I 
would like to use the same process but take a different  approach than the 
author in responding to the court. 
The court began "first,  we shall consider whether, in the absence of  privity, 
an action for  negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for  economic loss 
against the provider of  a service." The court continued: 
If  recovery for  defective  products may include economic loss, why 
should such loss not be compensable if  caused by negligent misrepre-
sentation? The maker of  the product and the person making a written 
representation with intent that it be relied upon are, respectively, 
impliedly holding out that the product is reasonably fit,  suitable and safe 
and that the representation is reasonably sufficient,  suitable and 
accurate. 
In response, I believe the differences  found  in the comparison made 
between a manufacturer's  product and a public auditor's opinion appear to far 
outweight the similarities. The manufacturer  controls, and is responsible for, 
the process by which the product is made as well as the product resulting from 
that process. Likewise, as pointed out earlier, the client controls, and is 
responsible for,  the adequacy of  the accounting process and its product. The 
public auditor, on the other hand, is charged to test management's assertions 
which are articulated in the financial  statements. A similar position is also held 
by Gormley and Minnow (Gormley, 1984; Minnow, 1984). 
The author then analyzes the court's second question—"what duty should 
the auditor . . . bear to best serve the public interest in light of  the role of  the 
auditor in today's economy?" The duty found  to exist must be equated with 
what is fair;  the analysis of  fairness  "involves a weighing of  the relationship of 
the parties, the nature of  the risks and the public interest in the proposed 
solution.'' 
In response, the courts judging fairness  in terms of  the objectives of 
financial  reporting mentioned earlier totally avoid addressing the broader issue 
which has given rise to the litigation explosion. It appears that the courts have 
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rejected the idea that when professionals  are working at the best of  their ability, 
within the concept of  the average prudent auditor, there are chance occur-
rences that may still befall  the client. The rejection of  this assumption leads the 
courts to accept the idea that all losses shall be borne by someone. This, in 
turn, leads to the notion that the deep pocket has no bottom; a fountain  of  funds 
for  all those who, by mere chance, have suffered  a loss. Courts in New Jersey, 
Wisconsin, and most recently California,  in International  Mortgage  Company v. 
John  P. Butler  Accounting Corporation,  view insurance as a readily available 
vehicle for  making the plaintiff  whole and have extended the accountant's 
liability to foreseeable  parties. Resultant insurance premium increases, the 
courts believe, can be passed along to all consumers. 
The insurance public policy argument has been successfully  employed in 
many other segments of  our society. So successful  has been its use that the 
insurance piggy bank is nearly empty. 
Between 1975 and 1984 product liability cases have increased 600 percent 
to approximately 10,500; suits against officers  and directors have increased 
more than 200 percent during the same time period (Samuelson, 1986). This 
significant  increase in liability cases is due primarily to the self  serving interests 
of  the members of  the Association of  Trial Lawyers, whose ranks tripled in the 
last 15 years to 60,000. This group has placed its own economic interests 
ahead of  the "public interest," or so many believe. A wave of  reforms  are 
under consideration in state capitals and Washington. In Washington, the 
Kasten bill limits the amount of  contingency-fee  lawyers can earn, and also 
restricts joint and several liability (WSJ, 1986). 
Summary and Conclusions 
Survival of  the profession  has and will continue to be measured in terms of 
the ability of  its members to adapt to changes in society. Change should be 
looked upon as an opportunity, an opportunity to serve, grow and mature. 
The application of  extending liability of  accountants to reasonably foreseea-
ble third parties will probably increase beyond the three states where it is now 
applied. The profession  can meet this challenge by aggressively pursuing: 
• A continuing dialogue with users of  financial  statements as to the role 
and responsibilities of  the external auditor, corporate management, 
and boards in the financial  reporting process. 
• Mandatory membership in the AICPA Division for  CPA Firms for  all 
firms. 
• A reasonable limitation, such as a multiple of  the annual audit fee,  on 
the amount of  liability extended to CPA defendants  and elimination of 
joint and several liability. 
End Notes 
1. 461 A 2d 138 (N.J. 1983) 
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An Assertion Based Approach To Auditing 
Donald A. Leslie 
Stephen J. Aldersley 
Donald J. Cockburn 
Carolyn J. Reiter 
Clarkson Gordon 
1. Some History And Introductory Comments 
It  is our contention that there is a theory of  auditing,  that there exist a 
number of  basic assumptions and  a body  of  integrated  ideas,  the 
understanding  of  which will  be of  direct  assistance in the development  and 
practice of  the art of  auditing.  Further,  it is our belief,  which we attempt  to 
support in the following  pages, that an understanding  of  auditing  theory 
can lead  us to reasonable solutions of  some of  the most vexing problems 
facing  auditors  today. 
Mautz  and  Sharaf 
The  Philosophy of  Auditing,  p. 1 
American Accounting Association, 1961 
It is interesting to note that this is the Silver Anniversary of  what is 
probably the most recognized pioneering work on auditing theory. It is a 
pleasure to have Bob Mautz with us today as a participant in Auditing 
Symposium VIII. 
The earliest reference  to the concept of  assertions that we could locate in 
the auditing literature can be found  in Chapter 5 of  Mautz and Sharaf.  After 
publication of  The  Philosophy  of  Auditing  by the American Accounting 
Association in 1961, the concept of  assertions appears to have gone into 
hibernation until 1973 when it made a brief  appearance in A Statement  of  BASIC 
AUDITING  CONCEPTS  [ASOBAC]. The definition  of  auditing provided in 
ASOBAC was: 
Auditing is a systematic process of  objectively obtaining and evaluating 
evidence regarding assertions about economic actions and events to 
ascertain the degree of  correspondence between those assertions and 
established criteria and communicating the results to interested users. 
In the early 1970s R.J. Anderson recognized the merits of  the assertion 
concept described by Mautz and Sharaf  and he organized the assertions by 
financial  statement component1 [assets, liabilities and income]. Figure 1, taken 
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Components of the Objective of Substantive Verification 
Income Components 
To provide reasonable assurance 
as to whether or not: 
To provide reasonable assurance 
as to whether or not. 
1. the reported assets really exist 
(existence); 
2. there are not other undisclosed 
assets (completeness); 
3. the enterprise really owns and 
has clear title to the 
reported assets (ownership); 
4. the assets are valued appropri-
ately and accurately (valuation); 
5. the assets are appropriately 
described and disclosed 
(presentation). 
the reported liabilities really 
exist (existence); 
there are not other undisclosed 
liabilities (completeness); 
the reported liabilities really 
incide on the enterprise and not 
on some other entity or person 
instead (incidence); 
the liabilities are valued 
appropriately and accurately 
(valuation); 
the liabilities are appropriately 
described and disclosed 
(presentation) . 
To provide reasonable assurance 
as to whether or not: 
the reported transactions really 
occurred (occurrence); 
there were not other, undisclosed 
transactions (completeness); 
the enterprise, and not some other 
entity or person instead, was 
really a party to the reported 
transactions (propriety); 
the income components are 
measured appropriately and 
accurately (measurement); 
the income components are appro-
priately described and disclosed 
(presentation). 
from  The  External  Audit  [Anderson, 1977], illustrates this structure. As the 
first  Chairman of  the CICA Auditing Standards Committee, Anderson was also 
instrumental in the CICA's decision to formally  recognize the assertion concept 
in its Handbook [Sections 5300.16-.21]. The commentary in Section 5300.17 
immediately following  a description of  the assertions states: 
The auditor seeks evidence with respect to these assertions primarily 
through the performance  of  substantive procedures. Obtaining evi-
dence relevant to one assertion, for  example, existence of  inventory, 
will not compensate for  failure  to do so for  another, for  example, its 
valuation. Some assertions will be virtually self-evident  to the auditor, 
for  example, the "valuation" of  cash, while others, such as the 
"completeness" of  accounts payable, may require extensive pro-
cedures. 
Section 5300.21 concludes the discussion of  assertions with the italicized 
statement: 
The  auditor  should  evaluate all  the evidence  he has obtained  and  assess its 
sufficiency  and  appropriateness.  He  should  consider  evidence  supporting 
and  evidence  refuting  an assertion  and  should  be alert  for  evidence 
supporting  one assertion  but inconsistent with that supporting  another. 
[Jan.  1978] 
The AICPA addressed financial  statement assertions in August 1980 when 
it issued SAS 31 on Evidential Matter [AU § 326.03 - .13]. Included in this 
statement is a section on "Use of  Assertions in Developing Audit Objectives 
and Designing Substantive Tests" which includes the following  sentence: 
In obtaining evidential matter in support of  financial  statement asser-




In the concluding paragraph of  SAS 31 under the heading "Evaluation of 
Evidential Matter" the Auditing Standards Board stated: 
In developing his opinion, the auditor should give consideration to 
relevant evidential matter regardless of  whether it appears to corrobo-
rate or to contradict the assertions in the financial  statements. To the 
extent the auditor remains in substantial doubt about any assertion of 
material significance,  he must refrain  from  forming  an opinion until he 
has obtained sufficient  competent evidential matter to remove such 
substantial doubt, or he must express a qualified  opinion or a disclaimer 
of  opinion. 
In January 1982, the International Auditing Practices Committee of  the 
International Federation of  Accountants issued International Auditing Guideline 
8 on Audit Evidence. The content of  IAG 8 is entirely consistent with the CICA 
and AICPA material on assertions. 
Although one can safely  conclude that the use of  an assertion based 
approach for  planning and evaluating an audit is in accordance with GAAS in 
both Canada and the United States, assertion based methodologies do not 
pervade either audit practice or audit literature. Most auditing books do little 
more than make reference  to SAS 31. It is not at all clear why the authors of 
such books appear to be reluctant to adopt the assertion concept. The answer 
may lie in the fact  that auditing firms  have also been very slow to integrate the 
concept into their audit approaches. Thus, academics in particular may be 
reluctant to produce a publication that is a step ahead of  practice for  fear  that it 
will be rejected by their peers who would prefer  to teach what they believe is 
the current common methodology. At this time, only two firms  in the US have 
exposed audit methodologies that utilize the assertion concept.2 
An important characteristic of  the assertion based methodology described 
in this paper [an "optional'' rather than "mandatory'' role of  internal control as 
a source of  assurance] is the subject of  the paper to be presented tomorrow 
morning by Thomas Bintinger. It would also appear that the role of  internal 
control in a GAAS audit may be addressed by the Auditing Standards Board of 
the AICPA. At its March 1986 meeting, the Board reviewed a significant  issues 
paper on the subject prepared by the staff.  The following  were among the 
issues identified: 
1. Should there be a separate field  work standard for  the study and 
evaluation of  internal control? Should the existing standard be 
incorporated into the other standards of  field  work? 
2. How should controls relevant to a financial  statement audit be 
defined  and classified?  How does an auditor relate internal controls 
to audit objectives? 
3. What should be the relationship between reliance on internal controls 
and substantive tests? To what extent can an auditor use internal 
controls to reduce substantive tests? 
4. Should a minimum study and evaluation of  internal controls be 
required in an audit of  financial  statements? If  so, what should the 
minimum be? Should there be a different  minimum study for  some 
(i.e., public) clients than for  others? 
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5. What should be the auditor's reporting responsibility for  his study 
and evaluation of  internal control performed  incident to his audit of 
financial  statements? 
The Board has instructed the staff  to proceed to develop the issues into a 
"concepts" paper that could then be used as a basis for  discussion. 
Mautz and Sharaf  [1961, p. 148] expressed very strong views on the role of 
internal control and they suggested that "a prudent practitioner will tend to 
give this phase of  the examination a full  measure of  emphasis." When one 
considers the ASB issues noted above, it becomes obvious that a consensus 
does not exist within the profession  as to the role of  internal control under 
GAAS. We look forward  to the discussion of  this critical issue by Symposium 
participants. 
Achieving The Audit Objective Is All That Really Matters 
In auditing, like many other aspects of  life,  achieving the objective is far 
more improtant than how it is done. In other words, it is the final  score that 
counts, not how the game is played. An analogy will serve to illustrate this 
point. Suppose that several individuals are in New York and all of  them would 
like to go to Philadelphia [their objective]. One might take a non-stop airplane 
flight  between the two cities while the second travels by train. The third might 
make the trip by bus and the fourth  by automobile. It would also be possible to 
make the trip by any combination of  airplane, train, bus or automobile. In fact, 
one could even go by boat. For each individual, the most important thing would 
be reaching the objective—Philadelphia. Each mode of  transportation could be 
judged on the basis of  its efficiency,  effectiveness  and economy in achieving the 
objective. 
An audit [provided that we agree on the objective] is no different.  Several 
practitioners could undertake the same audit and each could conduct the audit 
in a different  way and yet still comply with GAAS. Once again, the important 
point would be that each achieved the objective [to obtain reasonable assurance 
that the financial  statements "present fairly"  (do not contain a material error)]. 
While the audit fee  charged could vary significantly  from  auditor to auditor, that 
is not an issue that the profession  need concern itself  with provided that an 
agreed objective is being achieved by all participants. Over time, the market 
place should take care of  any significant  differences  in the "value for  money" 
being provided by practitioners. 
Finally, we wish to stress that we recognize that the approach to auditing 
described below is not the only way to achieve the objective of  an audit. We 
believe that the use of  different  audit methodologies, strategies, procedures 
and techniques throughout the profession  is a healthy situation. We offer  this as 
one alternative for  consideration. 
II. The External Audit Objective And The Elements Of  An 
Audit Strategy 
Financial  data  are mainly assertions of  intangible  facts.  Their  verification 
requires application of  the techniques and  methods  of  proof.  Proof  is apart 
of  the field  of  logic which has been described  by some as the "science of 
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proof."  Logic is concerned  with how we establish facts,  conclusions, and 
inferences  as valid  or invalid. 
Mautz and Sharaf,  p. 15 
While some might argue otherwise, the objective of  a financial  statement 
audit is to arrive at an opinion as to the fairness  (i.e. material correctness) of 
the client's financial  statements. There are probably as many ways of  achieving 
this objective as there are auditors but, by and large, they all tend to have 
similar characteristics (we all like to confirm  accounts receivable, vouch fixed 
assets, etc.) But what really distinguishes the good auditor is the type of 
questions he asks. We can all remember those auditors who asked something 
which, on the surface,  seemed so innocuous, but led to a revelation in terms of 
audit findings  when the client or, more likely, a third party responded. Asking 
good questions is the crux of  good auditing. 
At the outset, the auditor may address the financial  statement audit 
objective by asking two questions: 
1. What types of  error can materially affect  the financial  statements and 
what must I know to be satisfied  that these error types have not 
occurred? 
or 
2. What must I know to be able to conclude that the financial  statements 
are materially correct? 
Obviously, no auditor approaches audit planning by asking one of  the above 
questions to the exclusion of  the other. For example, when an auditor assesses 
inherent risk he must consider a question similar to the first  and when he plans 
his substantive procedures he often  focuses  on questions similar to the second. 
The real issue, therefore,  is not whether the auditor asks the first  or second 
question, but which question he emphasizes and at what level in the hierarchy 
of  his planning process he places that emphasis. 
In many cases, the audit strategy that follows  when emphasis is placed on 
answering the first  question will differ,  sometimes quite significantly,  from  that 
directed at answering the second question. While answering either of  the two 
questions properly will obviously lead to an adequate audit, there may be 
opportunities for  audit cost savings if  one option leads to selecting less costly 
audit procedures than the other. Our view is that an auditor who emphasizes 
the second question has a better chance of  selecting the most efficient 
combination of  procedures. In this paper we will focus  on the audit strategy that 
follows  from  that question. 
In the next three sections, we examine the three main elements of  an audit 
strategy: 
1. The sources of  audit assurance (See section III below) 
2. The links between each of  the financial  statement item assertions 
and the relevant procedures (See section IV below) 
3. The interrelationships among the financial  statement items (See 
section V below). 
These elements recognize that, in order to conclude as to the material 
correctness of  the financial  statements, the auditor must obtain reasonable 
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assurance with respect to the material correctness of  each of  the assertions for 
each financial  statement item. Although their application is likely to differ,  these 
elements do not change in any significant  way if  we were to adopt the first  of 
the above questions as our basic strategy. 
III. Audit Sampling, The Audit Risk Model And The Elements 
Of  An Audit Strategy 
The  auditor  requires evidence  in order  that he may rationally  judge  the 
financial  statement  propositions submitted  to him. To  the extent that he 
makes judgments  and  forms  his "opinion"  on the basis of  adequate 
evidence,  he acts rationally  by following  a systematic or methodical 
procedure;  to the extent that he fails  to gather  "sufficient  competent 
evidential  matter"  and  he fails  to evaluate it effectively,  he acts irrationally 
and  his judgments  can have little  standing. 
Mautz  and  Sharaf,  p. 68 
The essential features  of  the audit risk model, and its relationship to audit 
sampling, can be found  in the auditing literature in the 1930's and 1940's. For 
example, the principles underlying the second field  work standard of  generally 
accepted auditing standards, which permits a reduction in the extent of  testing 
conditional on the quality of  internal control, can be found  in auditing textbooks 
written over 40 years ago: 
In this day and age, when a business has a good bookkeeping system 
and a good system of  internal check, a test audit, which efficiently 
samples the transactions throughout a period, is about as detailed an 
audit as one would expect to find. 3 
While this quotation was written in the context of  comparing what we now 
call judgmental sampling to a detailed or 100 percent audit, and hence is only 
partly relevant to today's environment, it nonetheless represents an important 
trade-off  between the two fundamentally  different  types of  audit evidence. It is 
implicit in the statement that the preferred  form  of  evidence in terms of  quality 
would be the detailed audit. However, the additional quality of  this form  of 
evidence was (and is) not always worth the additional cost if  it was possible to 
place reliance on internal control and audit a sample. The reduction in quality in 
making the trade-off  was not considered significant  and was implicitly recog-
nized in the extent of  testing that became customary.4 
The increased use of  statistical sampling methods in auditing5 has brought 
with it the need to be more explicit in the related audit planning decisions. 
Proper planning of  statistical audit samples requires an explicit recognition of 
the desired sampling precision and the sampling risk. While it is not quite so 
simple, the sampling precision will be determined largely by materiality 
considerations which leaves sampling risk as the controllable variable.6 It is the 
sampling risk that is influenced  by the availability of  alternative forms  of  audit 
evidence. 
Over time, auditors have developed formal  (and informal)  methods of 
analyzing the effect  on sampling risk of  the strength of  internal control and 
other audit procedures such as analytical review. This led to the audit risk 
model. 
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The audit risk model has taken on a variety of  different  forms  over the past 
twenty years. The AICPA's SAP 54 model published in 1972 is a discrete joint 
risk model in which the audit risk is expressed as the product of  the internal 
control risk and the substantive testing risk. Teitlebaum [1973] illustrated the 
Bayesian approach to the audit risk model and the pre-audit sample concept of 
defining  priors. The SAP 54 model was subsequently extended by Stringer 
[1975] to explicitly recognize analytical review risk separate from  the substan-
tive sampling risk. Anderson [1977] presented audit sampling using an audit 
risk model which explicitly recognized the role of  inherent risk together with 
the Bayesian interpretation [illustrated by Teitlebaum] in an auditing context. 
Anderson's approach is further  described in Leslie, Teitlebaum and Anderson 
[1979] and in the CICA's Extent of  Audit Testing Research Study [1980]. 
The logical evolution of  the Anderson-CICA model is presented in Leslie 
[1984, 1985] in which the effect  of  preventive internal controls is distinguished 
from  the effect  of  detective internal controls. (The essential Bayesian character 
of  inherent risk assessment is also clarified  in Leslie's paper.) The conditional 
dependency of  the existence of  preventive internal controls on inherent risk 
leads to the prior probability of  error concept. The audit risk model we shall 
consider here is an adaptation of  Leslie's model. 
Our discussion has focused  on a risk-based approach directed at determin-
ing substantive sampling risk. Anderson [1977, p. 130] introduced the degree 
of  assurance concept as the complement of  the combined component risks (i.e. 
inherent, control, and audit7). By recognizing the complement of  each of  the 
individual component risks, we introduce the source of  assurance concept and 
the assurance-based approach to auditing. 
The shift  from  a risk-basis to an assurance-basis is, on the surface,  not a 
dramatic step nor is it anything fundamentally  new. In fact,  some firms  have 
been using the risk-complement approach of  recording their risk assessments 
for  years.8 Our move to this approach was originally made because it was 
considered easier to use than the risk-based approach. However, the shift  has 
the potential for  facilitating  a significant  shift  in philosophical attitudes towards 
auditing. In the previous section we presented two alternative auditor ques-
tions from  which an audit strategy could be derived. The first  question asked 
"what can go wrong" and proceeds along a risk-based approach whereas the 
second question asked "how could the auditor know something was correct'' 
and proceeds using a proof-based  thinking process. The risk-complement 
(source of  assurance) approach can be effectively  applied under a risk-based 
philosophy, but its full  potential is only realized under an assurance-based 
philosophy. 
Under the risk-based philosophy, the extent of  detailed testing is viewed as 
a focus  for  the risk analysis and the effect  of  each risk assessment is either to 
increase or decrease the testing extent. The approach requires an analysis of 
the possible causes of  error and then an assessment of  the chance of  each type 
of  error occurring. This necessarily leads the auditor to invest time and effort 
into reviewing and evaluating the internal control system because the system 
will be a major factor  in the assessed risks. There is no doubt that this risk-
based approach is effective  and, for  the most part, efficient.  Indeed, our firm 
has been using this approach since the 1960's9 and during the last five  years 
has moved more towards the assurance-based alternative. 
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The philosophical argument supporting the assurance-basis states that it is 
generally more persuasive and efficient  to establish the general validity of  an 
assertion than it is to enumerate the possible ways the assertion could be 
incorrect and then check each of  these possibilities. Thus, in an assurance-
based approach, the material correctness of  a particular financial  statement 
item assertion is an implicit hypothesis for  which the auditor selects a 
combination of  sources of  assurance which may support the hypothesis. The 
combination is chosen within the constraints of  available assurance (e.g. poor 
internal controls provide no assurance) to achieve the objective in the least 
costly way. 
The audit assurance model we use, therefore,  consists of  the following 
principal components: 
Inherent nature of  the item • the complement of  inherent risk, 
which is defined  in the usual way. 
Preventive internal controls • As explained in Leslie et al.[1979] 
and in Leslie [1984,1985], preven-
tive internal controls are related to 
the level of  inherent risk. The 
greater the inherent risk, the 
greater the need for  preventive 
controls and conversely. The com-
bined assessment of  inherent risk 
and preventive internal controls is 
referred  to as the prior proba-
bility of  error. 
• The assurance from  compliance 
procedures is related to the exist-
ence of  suitable preventive inter-
nal controls and helps support the 
assessment of  prior probability of 
error. 
Detective internal controls • Detective internal controls are ap-
plied subsequent to the processing 
of  data and increase the likelihood 
of  detecting any errors which may 
have occurred and hence supports 
the assessment of  prior probability 
of  error. (Compliance procedures 
on detective controls are part of 
the detective internal control iden-
tification  process.) 
Analytical review • The degree of  assurance from 
analytical review depends upon 
whether a judgmental or regres-
sion analysis-based analytical re-
view is being conducted. For 
regression analysis-based ana-
lytical review, the assurance level 
is determined primarily by the 
Compliance procedures (applied 
to preventive controls) 
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software  whereas in the case of 
judgmental analytical review the 
assurance level depends upon the 
quality of  the analytical review as 
assessed on a judgmental basis. 
Other substantive sources • These sources include substantive 
sampling together with other non-
sampling substantive procedures. 
In addition to the above sources of  assurance, the approach also permits the 
explicit recognition of  assurance from  audit procedures directed at other 
financial  statement assertions as explained below in section V. A practical 
illustration of  the above assurance matrix structure is presented in Figure 2 
which shows a Source of  Assurance Plan for  a particular financial  statement 
assertion. Note the various minima and maxima and the highlighting of  the prior 
probability of  error. The risk-complements are recorded using Poisson factors 
(-ln  β) which, for  purposes of  acceptability by our practitioners, we have 
called assurance factors. 
One aspect of  the use of  the assurance-based approach in contrast to the 
risk-based approach is the psychological effect  of  expressing the various 
assessments using the positive rather than negative  perspective. The positive 
approach also facilitates  discussion of  testing extents and related assurance 
levels with clients who find  it easier to understand that a procedure is adding 
assurance rather than reducing risk. 
Technical Interlude: Inherent Risk, Smoke, and Fire 
In the above discussion, the role of  compliance testing was mentioned only 
briefly.  From the source of  assurance plan it is apparent that compliance 
procedures, which may include sampling, are directed at supporting the 
assessment of  the assurance from  preventive internal controls. Our approach 
to compliance testing has been based upon Dollar-unit sampling and makes an 
explicit assumption as to the relationship between the frequency  of  compliance 
deviations and the occurrence of  monetary errors. The approach assumes a 
three-to-one ratio between smoke  (i.e. compliance deviations) and fire  (i.e. 
monetary error). This assumption has been discussed extensively by Leslie 
[1985]. In this technical interlude, we introduce a model which indicates that 
the actual ratio is dependent upon the inherent risk. 
Consider a transaction stream of  sales invoices totalling $1,000,000 in 
which all invoices are $1 and are either correct or 100 percent overstated, i.e. 
the customer should not have been charged at all. Materiality is $30,000 and 
the invoice pricing process is such that for  this audit year, the sales stream has 
a 20 percent error rate before  the effect  of  preventive internal controls. 
Suppose the client has an independent price-check control procedure which is 
100 percent effective  when it is applied to a particular invoice and the only 
method of  determining whether the checking procedure is applied is to examine 
the invoice. The issue is to determine the extent of  compliance test that is 
necessary in order to have 80 percent confidence  that a material error is not 
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Let r be the rate of  compliance deviations. Assuming the inherent error is 
evenly distributed throughout the population and the compliance deviations 
also occur evenly, the expected net error rate after  the application of  controls is 
.2r. To meet our audit objective, we must compliance test so that there is only 
a 20 percent chance that .2r >$30,000/1,000,000 where r is the upper limit of 
compliance deviations at an 80 percent confidence  level. Using discovery 
sampling, the Poisson factor  for  80 percent is 1.61 and hence the sample size is 
1.61/(.03/.2) or 11 items. This compares with a sample size of  1.61 x-
1,000,000/(3 x 30,000) or 18 when a 3:1 ratio assumption is used. Obviously, in 
this example, the actual ratio of  compliance deviations to monetary errors is 5:1 
(i.e. 1/20 percent). Applying similar reasoning to the general case in which the 
inherent error rate is p, the actual ratio of  compliance deviations to monetary 
errors will be 1/p. Thus, if  the population had a 10 percent inherent error rate, 
then a 10:1 ratio would be satisfactory  whereas a 50 percent inherent error rate 
would need a 2:1 ratio. 
Obviously this example is extremely simplified,  not only in the specific  audit 
context but more importantly in the somewhat naive statistical approach taken. 
A more realistic model might use a Bayesian approach for  inherent risk but 
would certainly need a more probabilistic approach to the distribution of 
monetary errors and of  compliance deviations. Nonetheless, the example 
serves as an indication that in high inherent risk situations (i.e. when high 
inherent error rates are more likely) the ratio of  compliance deviations to 
monetary errors will probably be lower than if  the inherent risk were less. 
More research into this issue seems warranted. 
IV. Assertions And The Links To Internal Control Procedures 
And Audit Procedures: Procedure Packages 
Auditing  is concerned  with the verification  or testing  of  financial  state-
ments and  similar data.  Such data  consists of  a series of  assertions. . . . 
The  total  number of  assertions included  in a set of  financial  statements  is 
considerable,  but our interest  here is in the essential  nature of  these 
propositions, not in their number. 
Mautz  and  Sharaf,  p. 79 
In the previous section we described the source of  assurance concept 
which categorizes audit procedures by the nature of  the audit evidence they 
provide. As was noted, the assurance sources are organized by financial 
statement assertion which makes the linking of  procedures (both internal 
control procedures performed  by the client and audit procedures performed  by 
the auditor) to assertions, a key element of  an assertion-oriented audit 
strategy. This linking deals with the relevance aspect of  the audit evidence 
that is obtained. 
For example, a numeric continuity internal control procedure on work 
orders is relevant to the revenue completeness assertion as is the audit 
procedure of  comparing paid service personnel hours with service revenue. 
Similarly, the internal control procedure of  checking invoice pricing is relevant 
to revenue measurement as is the audit procedure of  testing invoice pricing. 
These are examples of  procedures linked to transaction stream assertions 
[revenue completeness and revenue measurement]. 
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Internal control procedures are generally linked to transaction streams and 
not balance sheet items, as the latter are usually residuals of  the netting of  the 
underlying transaction streams. For example, the accounts receivable balance 
is the residual of  the revenue and cash receipts streams. An exception to this is 
inventory when the inventory balance is derived from  the inventory count and 
not from  the underlying transaction streams, purchases and cost of  goods sold. 
In this case the client may have controls over the count such as a second 
employee checking the count figures,  an example of  an internal control 
procedure directed at a balance sheet item. 
Audit procedures may be linked to transaction stream assertions or to 
balance sheet item assertions. An example of  the latter would be inventory 
pricing tests, an audit procedure relevant to inventory valuation. 
The linking of  procedures to assertions is usually straightforward.  How-
ever, there are some twists. For example, a particular procedure may be 
relevant to more than one financial  statement item assertion as is the case with 
a receivables circularization, an audit procedure which is relevant for  both the 
existence assertion and the valuation assertion (with respect to overstatements 
and, to a much lesser extent, with respect to understatements). 
The above discussion has focused  on individual procedures. However, what 
is normally required is a package of  procedures which jointly provide evidence 
relevant to a particular assertion. For example, the receivables circularization 
must be accompanied by adding the receivables trial balance and reconciling it 
to the general ledger in order to properly address the existence assertion. 
Similarly, when looking at internal control procedures to place reliance on 
internal control, the auditor considers a package of  procedures. The package of 
procedures must be complete in the sense that the appropriate environmen-
tal controls are present (for  example, controls over program maintenance, 
master file  changes, proper segregation of  duties) and the package of  controls 
covers all steps in the accounting process, from  initiation to the final  recording 
in the general ledger. For example, the package of  internal control procedures 
relevant to revenue measurement would not only include the checking of 
invoice pricing but also controls over the master price lists and the recording of 
invoices in the revenue journal. 
In principle, the link between assertions and procedures can be followed  in 
either direction, from  assertions to procedures or procedures to assertions. 
The audit strategy described here is driven by assertions and thus the link is 
made from  assertions to procedures. Alternative audit methodologies which 
make the link from  procedures to assertions are procedures-driven. In these 
latter methodologies, assertions are recognized but are not the driving 
force  behind the audit planning. In our practice we believe the assertion-
driven methodology has some advantages over the alternative because it asks 
the question why before  deciding how. It is more flexible  since the auditor can 
plan to select, using a source of  assurance plan within the constraints of  the 
situation, the most economical combination of  procedures packages that are 
relevant for  each assertion. 
One aspect of  the above flexibility  is the non-mandatory nature of  a review 
and evaluation of  internal control. An auditor would still carry out a review of 
the internal control environment and obtain knowledge of  the client's account-
ing systems (this is consistent with the minimum level of  review of  internal 
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control as described in SAS 43) but a review of  internal control procedures 
packages would only be carried out for  those internal control procedures 
packages on which the auditor intends to rely. 
This approach to internal control is consistent with emphasizing the second 
question in section II at the strategic planning level. If  the first  question had 
been emphasized, the auditor would normally require a review of  the specific 
internal control packages to identify  where in the process errors could  occur. 
Using the assertion-oriented approach at the strategic planning level permits 
the strategy decision to be made before  the auditor applies the "what can go 
wrong'' approach at the detailed level. 
Technical Interlude: Internal Control in the Audit 
Environment 
As can be seen from  the preceding discussion, internal control is treated as 
one of  a number of  sources of  assurance for  the auditor. There are two 
implications of  looking at internal control in this way. The first  is that the auditor 
should review and evaluate internal controls only when it helps to achieve the 
audit objective (obtaining sufficient  appropriate/competent audit evidence) in 
the most cost-effective  way possible. The second is that the auditor should 
review and evaluate internal controls when it is necessary in order to achieve 
the audit objective, i.e., when the only reliable method of  obtaining sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence requires the auditor to look to internal control as a 
major source of  assurance. This latter case arises most frequently  when the 
auditor is concerned about the completeness assertion—for  example, com-
pleteness of  deposits in a deposit taking institution. Looking at internal control 
in this way flows  logically from  the question "What must I know to be able to 
conclude that the financial  statements are materially correct?" 
Viewing internal control in this way also logically leads to the view that the 
second examination (field  work) standard can be eliminated from  generally 
accepted auditing standards. Auditing is an audit evidence gathering process. 
The review and evaluation of  internal control is one part of  this process. It can 
be subsumed within the existing third examination (field  work) standard—the 
audit evidence standard. 
V. Interrelationships Among the Financial Statement Items 
Part of  an auditor's  task  is to recognize the subsidiary  assertions 
contained  within any financial  statement  propositions. Only if  these are 
identified  can evidence  be obtained  to support or contradict  each one. 
Failure  to identify  all  subsidiary  propositions is failure  to recognize the full 
scope of  the audit  problem. This  in turn makes the obtaining of  adequate 
evidence  and  fully  rational  judgment  most unlikely. 
Mautz  and  Sharaf,  p. 104 
The third element of  the assertion-oriented audit strategy is a structure 
which takes into account the interrelationships among the financial  statement 
item assertions that arise from  the accounting model. The recognition of  the 
interrelationships is crucial in the development of  a cost-effective  audit 
strategy. Needless to say, the basic accounting interrelationships here amount 
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to elementary bookkeeping concepts and can be found,  in one form  or another, 
in any practical audit approach. 
The starting point for  identifying  the interrelationships are the accounting 
cycles (e.g. sales/receivables/receipts, purchases/payables/payments). Look-
ing at the accounting cycle, sales/receivables/receipts, the relationship be-
tween the accounting cycle components can be expressed in the form  of  a 
simple arithmetic equation: 
Receivables (beginning of  year) + Revenues (during the year) 
- Cash receipts (during the year) = Receivables (end of  year)* 
* prior to considering bad debt provision and write-offs. 
Given the above relationship, it seems obvious that procedures addressing 
the assertions related to the transaction streams—revenue and cash receipts-
should also provide assurance with respect to the assertions related to the 
receivables and vice versa, procedures addressing receivables' assertions 
should also provide assurance with respect to the underlying transaction 
stream assertions. 
To account for  the assurance from  the procedures in an appropriate 
manner, the auditor needs to link transaction stream assertions to the related 
balance sheet item assertion. This can be readily accomplished by considering, 
for  each transaction stream assertion, what balance sheet item assertion would 
be affected  if  the transaction stream assertion was not supported. For 
example, consider revenue -occurrence. The impact of  a revenue - occurrence 
error on the balance sheet item accounts receivable would be the recording of  a 
non-existent receivable balance and therefore  revenue - occurrence is linked to 
receivables - existence. Similarly, if  all cash receipts were not recorded (i.e. 
cash receipts - completeness error), then again this would result in non-
existent receivables balances. Therefore,  cash receipts - completeness is 
linked to receivables - existence. Links between all transaction stream 
assertions and related balance sheet item assertions can be established in a 
similar manner. The following  simple rules may be used as a shortcut to 
correctly identify  the links. 





Related Transaction Stream 
Assertions 
Measurement. 
Occurrence if  transaction increases 
balance sheet account. 
Completeness if  transaction decreases 
balance sheet account. 
Completeness if  transaction increases 
balance sheet account. 
Occurrence if  transaction decreases 
balance sheet account. 
An auditor would consider the interrelationships among the financial 
statement item/transaction stream assertions in developing an audit strategy 
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which produces a cost-effective  combination of  procedure packages. For 
some assertions, the greater part of  the assurance required may be obtained 
from  procedure packages linked to the balance sheet item assertion whereas, 
for  other assertions, the greater part of  the assurance required may be 
obtained from  procedure packages linked to the transaction stream assertions. 
For example, in many situations the greater part of  the assurance required with 
respect to receivables - existence is obtained from  the receivables circulariza-
tion whereas the greater part of  the assurance required with respect to 
receivables - completeness is obtained from  audit procedures, and control 
procedures, directed at revenue - completeness and cash receipts - occur-
rence. 
An important consequence of  these accounting interrelationships is their 
effect  on the audit assurance that is applicable to a particular financial  statement 
assertion. For example, the audit assurance on accounts receivable - existence 
will depend, in part, upon the assurance on revenue - occurrence and on cash 
receipts - completeness. However, since an existence error in accounts 
receivable could arise from  either the revenue stream or the cash receipts 
stream, the combined assurance from  sources directly connected with the 
related streams that is applicable to accounts receivable - existence cannot 
exceed the minimum assurance from  either of  the two related streams. This 
particular consequence is the main result of  recognizing the effect  of  accounting 
interrelationships. In our experience, its effect  has been somewhat less than 
explicit in many existing audit strategies. [See Appendix A for  A BAYESIAN 
MODEL FOR COMBINING INFORMATION.] 
VI. Audit Evaluation As The Start Of  The Planning Process 
Because the auditor  determines  the type of  audit  evidence  pertinent  to his 
needs,  then collects  that evidence,  and  finally  uses it in arriving  at 
judgments,  it behooves him to take  special precautions in reviewing it for 
pertinence, credibility,  and  usefulness. 
Mautz  and  Sharaf,  p. 106 
Planning an audit is like planning anything else. If  you do not have a 
reasonably clear notion of  where you are going, then you should not be 
surprised at where you end up. But to know where you end up, you have to be 
able to determine where you are at a point in time. Audit evaluation is how the 
auditor determines the state of  his opinion on the client's financial  statements, 
i.e., where he is at a point in time. 
Audit evaluation is multi-dimensional. On the one hand, the auditor deals 
with the concept of  materiality and its relationship to the errors (or departures 
from  generally accepted accounting principles) in the financial  statements while 
on the other hand the auditor must deal with the degree of  assurance he has in 
his audit opinion. This multi-dimensional viewpoint is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Thus, an audit evaluation consists of  an estimate or projection of  the error 
in the client's financial  statements together with some perception or measure 
of  the degree of  assurance that the auditor has with respect to the estimate. 
The former  depends primarily on the actual error in the client's financial 
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(In assurance factors) 
Our approach for  summarizing the errors on an audit focuses  on their effect 
on pre-tax income but also recognizes their effect  on the rest of  the financial 
statements. The achieved10 degree of  assurance is summarized on the various 
source of  assurance plans. The combined effect  of  these two evaluations is the 
maximum possible error in pre-tax income which includes the SAS 47 concept 
of  an allowance for  further  undetected error in addition to the most likely error. 
Given this approach to audit evaluation, the planning process involves impor-
tant judgments as to a reasonable materiality level and an indication of  the 
desired overall degree of  assurance for  the auditors' opinion. We have not 
introduced anything new in this section because the approach we use for 
dealing with audit evaluation is already described in existing literature.11 
VII. Operationalizing The Elementary Concepts In A Practical 
Audit Methodology 
Audit  evidence  is obtained  through  the application of  the basic audit 
techniques in the form  of  procedures  designed  to fit  the specific  situation. 
Mautz  and  Sharaf,  p. 100 
The various audit methodology components we have discussed in the last 
four  sections can be found  in the structure of  any practical and effective  audit 
strategy. They do not represent a fundamentally  new discovery, but they do 
represent a way of  thinking about the audit process that has the potential for 
changing the perspective some auditors take in their work. 
For example, an auditor who follows  a risk-based strategy would view the 
audit of  accounts receivable-existence along the lines shown in Figure 4. The 
two transaction streams, sales and cash receipts, would be audited during the 







and the accounts receivable-existence assertion would have been audited 
during the balance sheet or financial  statement audit. This customary division of 
the audit process into two stages separates the often  complex internal control 
system components from  the comparatively simpler balance sheet accounts. 
The perspective we have described in the previous sections attaches 
assertions to the transaction streams in the diagram (i.e. sales-occurrence and 
cash receipts-completeness) and then organizes the various sources of  as-
surance (or risk elements, if  the risk-based approach is preferred)  according to 
their relevance to the particular assertions. Instead of  burying the complexity 
of  the client's business in an interim audit file,  in which the links to the financial 
statement assertions may be difficult  to identify,  even when reviewed by the 
audit partner, the essential structural complexity of  the client's business 
operation is brought forward  and highlighted as an integral part of  the audit 
process. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
The shift  we are making is therefore  not merely to introduce some new 
terminology or to call risk by another name. We are shifting  our audit thinking 
to a more comprehensive level that deals with each of  the sources of  assurance 
in a consistent manner. In order to make practical use of  this audit methodol-
ogy, we need to deal with the now more visible complexity. 
A large portion of  the complexity in the planning process is due to the effect 
of  the interrelationships among the financial  statement items' assertions (see 
section V). This aspect can be simplified  (and ultimately automated) through an 
audit strategy structure which permits the use of  some simple rules based on 
accounting cycles. 
The first  simplification  is to achieve some parsimony in the planning 
process. This can be accomplished if  the audit strategy is organized so that 
each accounting cycle is included once and only once. The auditor would start 
out by listing the derived components. The derived component12 of  an 
accounting cycle is the component for  which the value is derived from  the 
netting of  the related components. In other words, the derived component is an 
image of  the net results of  its related components at a point in time (e.g. 
receivables usually represents the netting of  revenue less cash receipts at a 
point in time). 
Balance sheet items will usually fall  under this definition,  whereas income 
statement items and other transaction streams such as cash receipts will not.13 
Double-entry accounting ensures that an accounting cycle will always include 
one and only one derived component and therefore  organizing the audit 
strategy by the derived components ensures that each accounting cycle is 
included once and only once. 
The prior probability of  error and the effect  of  internal control on the audit 
assurance is relevant only to the generating components of  the accounting 
cycle, i.e. those components which are not derived. The generating compo-
nents determine the value of  the derived component. Because of  its residual 
balance nature, the sources of  assurance for  a derived component do not 
directly include the prior probability of  error or the assurance provided by 
internal controls. Typically, generating components involve transaction streams 
such as sales and cash receipts. For controls such as safeguarding  inventory, it 
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assertion. This arises when planning for  an inventory roll-forward  situation 
since the inventory balance is derived and cost of  goods sold is generating. 
The audit planning process can then focus  on an accounting cycle's derived 
component for  a detailed analysis of  the assurance sources in the components 
of  the accounting cycle which affect  the derived component. To perform  this 
analysis the auditor would, for  each derived component assertion, identify  the 
related generating component assertions along the lines given in section V. For 
example, for  the sales/receivables/receipts cycle the following  relationships 
would be identified: 
Derived Component Assertions Related Generating 
Component Assertions 
Receivables - Existence/Ownership Revenue - Occurrence 
Cash receipts - Completeness 
Receivables - Completeness Revenue - Completeness 
Cash receipts - Occurrence 
Receivables - Valuation14 Revenue - Measurement 
Cash receipts - Measurement 
As explained in section V, assurance may be obtained from  a combination of 
procedure packages addressing transaction stream assertions (usually generat-
ing component assertions) and balance sheet item assertions (usually derived 
component assertions.) In principle, the auditor could directly plan to obtain the 
required overall level of  assurance on each of  the derived component 
assertions for  the entire audit. However, from  our discussions of  accounting 
interrelationships, this would clearly involve a considerable amount of  duplica-
tion and would be unduly complicated. In some cases overauditing may occur 
whereas in others there may be some underauditing. The solution is to employ 
the following  direction of  assurance rules in the development of  the audit 
strategy. 
If  the derived component assertion is: 
1. asset — existence/ownership 
2. liability — completeness 
3. expense — occurrence 
or 
4. revenue — completeness 
a Source of  Assurance Plan [SAP] will be set up whereby the 
assurance required from  procedure packages directed at the derived 
component assertion will be reduced by the minimum of  the assurance 
from  sources directed at the related generating component assertions. 
If  the derived component assertion is other than one of  the four  listed 
above, no procedures directed at the derived component assertion will 
be planned. Instead, all the required assurance will be obtained from 
audit plans providing overall assurance with respect to each of  the 
related generating component assertions. If  the related generating 
component is already included on another audit plan then no further 
planning is required for  that related generating component assertion. 
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By following  these direction of  assurance rules throughout the entire 
audit plan, it can be shown that: 
1. The assurance required from  procedures directed at a derived 
component assertion is reduced by the minimum assurance obtained 
from  procedures directed at the related generating component 
assertions. 
2. The assurance obtained from  procedures directed at the derived 
component assertion also provides the same level of  assurance with 
respect to each of  the related generating component assertions. 
[See Appendix B for  a proof  of  this DIRECTION OF AS-
SURANCE THEOREM] 
Continuing with the example of  receivables and following  the direction of 
assurance the following  plans would be required: 
1. receivables — existence 
2. revenue — completeness 
3. revenue — measurement 
Cash receipts - occurrence and measurement would be addressed by the cash 
plans. An example of  a receivables-existence SAP is shown in Figure 6. Note 
Figure 6 
52 
how the generating components play an explicit role here when the plan is 
directed at a derived component. (The SAP in Figure 2 is for  generating 
components only.) 
Obviously, if  the above approach was followed  for  all accounting cycles in a 
client's business, the number of  components and plans would likely be 
unmanageable. To simplify  the process, we categorize accounting cycles as 
major (i.e., with a material amount and a large number of  transactions) and as 
minor. The above process is applied to the major accounting cycles. For the 
minor accounting cycles such as prepaids and long-term debt (in some cases), 
the auditor usually employs a package of  substantive procedures directed at the 
derived component assertions without performing  a detailed analysis by source 
of  assurance. 
VIII. Automation 
Since micro-computers  did  not even exist in 1961, Mautz  and  Sharaf  can 
be forgiven  for  not addressing  their eventual role in automation of  the 
audit. 
L, A, C & R 
With the dramatic increase in the use, and usefulness,  of  microcomputers in 
accounting firms,  it should not come as a surprise that the audit methodology 
we have described in this paper has been automated for  use on microcom-
puters. The software,  which we have called ADAM15 [audit decision assis-
tance modules], runs on IBM-XT's and compatible computers and has been 
under development since 1982. During the development period, progressive 
versions of  the software  have evolved in a series of  prototypes, paralleling the 
evolution of  the audit methodology during this period. The current version of 
the software  has been in limited field  use since mid-1985 and we anticipate 
increasing use throughout our practice. 
In the previous section, we commented on the inherent complexity of  the 
audit planning process when the role of  the client's internal control system is 
highlighted at the planning stage. Although we use simplifications  in the 
methodology to deal with this complexity, there remain a number of  areas 
where automation can be of  assistance. 
Figure 7 is a functional  schematic of  ADAM which shows some of  the logical 
links between the various functions.  Staff  using ADAM begin by entering some 
overall planning information,  including decisions on planning materiality and the 
overall level of  assurance for  the audit, and then summarize their knowledge of 
the client's accounting system by setting up the financial  statement compo-
nents and the principal journal entries. Staff  then identify  the major and minor 
accounting cycles and use ADAM's tentative audit strategy (TAS) modules 
which automatically develops a customized TAS, setting up the linkage 
structure from  the TAS to the source of  assurance plans, procedure packages 
and results that is appropriate for  the particular client. The ADAM SAP's are 
essentially the same as those presented in Figures 2 and 6 but they are 
automated and integrated with the underlying procedure packages. The 
procedure packages include standard audit questionnaires together with 
automated planning for  representative compliance and substantive sampling 
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applications. The latter are integrated with the overall planning decisions, 
representative sample selection, sample evaluation and overall audit evaluation. 
Needless to say, we believe ADAM represents the automation of  a 
substantial portion of  the technical audit planning and evaluation task and feel 
that it is a major step towards an automated audit file. 
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IX. Prospectus 
In  the past, auditing  has been conceived  only as a practical  subject with 
little  need  for  or possibility of  any underlying  theory. Thus  attention  has 
been given to its practical  applications to the almost complete exclusion of 
theoretical  considerations.  We  hope we have indicated  the close connection 
between the theory and  practice of  auditing,  for  we are convinced  that the 
only sure solution to practical  problems is through  the development  and 
use of  theory. Auditing  stands  at the threshold  of  service opportunities  we 
can as yet scarcely foresee,  even in dim  outline.  With  a well-developed 
theory it will  not only be prepared  to take  advantage  of  such opportunities 
but will  be able to escape confusion  and  misplaced  effort  in its desire  for 
real service. 
Mautz  and  Sharaf,  p. 248 
Auditing is a pragmatic art. In order for  it to continue to be of  economic 
value to society, auditing must continue to address society's needs which are 
not static but ever changing, ever evolving. The demands placed upon auditors 
should be expected to evolve over time, albeit at a gradual pace. As new 
economic entities, transactions and activities are created, as some increase in 
importance and others decline in importance, it will be impossible for  the 
auditing profession  to stand still. There is no such thing as a status quo when 
faced  with the inexorable march of  time. 
Audit methodology deals primarily with the how of  auditing and to a large 
degree it is reactive to the audit requirements imposed by society. These 
requirements are, by far,  the most significant  factor  in the evolution of  audit 
methodology. But to some extent, audit methodology is proactive since new 
audit techniques may permit the auditor to broaden the scope of  his responsibil-
ities and address issues that were previously impossible or uneconomic to deal 
with. Obviously, future  audit methodologies will result from  the interplay of 
these two factors. 
Current professional  developments, such as the introduction of  attestation 
standards and standards for  reporting on forecasts  and projections, are 
responses to the needs of  society. These expanded requirements will probably 
lead to some changes in existing audit methodologies as our present strategies 
are extended to provide the service. The extension of  the SAS 47 risk model to 
the broader range of  assertions contemplated in the attestation standards is one 
example of  this evolution.16 
One area to which a great deal of  attention is being directed at present is the 
possible extension of  the auditor's reporting responsibility to include reporting 
on internal control. Although the U.S. profession  is the first  to deal with this 
possibility at an official  level, there is no doubt it will be given consideration in 
other countries, including Canada. It is therefore  instructive to consider the 
implications of  such an extension on audit methodology, particularly in light of 
the audit methodology we have described in this paper. 
Perhaps the most important thing to recognize is that, generally, auditors 
have never looked at a client's internal control system in the broad sense that 
the client's management typically applies: 
Canadian managers seemed to have little difficulty  in defining  internal 
control as a broad concept. From this perspective, internal control was 
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found  to encompass accounting, management and operational controls, 
including such factors  as organizational structure, quality of  personnel 
and management, delegation of  responsibility commensurate with au-
thority, and effective  and efficient  management.17 
This is illustrated in Figure 8 which shows a broadly defined  internal control 
concept with the various systems. The accounting system is shown at the 
center for  our purposes here and its tentacles or nerves stretch into each of 
the various systems. 
Auditors who follow  an internal control oriented audit approach will, for  the 
most part, focus  attention on aspects of  the various systems which are directly 
related to the extensions of  the accounting system (shaded regions in the 
diagrams). In the assertion-oriented audit methodology we have described in 
this paper, attention is directed first  at the accounting system and then along 
the various tentacles as considered necessary given the strategic audit plan. 
However, in this context neither approach can be considered comprehensive in 
the way it addresses internal control. Hence, any extension of  auditor's 
responsibilities towards reporting on internal control will require either a 
careful  limitation on the scope of  the responsibility or a possibly radical change 
in the nature of  the audit methodology that is employed.18 
Developments from  within audit methodology have also had an influence  on 
its evolution. The increased importance of  statistical sampling and its effect  on 













widespread use of  techniques such as regression analysis in analytical review is 
another example of  how audit techniques can affect  the overall methodology. 
One technological development that should have a considerable effect  on audit 
methodology is the microcomputer. In time, these remarkably powerful 
machines will become as prevalent as the hand held calculator, if  they are not 
already. Their considerable computational power will permit the development 
of  a computerized audit file  in which expert systems and comprehensive 
decision support capabilities can play a major role. Technologically these are, no 
doubt, exciting times. 
Epilogue 
In this paper we have described an assertion-based approach to auditing. 
We have focused  at the strategic level and explained the consequences of  our 
strategic emphasis in terms of  its effect  on the elements of  the audit strategy. 
Our description has included an outline of  a practical approach for  applying the 
methodology together with its automation on a microcomputer. But in the final 
analysis, have we introduced anything that is fundamentally  new? Perhaps we 
have. For example, we have refined  the approach for  reviewing and evaluating 
internal controls conditioned on our inherent risk assessment and we have 
directed the auditor to a more comprehensive view of  the financial  statements 
in which the role of  transaction streams and their assertions is placed on an 
equal footing  to the remainder of  the financial  statements. But surely, these are 
not new discoveries. 
We believe our contribution is the bringing together of  all of  these known 
and familiar  concepts and, using financial  statement item assertions as the 
organizing principle, integrating the various elements into a cohesive, consist-
ent framework  that provides a practical and effective  audit methodology for  our 
professional  environment. 
End Notes 
1. First exposed at the Frontiers  of  Auditing  Research conference  at the University of  Texas at 
Austin in 1976 [published in 1977]. 
2. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., "Unique Audit Methods: Peat Marwick International," by 
Robert K. Elliott, Auditing:  A Journal  of  Practice  & Theory,  Spring 1983. Arthur Young at the 
University of  Southern California  Symposium on Expert Systems and Audit Judgment, 1986. 
3. See Hanson [1942] p. 6. 
4. Some would argue that there was no reduction in quality when sampling was employed 
because of  the more intensive and effective  effort  that could be directed at a sample. 
5. See Stringer [1975], Elliott and Rogers [1972], Anderson and Teitlebaum [1973] and Kinney 
[1983]. 
6. The oversimplification  is due to not recognizing the interplay between statistical precision 
and the α and β risks. For example, in dollar-unit sampling α risks can be contolled by adjusting 
from  planning materiality to a basic precision which allows a margin for  expected error. See Leslie, 
Teitlebaum and Anderson [1979]. 
7. This refers  to substantive procedures including testing. 
8. See Holstrum and Kirtland [1982] for  one example. 
9. See Skinner and Anderson [1966] and Anderson [1977]. 
10. To say achieved is an overstatement. The auditor can only believe he has achieved the 
desired degree of  assurance. 
11. See for  example, Leslie, Teitlebaum and Anderson [1979] and Leslie [1985]. 
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12. We would like to acknowledge the contribution of  Jean Pare [formerly  with our National 
Office  and now with Arthur Young in London, England] for  suggesting the concept of  derived and 
generating components. 
13. An exception is inventory at the count date. In this situation, inventory is not derived from 
purchases and cost of  goods sold. Instead, cost of  goods sold is derived from  inventory and 
purchases. 
14. Valuation refers  to pricing. A separate audit plan would be designed to address net 
realizable value. 
15. We wish to acknowledge the contribution of  David Pollard, leader of  the ADAM 
development project. 
16. See Stilwell and Elliott for  an explanation of  this approach. 
17. See Etherington and Gordon, p. 2. 
18. One might consider re-orientation of  the audit objectives to the non-accounting systems on 
which the effect  of  audit procedures directed at components of  the accounting system could be 
recognized. For example, responses to accounts receivable confirmations  could give some 
information  relevant to operations such as customer service and perhaps marketing. 
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A Bayesian Model for  Combining Information 
We introduce an example in which explicit Bayesian priors are assessed for 
revenue-occurrence and for  cash receipts-completeness and then combined to 
give a prior for  accounts receivable-existence. In this example, the subjective 
probabilities are attached to specific  financial  statement and transaction stream 
assertions and their combination is the result of  the interrelationship between 
the components of  the sales/receivables/receipts accounting cycle. 
In our example, we use the following  assumptions: 
Tables 1(a) and 1(b) show the posterior probability calculations for  sales and 
cash receipts separately. The sample sizes represent either representative 
substantive samples (assuming such testing is an appropriate procedure) or an 
equivalent pre-audit sample size. 
Table 2(a) shows the combined error rates that arise from  combining the 
error rates from  the two streams. Thus, the error rate of  .09143 for  a sales-
cash receipts error rate pair of  (.01, .015) is computed as [(.01 x 1,400,000) + 
(.15x1,200,000)]/350,000 which reflects  the fact  that a sales-occurrence 
error and a cash receipts-completeness error will be additive in accounts 
receivable. 
Table 2(b) shows the combined (posterior) probabilities of  each of  the sales-
cash receipts error rate pairs in the corresponding positions to Table 2(a). 
These probabilities are simple products of  the posterior probabilities from 
Tables 1(a) and 1(b). Table 2(c) shows the probability of  obtaining zero (100% 
tainted) existence errors in a sample of  the indicated size drawn from  the 
accounts receivable population for  each of  the error rates in Table 2(a) [again, in 
corresponding positions]. Table 2(d) is the element by element product of 
Tables 2(b) and 2(c) and Table 2(e) contains the relative frequencies  of  each of 
the probabilities in Table 2(d). The Table 2(e) entries are the posterior 
probabilities for  each of  the error rates in Table 2(a). 
Given the posterior probabilities in Table 2(e), it is possible to compute the 
total of  the posterior probabilities for  these error rates in Table 2(a) which 
exceed materiality. For the example used in Tables 1 and 2, the posterior 
probability of  a material error, i.e. one exceeding $20,000, is .12628. 
In the above example, the prior probabilities and pre-audit sample sizes 
resulted in a fairly  low risk of  error before  the effect  of  the sample from 
accounts receivable. It is instructive to consider some alternative combinations 
of  the various factors.  Table 3 shows posterior probabilities of  error greater 
than $20,000 under a variety of  situations. Case A shows the posterior risk in 
accounts receivables-existence when no errors are possible in cash receipts 
and the only sample is in the sales stream. As would be expected, the .05431 










sales stream alone as shown in Table 1(a). A similar effect  occurs when the 
(pre-audit) sample size in cash receipts is made very large (e.g. 1,000,000 or 
more). 
In Case B, less optimistic prior probabilities are assumed and the result of 
the limited (pre-audit) samples is a very high posterior probability of  a material 
error. Case C illustrates the effect  of  sampling in accounts receivable (e.g. a 
circularization of  accounts) in reducing the case B posterior risk to a more 
acceptable level. Cases D and E illustrate the effect  of  concentrating the audit 
effort  on the streams and then on the residual balance. This is a very graphic 
example of  the necessary extent of  reliance an auditor must place on the 
transaction stream assurance sources in comparison with that needed on the 
balance sheet account. The differences  in overall sample size are mainly due to 
the relative magnitudes of  the streams ($2,600,000) in comparison with the 
balance sheet amount ($350,000). 
Although the above combining model has some appeal, it does possess 
some technical weaknesses. Foremost among these is the assumption that the 
posterior probabilities for  sales-occurrence and cash receipts-completeness 
are independent. We know this is not the case. For example, if  the client has a 
good credit department that actively follows  up old unpaid accounts, it is 
unlikely there will be a large amount of  sales-occurrence or cash receipts-
completeness errors. This one detective control is common to the two streams 
and therefore  its effect  on the posterior probabilities from  each stream is 
dependent. Nonetheless, this weakness should not undermine the example as 
an illustrative theoretical model, but it should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results. 
An extension of  this Bayesian combining model directed at pre-tax income 
could possibly serve as an approach for  combining results for  the audit as a 
whole. Although the practical utility of  such a model would have to be 
questioned (it would be many dimensional), it would certainly have some 
theoretical value. One of  the main theoretical conclusions implied by such a 
model can be seen in our example here. Even if  the individual prior probabilities 
and pre-audit samples are independent, the combination of  the effect  of  these 
probabilities, which is determined by the nature of  the accounting model, leads 
to an overall model in which there are significant  dependencies. An auditor 
wishing to draw some conclusions at the end of  the audit cannot set his prior 
probabilities on each of  the individual transaction streams (etc.) independently. 
They are related by the overall evaluation model and their reasonability must be 
assessed at both the individual level and at the overall level. This is entirely 




A Direction of  Assurance Theorem 
One of  the major assumptions made in developing audit strategies is that by 
focusing  attention on achieving the desired overall assurance on a subset of  the 
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financial  statement assertions the auditor will obtain the desired level on all of 
the financial  statement assertions. This permits the use of  simplifications  in the 
planning process and ensures the audit has complete coverage of  the financial 
statement assertions. In order to apply this approach, it is necessary to 
introduce a method of  identifying  the subset. The direction of  assurance rule 
provides the identification  method and the direction of  assurance theorem, 
which we will outline below, states that the rule leads to minimal sufficient 
audit plans, within the context of  the problem framework  set out below. 
We consider a simplified  situation with three accounting cycles: 
1. Cash, Cash disbursements, Cash receipts 
2. Accounts receivable, Cash receipts, Revenues 
3. Accounts payable, Cash disbursements, Expenses 
The results derived in this analysis would extend to more complex situations. 
From these cycle elements, the corresponding accounting cycle equations can 
be written, using the obvious notational abbreviations, as: 
We will call these the normal form  of  the cycle equations. 
The accounting cycle assurance formula  for  a given accounting cycle 
equation can be derived by writing the accounting cycle equation in the form 
desired and then writing the accounting cycle assurance formula  that corre-
sponds beneath it. For example: 
This assurance formula  shows how audit assurance (measured discretely in 
terms of  Poisson factors)  on A/RO/S and RECO/S provides assurance on 
REVO/S. The " ^ " symbol in the formula  indicates that only the minimum 
assurance can be carried over. 
In the remainder of  this discussion, the assurance formulas  will be written 
out explicitly using the following  symbols for  the direct assurance obtained 
with respect to each component error exposure (we focus  here on error 
exposures rather than assertions since the main results arise from  interre-
lationships between various accounting cycle components of  an arithmetic 
nature. The extension to assertions is straight forward.):  CashO, CashU, 
RECO, RECU, DISO, DISU, A/RO, A/RU, REVO, REVU, PAYO, PAYU, EXPO 
and EXPU. Thus, REVO represents the assurance level, expressed as a 
Poisson factor,  obtained from  audit procedures directed at the revenue 
account and effective  at detecting overstatements. Since it is an assurance 
level, it can be derived only from  inherent assurance, internal control 
assurance (preventive or detective), analytical review assurance or substantive 
procedures such as testing of  the revenue transaction stream. In any particular 
situation, some of  the sources may not be available ... e.g. direct inherent 
Cash (t) = Cash (t -1) + REC(t) - DIS(t) 
A/R(t) = A/R (t -1 ) + REV(t) - REC(t) 
PAY(t) = PAY (t-1) + EXP(t) - DIS(t) 
REV(t) A/R(t) + REC(t) A/R(t-1) 








assurance (and internal control assurance) on A/RO is negligible although this 
type of  assurance can be found  in the related component exposures REVO and 
RECU. Similarly, there is little direct assurance possible on A/RU. 
The total assurance on any particular component exposure will be ex-
pressed as vx(*) where * represents the component exposure and x repre-
sents/indicates the accounting cycle (x is one of  either cash (C), receivables (R) 
or payables (P) cycles). Thus, 
vR (REVO) = REVO+ min {A/RO, vc(RECO)} 
is the explicit formula  for  the accounting cycle assurance formula:  REVO/S 
A/RO/S RECO/S introduced above. The fact  that REC is an element of 
both the receivables (R) and cash (C) cycles requires the use of  vc(RECO) 
when it appears in a formula  for  an R-component exposure. 
The formula  says that the total assurance on revenue overstatements obtained 
from  the revenue cycle is equal to the sum of  the direct assurance on REVO/S 
plus the minimum of  the direct assurance on A/RO/S and the total assurance on 
receipts overstatements obtained from  the cash cycle. 
Using this notation, it is possible to develop audit programs that ensure a 
sufficient  level of  audit assurance is obtained on each financial  statement 
component exposure. Stated in terms of  the vx operator, if  the required overall 
level of  assurance is 3.0, then a sufficient  audit plan must have: 
I. vc(CashO)≥3.0 II. vc(CashU)≥3.0 
III. vR(A/RO) ≥3.0 IV. vR(A/RU)≥3.0 
V. Vp(PAYO) ≥3.0  VI. vP(PAYU)≥3.0 
VII. vR(REVO)≥3.0  VIII. vR(REVU)≥3.0 
IX. vP(EXPO)≥3.0  X. vP(EXPU)≥3.0 
For convenience, each of  the vx formulas  will be referred  to as source of 
assurance plans, i.e. SAPs. 
Obviously, an auditor could develop a sufficient  audit plan by entering 
factors  so that each of  the above ten inequalities was satisfied,  but this would be 
inefficient  since it would not recognize the structural relationships between the 
various component exposures. Thus, for  efficiency,  the auditor is interested in 
finding  the minimum number of  SAPs which when "satisfied,"  i.e., indicate the 
required overall level of  assurance, imply that all the other SAPs are satisfied. 
The following  theorem answers this question for  the three-cycle situation. 
Direction of  Assurance Theorem 
In the three-cycle situation, a minimal sufficient  audit plan must have at least 








To prove the theorem, it is necessary to show that a minimum of  five  SAPs 
is required and that the five  SAPs listed provide a sufficient  plan since they 
imply that the remaining five  SAPs are also satisfied.  We begin by expressing 
each of  the SAPs in terms of  the basic assurance elements (e.g. EXPO, CashU, 
etc.) and writing out the equivalent inequalities. These are as follows: 
I. vc(CashO)≥ 3 is equivalent to 
1. CashO + RECO + REVO ≥  3 
2. CashO + RECO + A/RU≥  3 
3. CashO + DISU + PAYO≥  3 
4. CashO + DISU + EXPU ≥  3 
III. VR(A/RO)≥3  is equivalent to 
1. A/RO + REVO ≥  3 
2. A/RO + RECU + CashU ≥  3 
3. A/RO + RECU + DISU + PAYO ≥  3 
4. A/RO + RECU + DISU + EXPU ≥3 
V. Vp(PAYO) ≥  3 is equivalent to 
1. PAYO + EXPO ≥3 
2. PAYO + DISU + CashO≥3 
3. PAYO + DISU + RECU + REVU ≥  3 
4. PAYO + DISU + RECU + A/RO ≥  3 
VII. VR(REVO) ≥3  is equivalent to 
1. REVO + A/RO ≥3 
2. REVO + RECO + CashO ≥3 
3. REVO + RECO + DISO + PAYU ≥3 
4. REVO + RECO + DISO + EXPO ≥3 
IX. vP(EXPO)≥  3 is equivalent to 
1. EXPO + PAYO ≥3 
2. EXPO + DISO + CashU ≥3 
3. EXPO + DISO + RECO + REVO ≥  3 
4. EXPO + DISO + RECO + A/RU ≥3 
II. vc(CashU) ≥3  is equivalent to 
1. CashU + RECU + REVU ≥3 
2. CashU + RECU + A/RO ≥3 
3. CashU + DISO + PAYU ≥3 
4. CashU + DISO + EXPO ≥3 
IV. vR(A/RU)≥3  is equivalent to 
1. A/RU + REVU ≥3 
2. A/RU + RECO + CashO ≥3 
3. A/RU + RECO + DISO + PAYU ≥3 
4. A/RU + RECO + DISO + EXPO ≥3 
VI. Vp(PAYU) ≥  3 is equivalent to 
1. PAYU + EXPU≥3 
2. PAYU + DISO + CashU ≥3 
3. PAYU + DISO + RECO + REVO ≥  3 
4. PAYU + DISO + RECO + A/RU ≥3 
VIII. VR(REVU) ≥3  is equivalent to 
1. REVU + A/RU ≥3 
2. REVU + RECU + CashU≥3 
3. REVU + RECU + DISU + PAYO ≥  3 
4. REVU + RECU + DISU + EXPU ≥3 
X. Vp(EXPU) ≥3  is equivalent to 
1. EXPU + PAYU 
2. EXPU + DISU + CashO ≥3 
3. EXPU + DISU + RECU + REVU ≥3 
4. EXPU + DISU + RECU + A/RO ≥3 
Thus, in the above analysis, each of  the ten SAPs has been analyzed into its 
equivalent set of  four  inequalities that must be satisfied  by the basic assurance 
elements. There are 40 such inequalities but they are not all distinct as a 
cursory review of  the table would show. 
The distinct inequalities in the above list can be grouped into 2-term, 3-
term and 4-term subgroups as follows: 
Distinct inequalities 
2-Term (a) A/RO + REVO ≥  3 
(b) A/RU + REVU ≥3 
(c) PAYO + EXPO ≥3 
(d) PAYU + EXPU ≥3 
3-Term (a) CashO + RECO + REVO ≥  3 
(b) CashO + RECO + A/RU ≥  3 
(c) CashO + DISU + PAYO ≥3 
(d) CashO + DISU + EXPU ≥3 
4-Term (a) A/RO + RECU + DISU + PAYO ≥  3 
(b) A/RO + RECU + DISU + EXPU ≥3 
(e) CashU + RECU + REVU ≥3 
(f)  CashU + RECO + A/RO ≥3 
(g) CashU + DISO + PAYU ≥3 
(h) CashU + DISO + EXPO ≥3 
(e) A/RU + RECO + DISO + PAYU ≥  3 
(f)  A/RU + RECO + DISO + EXPO ≥3 
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(c) PAYO + RECU + DISU + REVU ≥  3 (g) PAYU + RECO + DISO + REVO ≥  3 
(d) EXPO + DISO + RECO + REVO ≥3  (h) EXPU + DISU + RECU + REVU ≥  3 
There are 20 distinct inequalities here. Since each of  the ten SAPs is 
equivalent to only four  inequalities, it is therefore  obvious that at least five  are 
required in order to form  a sufficient  audit plan. This proves the first  part of  the 
theorem. To prove that SAPs I, III, VI, VIII and IX are sufficient,  it is only 
necessary to show that each of  the above 20 inequalities are included in the set 
of  inequalities implied by these SAPs. 
Thus, 
I. is equivalent to 3 - T(a), 3 - T(b), 3 - T(c), 3 - T(d) 
III. is equivalent to 2-T(a), 3-T(f),  4-T(a), 4-T(b) 
VI. is equivalent to 2-T(d), 3-T(g), 4-T(e), 4-T(g) 
VIII. is equivalent to 2 - T(b), 3 - T(e), 4 - T(c), 4 - T(h) 
IX. is equivalent to 2-T(c), 3-T(h), 4-T(d), 4-T(f) 
Simple inspection shows that the above are indeed distinct and therefore 
equivalent to the distinct inequalities listed above. This proves the theorem. 
Corollary 
By reflection  (i.e. o/s u/s, u/s o/s), the SAPs II, IV, V, VII and X are a 
minimal sufficient  audit plan. 
Thus, as one would expect, minimal sufficient  audit plans are not unique. 
Corollary: Direction of  Test Concept 
In the three-cycle situation, the audit strategy of  testing debit account 
overstatement exposures directly, credit account understatement exposures 
directly and then relying on the accounting model to provide assurance in all 
other areas leads to a sufficient  audit plan. 
Proof:  The sufficient  audit plan of  the Theorem is an example of  this strategy. If 
sufficient  direct procedures are applied to CashO, A/RO, PAYU, REVU and 
EXPO, the required SAPs listed in the theorem are obviously satisfied. 
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Discussant's Response to 
"An Assertion-Based Approach to Auditing" 
William L. Felix, Jr. 
The University of  Arizona 
Critiquing an assertion-based approach to auditing is a bit like criticizing 
motherhood and apple pie, given its reliance on Mautz and Sharaf  and an 
existing SAS, but my role here today is not to toss bouquets. My discussion of 
this paper will begin with a number of  general issues where I think the paper 
misses its target or I have doubts about its content. I will conclude my 
discussion with a few  points of  lesser significance.  These comments are 
intended to stimulate discussion. 
Some Basic Issues 
The authors of  this paper present a wide-ranging analysis of  their views on 
an assertion-based approach with some interesting insights into Clarkson 
Gordon's use of  this method in their development of  microcomputer tech-
nology for  audit practice. While very interesting and appealing ideas are 
presented, there are some major omissions that are critical to a careful 
evaluation of  the ideas in this paper. 
Beyond the author's assertions, there is no convincing argument in this 
paper as to why an academic or practitioner ought to view an assertion-based 
approach as either more effective  or more efficient  than some particular 
alternative or as a dominant strategy with respect to all available alternatives. 
An example of  this lack of  convincing argument is included in the last paragraph 
on the first  page where it appears the authors suggest that since an assertion-
based approach to auditing is in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards, that it should  be used by practitioners and authors of  auditing books. 
This is clearly an inadequate criteria. Our choices of  both general audit 
philosophy as well as specific  audit policies should be based on perceptions of 
improved efficiency  and/or effectiveness.  Ideally such perceptions would be 
based on some analysis or empirical data. Such evidence or other supporting 
analysis seems to have been omitted from  the paper. If  the authors or Clarkson 
Gordon have such data or analysis, it would be very worthwhile to present that 
information. 
An assertion-based approach could be viewed as a planning framework  to 
organize thinking about or planning for  the types of  errors that: 1) are possible 
or likely; 2) for  which internal accounting controls may be considered; and 3) 
for  which effective  substantive tests (analytical review or substantive tests of 
details) need to be considered. Although the authors do not address the 
differences  specifically,  a useful  focus  for  our following  discussions might have 
been to identify  key differences  between the risk-oriented error-discovery 
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audit that the authors seem to be referring  to as a foil  and an assertions-based 
approach. By considering the specific  differences  between the two methods, 
possibly in the context of  a specific  illustration, we could have discussed how 
the assertions-based approach differed  in terms of  our own criteria. Such a 
discussion will be difficult  today because we lack those specifics. 
The questions stated in Section II are instructive. The authors' categoriza-
tion of  an error-based (negative) approach and an assertions-based (positive) 
approach is questionable. I prefer  their following  observation that both 
questions are probably considered jointly in many audit-planning approaches. 
Also, both questions can be stated either positively or negatively. However, 
since the authors appear to favor  the second question in its positive form,  it is 
worth reminding the group of  the evidence from  the philosophy and psychology 
of  decision making. A number of  authors have noted that the search for 
evidence to support a belief  is suspect behavior on philosophic grounds (see for 
example On Scientific  Thinking) 1; and empirical evidence in psychology 
suggests that human decision makers are overly inclined to recognize evidence 
that supports their views and ignore contrary evidence (see for  example Waller 
and Felix).2 Both of  these observations suggest that there is considerable risk 
in pushing auditors to look for  supporting evidence alone as suggested in the 
second question. However, the use of  research from  supporting disciplines 
uncritically is very questionable. Research on the issues implicit in an auditor 
searching for  evidence to refute  an assertion (negative approach) as opposed to 
searching for  evidence to support an assertion (a positive approach) is needed. 
In view of  the comments above, I also found  the eighth paragraph in Section 
III difficult  to follow.  An assurance as opposed to a risk approach does not differ 
as to "a proof-based  thinking approach" per se. As the approaches are being 
used by the authors, they do differ  in the direction of  the implicit hypotheses 
about errors, but the concepts of  evidence and the support of  beliefs  of  which I 
am aware say very little about proving anything in an absolute sense. 
In reading Section 4 of  the paper, I must have missed something. The title 
suggests that "Assertions And The Links To Internal Control Procedures And 
Audit Procedures . . . " will be analyzed. Instead, the discussion seems to 
focus  on procedure packages (also included in the title) without linking 
assertions and internal controls. To be fair,  careful  study of  Figure 2 will supply 
some insights into the authors' implicit views. An explicit discussion of  their 
views would still be preferable. 
The authors sketch very briefly  a Source of  Assurance Plan (SAP). I 
suspect that this SAP is central to their planned microcomputer decision 
support package, but as described, it includes some unstated efficiency  and/or 
effectiveness  tradeoffs  which are important to facilitate  understanding. At a 
minimum, a brief  comment as to how these tradeoffs  were made would be very 
informative. 
Some Other Comments 
I disagree strongly with the description in Section III of  the degree of 
assurance available from  analytical review. The authors describe the degree of 
assurance as depending upon the type of  procedure used to organize analytical 
review evidence. As is true of  all audit evidence, the degree of  assurance an 
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auditor obtains should depend on the quantity and the quality of  the evidence. 
Not, as is described in this case, the choice between judgmental or statistical 
methods. 
I agree with the author's position that internal control may be viewed as 
one alternative source of  evidence, at least in a conceptual sense. However, 
this position is not unique to the assertions-based approach. It also raises the 
possibility that the approach may push auditors too far.  Even in an assertions-
based audit, internal control may be critical to adequate evidence in a client of 
larger size. In developing new approaches and new philosophies about carrying 
out the auditor's opinion formulation  process, the central role of  internal 
controls, particularly at the point of  capture of  transactions in large clients, may 
need special emphasis in order to avoid understating their significance. 
In Section VI and also in Figure 3 a multidimensional evaluation concept is 
"asserted." It is not clear how this evaluation concept operates or relates to 
the notion of  aggregating achieved levels of  assurance and materiality across 
assertions and across balances. If  there is some other role to this multidimen-
sional evaluation concept, this discussion needs to be expanded significantly. 
Otherwise, Figure 3 adds little and should be omitted. 
The notions of  derived components and generating components were 
difficult  to follow.  Are they just complicated ways of  labeling transaction flows 
into balances or are there more insights intended? Knowing Don Leslie I 
suspect there is more intended but it did not come through in my reading. 
As always, a Leslie or a Leslie and others paper is stimulating reading. Our 
progress as both efficient  and effective  auditors requires that we continually 
question and reevaluate all that we do. This paper is an important contribution 
to that progress. 
End Notes 
1. Tweney, R.D., M.E. Doherty and C.R. Mynatt, On Scientific  Thinking,  Columbia 
University Press (1981), p. 458. 
2. Waller, W.S. and W.L. Felix, Jr., "The Auditor and Learning from  Experience: Some 
Conjectures," Accounting,  Organizations  and Society,  Vol. 9, No. 3/4 (1984). 
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3 
On the Economics of  Product 
Differentiation  in Auditing* 
Dan A. Simunic 
Michael Stein 
University of  British Columbia 
I. Introduction 
Corporate financial  statement audits have traditionally been viewed as 
homogeneous across auditors. For example, the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities ("Cohen Commission") in its Report [1978, p. 111] stated 
that: 
When a product or service offered  by different  suppliers differs 
significantly  to the user, or appears to differ  significantly,  it is easier for 
one of  its producers to maintain a higher, noncompetitive price. Public 
accounting firms  go to considerable length to develop superior services 
for  their clients, but there is little  effective  product  differentiation  from  the 
viewpoint of  the present buyer of  the service (emphasis added), that is, 
management of  the corporation. 
In support of  this view, it is usual to assert that the identity of  the firm  which 
performs  an audit is irrelevant since every examination must conform  to 
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and all firm  partners must be 
fully  professionally  qualified.  Thus users of  financial  statements have no reason 
(nor basis) to distinguish among auditing firms. 
At the same time, however, it has also been recognized that a company 
which may have a perfectly  satisfactory  relationship with a local accounting firm 
will often  change auditors to a well-known national firm  when that company first 
sells securities to the public. It is usually alleged that such "displacement" 
occurs as a result of  pressure from  underwriters (see, for  example, Wall  Street 
Journal,  July 18, 1983, "Small CPA Concern Sues an Underwriter Over Loss 
of  Client") or because of  other unwarranted "biases." For example, Arnett 
and Danos [1979] use the term "perceptual barriers to viability" to describe 
these "biases." Under the assumption that the services of  auditing firms  are 
homogeneous, it follows  that professional  accounting 
*The research study, upon which this paper is based, was funded  by a grant from  the Canadian 
Certified  General Accountants' Research Foundation (Vancouver, B.C.), whose support we 
gratefully  acknowledge. Also, we have benefited  from  the comments of  participants in the 
accounting workshops at the University of  Alberta, University of  British Columbia, Ohio State 
University, and Washington University (St. Louis) on earlier versions of  the paper. 
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bodies, such as the AICPA or CICA, should strive to eliminate "biases," 
perhaps by "educating" managers, underwriters, and other financial  statement 
users. However, if  we drop the homogeneity assumption, then auditor 
displacement at the time of  an initial public offering  of  securities (to the extent 
such displacement actually occurs) may simply be evidence of  rational economic 
behavior. 
1.1 The  Product  Differentiation  Hypothesis 
Recently, several researchers [Simunic, 1980; De Angelo, 1981(a) and 
1981(b); Dopuch and Simunic, 1980 and 1982] have suggested that audit 
services, like most products, are likely to be differentiated. 
De Angelo [1981(a)] argues for  the existence of  audit quality differentiation, 
in the sense of  systematic differences  in auditor independence, essentially as 
follows.  First, she assumes that the production of  audit services for  a specific 
client over time is subject to a learning curve. Given this condition, if, 
whenever a client changes auditors, there is competitive bidding among 
potential suppliers, then the first  year's audit fee  will be less than the avoidable 
cost in that year. This is referred  to as "low balling." In other words, the 
auditor is "forced"  (through the competitive bidding process) to invest in the 
client by passing through into his initial fee  bid the discounted future  cost 
savings due to learning. The investment will be recovered (along with at least a 
normal return) through fees  in subsequent years which exceed avoidable costs, 
and these "excess fees"  constitute client-specific  quasi-rents. 
With respect to auditor independence, the important feature  of  this 
argument is that the quasi-rents can be lost (and the auditor earn less than a 
normal return) should a client unexpectedly  change auditors. Thus, other things 
being equal, the existence of  client-specific  quasi-rents gives a client more 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the incumbent auditor, potentially impairing that 
auditor's independence. However, De Angelo argues, other things are not 
equal in that an incumbent auditor who is tempted to "cheat'' in order to please 
one client must also consider the possible loss of  his other clients, should his 
malfeasance  subsequently be discovered. Hence a large audit firm  with many 
audits and earning large aggregate client-specific  quasi-rents faces  a higher 
potential opportunity loss from  "cheating'' to retain a client than would a small 
audit firm  with few  clients. The aggregate quasi-rents are said to constitute a 
"collateral bond" against auditor "cheating." As a result, auditor independ-
ence will be positively correlated with audit firm  size. 
Note that De Angelo's argument is essentially mechanistic, being driven by 
an assumed audit learning curve and competition in the bidding process. Many 
objections can be raised against the reasonableness of  this scenario, including 
the fact  that the existence of  a significant  learning curve in auditing has not been 
empirically demonstrated.1 In addition, De Angelo ignores the demand  for 
differentiated  audit services, except in the narrow sense that a client is not 
willing to pay the cost of  an independent audit to an auditor who, in fact,  is not 
perceived as supplying such audits (i.e., a "cheater"). 
In a second paper, De Angelo [1981(b)] broadens her notion of  audit quality 
into "the market assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) 
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discover a breach in the client's accounting system and (b) report the breach" 
[p. 186]. Differences  in quality supplied are still motivated by differences  in 
auditor collateral bonds; that is, audit quality is correlated with audit firm  size. 
In addition, De Angelo conjectures that the demand for  differences  in audit 
quality arises from  differences  in agency costs across clients. Several of  the 
linkages (particularly the connection between the size of  the collateral bond and 
the probability of  discovering  a breach) in that paper are very vague. However, 
some of  the arguments (discussed later) are consistent with the present work. 
At about the same time, Dopuch and Simunic [1980; 1982] proposed a 
demand based model of  product differentiation  wherein audit services pos-
sessed two characteristics valued by a company's top management: a contribu-
tion to organization control and credibility with external financial  statement 
users. They argue that credibility is simply associated with an auditor's 
reputation or brand name. The demand for  credibility is assumed to arise when 
there is an asymmetry of  information  between top management and investors 
about the honesty of  top management. In this situation, a costly audit by a 
credible auditor can either signal management's honesty to investors or reduce 
agency costs by restricting top management's ability to conceal, through 
misrepresentation in the financial  statements, the consequence of  actions taken 
which were in the best interests of  top management ("self-serving  behavior") 
but not shareholders. Dopuch and Simunic argue further  that top manage-
ments' utility functions  and opportunity sets for  "self-serving  behavior" likely 
vary across companies. Hence, "the market is not likely to be characterized by 
a single value of  credibility demanded and supplied" [1982, p. 413]. Note that 
an important element of  any market characterized by information  asymmetry is 
the question of  observability. Thus, Dopuch and Simunic argue further  that 
auditor credibility must be associated with an observable characteristic, such as 
the name of  the auditor, rather than the undisclosed details of  the audit 
examination. 
These arguments are silent as to the specific  rank ordering(s) of  auditors on 
a credibility dimension and the theory is sufficiently  general to allow different 
orderings of  audit firms  in different  circumstances. For example, auditors may 
possess different  local, regional, or client industry-specific  reputations. How-
ever, from  the observed dominance of  the Big Eight firms  in the market for 
audits of  publicly held companies, Dopuch and Simunic infer  that audits of  such 
companies by Big Eight firms  are more credible than audits by smaller firms. 
1.2 Previous  Tests  for  Product  Differentiation 
Several researchers have attempted to empirically test this "product 
differentiation  hypothesis," generally in the simplified  two-class form  wherein 
audits by Big Eight firms  are hypothesized to be of  higher quality than audits by 
non-Big Eight firms. 
Nichols and Smith [1983] examined the stock market reaction to auditor 
changes between auditor classes during the years 1973-79 by 51 companies 
whose common shares were listed on either the New York or American Stock 
Exchanges. In a series of  tests, they found  that while abnormal returns were in 
the directions predicted by the product differentiation  hypothesis (i.e., negative 
residuals were associated with Big Eight to non-Big Eight changes while 
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positive residuals were associated with non-Big Eight to Big Eight changes), 
the mean differences  were not statistically significant.  They concluded that the 
magnitude of  any market revaluation of  the firm  arising from  a change in auditor 
class may not be detectable using conventional methods, particularly for  large, 
listed companies. 
Shockley and Holt [1983] used multidimensional scaling to examine how a 
sample of  bank chief  financial  officers  rated the Big Eight CPA firms.  The basic 
issue tested was whether or not purchasers of  audit services could systemat-
ically differentiate  among the Big Eight firms  (i.e., whether there was product 
differentiation  within the Big Eight). Shockley and Holt found  that bankers 
tended to differentiate  among these audit firms  largely on the basis of  market 
shares within the banking industry. They therefore  suggested that industry 
expertise may be a source of  audit quality differentiation. 
Healy and Lys [1983] used the product differentiation  hypothesis to explain 
the acquisition by Big Eight firms  of  smaller audit firms.  They conjectured that 
auditor mergers may be the least costly method for  the clients of  the acquired 
firm  to change the quality of  their auditing. However, not all clients of  the 
acquired firm  are likely to demand a change in audit quality at the time of  the 
merger. Hence, any systematic differences  between those clients which stay 
with the acquiring Big Eight firm  and those which revert to a smaller auditor 
would represent factors  associated with the demand for  audit quality. Their test 
consisted of  an examination of  switching vs. non-switching clients of  J.K. 
Lasser & Co., following  its merger into Touche Ross, and the clients of  S.D. 
Leidesdorf  & Co., following  that firm's  acquisition by Ernst & Whinney. The 
results were weakly consistent with the product differentiation  hypothesis in 
that switching vs. non-switching clients differed  on certain plausible dimen-
sions, including size and leverage. However, other plausible explanatory 
variables, including changes in client capital structure, were found  to be 
insignificantly  different  between the two groups. 
Palmrose [1984] investigated the association between agency cost variables 
and the use of  different  classes of  auditors. She hypothesized that the higher 
the expected level of  agency costs arising from  a certain ownership-manage-
ment structure in a company, the higher the level of  audit quality which will be 
demanded. The test consisted of  a series of  logistic regressions of  auditor 
choice (Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight) on a set of  potential explanatory variables 
which measured expected agency costs (i.e., client size, degree of  separation 
between ownership and management, leverage, and the existence of  manage-
ment compensation plans tied to accounting numbers). The sample consisted of 
a cross-section of  276 companies classified  by industry. The results were 
inconclusive and somewhat anomalous in that client size was the only consist-
ently significant  explanatory variable (i.e., the clients of  the Big Eight firms 
tended to be larger). In addition, leverage was the only other variable which 
was sometimes significant,  but in the wrong direction. That is, the clients of 
Big Eight firms  tended to have lower leverage (lower expected agency costs), 
which was contrary to the hypothesis. 
One direct implication of  product differentiation  in auditing is that there 
should be related systematic differences  in audit prices. As pointed out by 
Simunic [1980], the market for  audits is a hedonic market wherein differenti-
ated products are not observable directly, but rather are revealed by differ-
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ences in prices associated with differences  in observed product characteristics. 
Thus, if  Big Eight firms  deliver a higher quality of  service than non-Big Eight 
firms  then, other things held constant, audit prices should likewise vary 
between the two groups. 
The existing evidence on this point is mixed. Simunic [1980] found  that 
prices charged by the Big Eight firms  in the United States were, on average, 
not significantly  different  and perhaps somewhat lower than non-Big Eight firm 
prices, across all sizes of  clients. Note that his sample consisted of  a cross 
section of  397 audits of  companies ranging in size from  $500,000 in assets (and 
sales) to about $10 billion in assets (and sales). Using a pooled cross section of 
136 Australian companies, Francis [1984], on the other hand, found  that prices 
charged by Big Eight firms  were significantly  higher than prices charged by non-
Big Eight firms.  This is consistent with the results reported by Taffler  and 
Ramalinggam [1982] using data from  the United Kingdom. However, in addition 
to the institutional differences  between countries, the companies in Francis' 
sample were significantly  smaller (by about a factor  of  10) than those in 
Simunic's U.S. sample. In a subsequent paper, Francis and Stokes [1985] 
report that the positive difference  between Big Eight and non-Big Eight firm 
prices seems to be largely confined  to the very smallest companies in their 
sample (mean assets of  $1.8 million Australian dollars). This leads the authors 
to speculate that scale economies to Big Eight firms  and consequent lower 
production costs may "swamp" the price effects  of  product differentiation, 
.except for  audits of  very small companies where "scale economies are less 
likely to exist" [p. 12]. 
The conflicting  nature of  this evidence may, at least partially, be due to the 
difficulties  of  inferring  audit prices from  audit fee  data. An audit fee,  which alone 
is directly observable, can be thought of  as the product of  price times audit 
quantity purchased by the client company. Hence in a cross section (and time 
series) of  fees,  sources of  extraneous differences  in audit quantities must be 
carefully  controlled before  inferences  about prices can be made. While there is 
now considerable evidence about the major determinants of  audit fees  [e.g., 
Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1983; Maher, Broman, Colson and Tiessen, 1985], 
the specifications  of  existing models are no doubt imperfect  and omitted 
variables may bias regression coefficients.  In addition, many audit fee  deter-
minants are correlated with company size, the relation between fees  and size is 
nonlinear, and, because of  the dominance of  the Big Eight firms  in the audits of 
large companies, it is very difficult  to obtain a sample of  audits wherein the 
clients of  Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms  are well matched on a size 
dimension. Hence, a failure  to properly control the nonlinear client size effect 
on fees  can easily lead to a biased coefficient  on an auditor identity variable. 
Add to these econometric difficulties  the possible confounding  effects  of  scale 
economies to large auditors, and it is not surprising that no clear evidence on 
product differentiation  has yet emerged using audit fee  data. 
In summary, the empirical tests of  the product differentiation  hypothesis 
have, to date, been suggestive but inconclusive. But, this is not surprising 
given the early stage of  the research on this topic, as well as the economics of 
auditing in general. 
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1.3 Plan  of  this  Paper 
The economic foundations  for  the product differentiation  hypothesis in 
auditing are only roughly and incompletely sketched out in the existing 
literature. Our objective in this paper is to develop these foundations,  which 
serve as a basis for  a theory of  auditor choice by top management of  a company. 
Note that the auditor choice decision is non-trivial only under the hypothesis 
that auditor services are somehow differentiated.  The assumption of  homoge-
neous audit services implies that the assignment of  auditors to clients is random 
or simply a function  of  auditor cost conditions. For example, if  only the largest 
auditing firms  are fully  able to exploit available economies of  scale due to input 
indivisibilities, then there is no meaningful  auditor choice and these largest 
firms  will eventually (in a world of  transaction costs) "sweep" the market for 
audits. 
In Section II, using Lancaster's [1966] "characteristics" framework,  we 
begin by analyzing the attributes of  the audit service which may be valued by 
top management. In doing so, we consider the distinction between audit quality 
and quantity and their relation to audit service inputs. We then analyze the 
"product location" decision of  auditors, and develop the argument that the 
credibility of  an audit is communicated to external financial  statement users 
(e.g., prospective shareholders and creditors) through an audit firm's  brand 
name. Thus it is the brand name which has ex ante value to top management 
when seeking to influence  the decisions of  users. We conclude this section with 
a discussion of  some welfare  implications of  product differentiation. 
In Section III, we associate auditor credibility with the power of  an auditor's 
tests (in a statistical sense), and analyze the sources of  demand for  different 
levels of  credibility. We argue that an auditor's brand name induces a Bayesian 
revision of  users' prior probability distributions that financial  statements 
contain material error. In a world of  rational users who can "price protect" 
themselves when transacting with management, cross sectional differences  in 
the prior probability of  error and the wealth effects  of  error will cause top 
managers of  different  companies to demand different  credibility levels. We 
examine the role of  future  rents and quasi-rents in "enforcing"  the delivery of 
a particular expected power of  test, and consider the implication of  our analysis 
for  rates of  litigation ("hit rates") which can be expected to occur across audit 
firms  whose credibility varies. Finally, we compare our analysis to that of  De 
Angelo and present some examples to illustrate the main ideas. The paper 
closes with some concluding observations and comments. 
II. Economics of  Product Differentiation 
2.1 Basic Concepts 
Consistent with the traditional view of  financial  statement audits, the 
standard assumption in microeconomic analysis has been that the products 
produced by firms  in a particular industry or market are homogeneous. That is, 
within an industry, consumers cannot distinguish the product produced by firm  i 
from  that produced by firm  j. More formally,  this assumption is expressed by 
the condition that the cross price elasticity of  demand for  the product of  the i th 
firm  in an industry with respect to the price of  product of  the j th firm  in the 
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industry is infinite,  or the products are perfect  substitutes.2 An implication of 
this assumption is that a single price must prevail within the market. 
Chamberlain [1933] was the first  economist to suggest that no two firms 
are likely to make precisely the same product, even though they operate in the 
same industry. He coined the term "monopolistic competition" to describe a 
market where there are many sellers, each one producing a somewhat 
differentiated  product. If,  on the other hand, there are only a few  firms  in the 
industry, the market can be described as a differentiated  products oligopoly. 
Note that differentiated  products are assumed to be strong  substitutes, but not 
perfect  substitutes for  each other. That is, their cross price elasticities are finite 
and relatively large. If  the products are very weak substitutes in demand (cross 
price elasticities approach zero), then the products are no longer simply 
differentiated,  but the firms  can be thought of  as operating in different 
industries. In fact,  a criticism of  Chamberlain's work has been that the notion of 
differentiated  products is really nothing new, but simply causes us to think 
more deeply about which group of  firms  ought to be considered an industry 
[e.g., Stigler, 1968]! 
Following Chamberlain, and the essentially concurrent work by Hotelling 
[1929] on spacial duopoly, there were few  contributions to the economics of 
product differentiation  until the work of  Lancaster [1966; 1971] on the nature of 
product characteristics. In considering exactly how products may be differenti-
ated, Lancaster proposed the notion that a commodity is not desired in and of 
itself,  but rather for  the bundle of  utility bearing characteristics it contains. For 
example, a specific  brand and model of  automobile provides not only the 
obvious characteristic transportation,  but also some amount of  the characteris-
tics safety,  social prestige,  driving  entertainment,  pleasant appearance, etc. Each 
of  these characteristics commands an implicit price in a market, and the 
observed market price of  the commodity (e.g., automobile) will be a linear 
combination of  the measured quantities of  each of  the component characteris-
tics. Since quantities of  characteristics vary across products, observed prices 
will also vary. Hence in order to compare product prices, construct price 
indices over time, or test hypotheses about market behavior using price data, it 
is necessary to control for  differences  in product characteristics. A way to do 
this is to estimate the coefficients  of  a hedonic regression function  where 
product price is the dependent variable and quantities of  characteristics are the 
independent variables. This is essentially the theoretical rationale underlying 
the studies of  audit fees  discussed in Section 1.3 
The notion of  characteristics suggests that there are two basic ways in 
which products can be differentiated.  In the simplest case, the industry's 
product contains only one characteristic, but products of  various firms  differ  in 
the amount of  the characteristic each contains. This situation can be described 
as vertical product differentiation  and it implies that products can be ordered on 
a single dimension, which can be labeled product  quality.  The more general 
case, where the product possesses many characteristics and producers differ  in 
the amount of  each characteristic their product contains, can be called 
horizontal product differentiation.  Note that in this case, the description of  each 
firm's  product is a k component vector of  quantities (where k is the number of 
characteristics or dimensions) and, in general, the products of  various suppliers 
cannot be ordered. 
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2.2 Demand for  Audit  Service  Characteristics 
Before  proceeding further,  it is useful  to relate these concepts to the audit 
services market. First, it is important to recognize that audit services are not a 
consumption good, but rather a factor  of  production. That is, neither audit 
services nor their component characteristics are direct objects of  utility to any 
ultimate consumer, and the demand for  audit services is not the outcome of  a 
standard constrained utility maximization problem. Thus, the demand for 
differentiated  audit services cannot arise from  a simple assumption that 
consumers vary in their tastes, preferences,  and incomes. 
As a factor  of  production or intermediate good, the demand for  audit 
services is derived from  the objective function  of  the top management of  the 
audited company. We assume that this objective is to maximize own expected 
utility.4 Some insight into the characteristics of  the audit service which may be 
valued by (or increase the wealth of)  top management can be derived by 
considering various possible relationships between top management, share-
holders, and creditors. 
Top  managers are also owners and  there are no creditors 
These assumptions describe a smaller closely-held company with no debt. 
Will audit services be demanded at all in this situation? The answer would seem 
to depend crucially on the size and complexity of  the company and the resulting 
degree to which top managers can personally monitor the various activities of 
their subordinates. The less their personal control over the organization, the 
more likely an outside audit would be valuable to top management. The audit 
service would be part of  the control system over the information  produced 
within the organization, and hence the company's financial  statements. This 
demand, which arises from  the internal agency problems of  an organization, 
may be termed a control  demand. Therefore,  a plausible audit service 
characteristic along which auditors can be differentiated  is the contribution of 
the audit to the organization's internal control system. 
Top  managers are separate from  owners and  there are no creditors 
These assumptions describe a publicly held company with an all-equity 
capital structure (ignoring government regulations and any mandatory audit 
requirement). There is now an agency relationship between top management 
and outside shareholders.5 Given the existence of  this agency relationship, 
there is likely to be a demand for  an independent attestation (audit) as to the 
truthfulness  of  the information  reported by top management to the outside 
shareholders, and, in general, both parties (groups) might benefit  from  such an 
audit [Beaver, 1981]. The key attribute of  the audit service is likely to be its 
credibility  as perceived by the shareholders. Hence, this is a second character-
istic or dimension along which audit services can be differentiated. 
Effects  of  the introduction  of  debt  into the capital  structure 
The issuance of  debt by a closely held company creates an agency 
relationship between the debtholder(s) as principal and an owner-manager as 
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agent. After  the issuance of  debt, the owner-manager is motivated to take 
actions which increase the value of  the equity, but decrease the value of  the 
debt. A major potential source of  such agency costs is adoption of  an 
investment policy in which projects with a high variance but low expected net 
present value are substituted for  lower variance but higher net present value 
projects [Jensen and Meckling, 1976].6 Note that the owner-manager will 
exclusively earn the possible high returns from  high variance projects, but 
shares the risk of  possible low returns or losses with the debtholders. This 
agency relationship is likely to give rise to the use of  restrictive covenants in 
debt agreements [see Smith and Warner, 1979] as well as a demand for 
independent attestation to verify  both the compliance with these agreements 
and the truthfulness  of  general financial  information  reported by the owner-
manager to the debtholders. As with public shareholders, credibility  or 
reputation is thus likely to be an important audit service attribute. Of  course, 
both the manager-shareholder and manager-debtholder agency relationships 
will exist simultaneously if  debt is issued by a publicly held company, reinforcing 
the demand for  audit service credibility. 
In summary, two major audit service characteristics arise from  a considera-
tion of  the possible organization structure of  the audited company: 
1) the contribution of  the audit to organization control,  and 
2) the credibility  of  the audit as perceived by shareholders and creditors. 
The importance of  these two characteristics was confirmed  in a recent study of 
881 small, closely held U.S. companies by O'Keefe  and Barefield  [1985]. Of  the 
companies who voluntarily  purchased audits in this sample (132 companies or 
15 percent), 57 percent listed "enhances credibility (of  financial  statements) 
with outside users" as the most important reason for  the purchase, while 46 
percent listed "augments internal control" as the second most important 
reason.7 Moreover, other reasons for  the purchase were mentioned only 
infrequently  (e.g., 12/17 percent listed "limits liability" as a primary/second-
ary reason). 
A third possible characteristic which top management may value is the 
scope of  the product  line offered  by an audit firm,  in particular the availability of 
various management consulting type services from  the audit supplier. Such 
product availability reduces management's search costs when seeking to 
acquire consulting services. In addition, it is often  claimed that production of 
auditing creates a knowledge externality or spillover which reduces the costs of 
consulting services when the services are produced jointly. This issue was 
analyzed and tested by Simunic [1984] who found  that the pricing of  audit 
services is consistent with the hypothesis that knowledge spills over from 
auditing to consulting. Thus, managers in certain circumstances may be better 
off  by purchasing the audit service from  a supplier with a wide product line. 
However, this need not be true in all situations. For example, in the data set on 
publicly held companies underlying Simunic [1980; 1984], 235 of  381 companies 
or 62 percent purchased no consulting service from  their auditor over a three-
year period.8 Further, of  the 277 companies audited by a Big Eight firm,  163 or 
59 percent purchased no consulting service from  their audit firm  during the 
period. Hence, the value of  wide service scope to managers can be assumed to 
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vary, creating a third characteristic along which audit firms  can be differenti-
ated. 
2.3 Distinctions  Between Characteristic  Quantities,  Quality  of 
Service,  and the Quantity  of  Inputs  and Output 
Based on this analysis, a description of  the audit service purchased by a 
particular client9 from  a particular audit firm  requires, in principle, the 
specification  of  a vector of  quantities of  three service characteristics: 
{control, credibility, product line} or {c1; c2, c3}. 
A unit of  each characteristic is assumed to be costly to produce. For example, 
the offering  of  a line of  consulting services which may or may not be demanded 
by a particular client is costly to the audit firm.  Or the development of  a certain 
credibility10 level with outside shareholders and creditors is also costly. 
Therefore,  each service characteristic commands a positive implicit price—say 
λ1, λ2 and λ3 — in the market. 
With differentiated  audit services, quality  of  service comparisons can be 
made using any dimension of  interest if  the quantities of  the suppressed 
characteristics are at least equal. For example, an audit service described by 
the vector {2, 8, 5} is of  higher quality than the service {2, 5, 5}, of  lower 
quality than the service {2, 9, 5} and not comparable in quality to the service 
{1, 10, 5}. 
In addition to the quantities of  service characteristics from  which quality of 
service rankings can sometimes be made, auditing also has a pure quantity 
dimension. This is so because audit service contexts differ  radically across 
companies. We have argued that some differences  in client contexts are the 
basis for  a demand for  differentiated  audit services. However, other contextual 
differences  lead to supplier choice and the delivery of  a certain quantity of 
service on the basis of  supplier efficiency  considerations in a context  taken 
alone. To make this distinction meaningful,  it is necessary to clearly specify  a 
base level or standard service. All client context differences  which affect  the 
resources expended by a supplier in providing the base level service are 
sources of  pure audit quantity differences.  Conversely, any context differences 
which lead to different  choices of  service vectors, {c1, c2, c3}, are sources of 
product differentiation  among auditors. 
The base level service is defined  by the simple purchase of  an audit 
opinion.11 If  management only values an audit opinion per se (perhaps because 
an audit is mandated by law), then management would simply choose the least-
cost producer in the circumstances. This characterization of  the problem is the 
basis for  the traditional view that all auditors deliver the same homogeneous 
product—an appropriate audit opinion. Empirically, it motivates a search for 
auditor scale economies [e.g., Danos and Eichenseher, 1982]. The hypothesis 
of  product differentiation  motivates a search beyond  the opinion to distinguish-
ing service characteristics. Of  course, management still demands an efficient 
producer of  a particular characteristic vector, but auditor choice is no longer a 
cost minimization problem. Rather, it requires explicit recognition of  a benefit 
function  to top management. 
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If  the pure quantity of  auditing is measured by q, then an audit service fee 
can be denoted as 
F = (λ1C1 + λ2c2 + λ3c3)q. 
While audit fee  data are not examined in this paper, some examples of  fee 
determination are useful  to illustrate the ideas. Suppose that a client wishes to 
purchase a base level service—an audit opinion. Management deems the audit 
valueless in controlling the organization and has no use for  consulting services. 
Since some auditor must sign the opinion, credibility or c2 can arbitrarily be 
assigned a minimum value of  1. Hence the characteristic vector demanded 
would be the base level {0,1,0} and the fee  would be 
F = λ2q 
where q depends on company size, complexity, etc. Consider now an identical 
company, except that management values the auditor's ability to perform 
certain consulting services as needed. Say the desired characteristic vector is 
{0, 1, 1}. Note that this is a higher quality service. The service fee  would be 
F = (λ2 + λ3)q where F > F . 
The fee  now reflects  the presence of  both attributes and is scaled by q. Finally, 
suppose there exists another identical company in terms of  size, complexity, 
etc. whose top management chooses an audit service which improves organiza-
tion control, has a higher credibility with outsiders than the base level, and is 
obtained from  a supplier who is capable of  rendering certain consulting services 
as needed. Say the vector {2, 3,1} characterizes this service. The fee  for  this 
service, which is of  higher quality than in the previous case, would be 
F' = (2λ2 + 3λ3 + λ3)q where F' > F > F . 
What is the role of  service inputs in this fee  model?12 The outputs of  the 
audit service are the quantities {c1, c2, c3} and q. These outputs are related to 
inputs through a production function,  but the relationship need not be simple. 
For example, it seems likely that control and credibility are largely joint 
products, thus restricting the values c1 and c2 can assume. On the other hand, 
the breadth of  the available product line is not a function  of  variable audit 
service inputs but requires the incurrence of  a fixed  cost by the auditing firm. 
Higher levels of  available services presumably are associated with higher fixed 
costs. Thus, distinguishing between inputs and output is important in concep-
tualizing the audit service; but detail specification  of  the input/output rela-
tionship is not possible, nor usually necessary. 
2.4 Product  Location in Characteristics  Space 
If  audit services are differentiated,  then the question arises as to what 
service designs will be offered  for  sale in the market? Also, can a given audit 
firm  be expected to supply a single type of  service (i.e., a vector with specific 
characteristics {c1, c2, c3}) or simultaneously supply a variety of  characteristic 
vectors? These are important issues from  the point of  view of  both purchasers 
and producers. Audit firms  presumably want to design services so as to 
maximize economic rents; conversely, the services (and prices) which emerge 
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in market equilibrium affect  the welfare  of  purchasers. In the economics 
literature, these issues are described as "product location" decisions since the 
insights are frequently  derived by analogy from  formal  models of  spatial 
competition. 
Consider first  the question of  whether a producer will offer  a single or 
multiple characteristic vectors. For typical goods, it is common to observe a 
company which produces and markets a variety of  product types. For example, 
in a study of  product characteristics of  the U.K. fertilizer  industry, Shaw [1982] 
found  that 69 different  compound fertilizers  were available in 1978 from  three 
major producers. These products largely differed  only in composition with 
respect to the three plant nutrients—nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash. In this 
setting, labeling presumably allows the consumer to choose the most suitable 
product for  a particular situation, and the identity of  the selling firm  may well be 
irrelevant. 
As product characteristics become more subtle and thus more difficult  to 
enumerate and measure, a company will use separate brand names to identify 
products with specific  sets of  characteristics. For example, automobile manu-
facturers  sell a variety of  models which presumably differ  as to the amounts of 
the characteristics—transportation, safety,  prestige, etc.—each provides. In 
the limit, if  a company is (somehow) precluded from  developing a multiplicity of 
brands, the relevant brand will be the name of  the company itself.  In that 
situation, where the nature of  the product precludes direct communication of 
component characteristics and the firm  name is the brand, each supplier will 
produce a product with a single set of  characteristic quantities. 
Turning to the location decision, rent seeking suppliers can be expected to 
locate (i.e., choose a vector) in response to demand and the location choices of 
other suppliers. Unfortunately,  the economics literature offers  few  general 
results on equilibrium location choices, as solutions are very sensitive to 
alternative plausible assumptions about the behavior of  competitors, the nature 
of  the space in which competition occurs, and the distribution of  customers 
[Eaton and Lipsey, 1975]. However, some insights can be obtained by 
considering the basic factors  which affect  the location decision [see Waterson, 
1984]. 
Three cost elements enter into economic models of  location: 
a. a transportation cost per unit of  distance, 
b. production costs which can consist of  a fixed  and/or variable component, 
and 
c. relocation costs. 
The existence of  fixed  costs is crucial to the solution. If  there are no fixed  costs 
of  production, then firms  will simply produce at all points at which there are 
customers. That is, demand will be perfectly  satisfied  without the incurrence of 
transportation costs. The assumption of  fixed  costs implies that the number of 
suppliers must be limited to maintain profitability;  hence customers will vary in 
distance from  the nearest supplier. A second key assumption concerns the 
possibility of  relocation. That is, once a supplier chooses a location, are there 
costs of  relocation? In general, if  relocation is costless but there are fixed 
production costs, there is no unique equilibrium solution [Eaton and Lipsey, 
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1975]. Conversely, if  initial location choice is irreversible and suppliers enter a 
market sequentially, then the equilibrium location pattern will be symmetrical 
for  a uniform  distribution of  customers. For example, if  buyers are uniformly 
scattered along a line segment of  fixed  length, sellers will anticipate that 
unusually large "gaps" in the market will be filled  by competitors and hence 
will array themselves at equally spaced intervals [Waterson, 1984]. However, if 
customers are located in clusters, a closer packing of  suppliers will occur in 
areas of  high demand density with the "gaps" increasing in width in areas of 
low demand density [Shaw, 1982]. 
Let us now relate these ideas to the audit service. If  different  quantities of 
control, credibility, and product line scope can be readily observed and 
measured by top management (i.e., these attributes are like nitrogen, 
phosphorus, and potash!), it would seem that each audit firm  can produce a 
multiplicity of  characteristic vectors to meet (perhaps imperfectly  if  there are 
fixed  costs) client demand. However, even if  top management possesses such 
complete information,  the situation is complicated by the fact  that credibility  is 
purchased  solely  to influence  the decisions  of  shareholders  and  creditors.  These 
outside parties, who may be numerous and geographically scattered, are very 
unlikely to possess complete information.  We therefore  conclude that, for 
them, the audit firm's  brand name or reputation is the relevant measure of 
credibility. However, brand name will be less important for  the other two 
characteristics where the outputs (and inputs) can be more easily observed by 
top management, who directly value these characteristics. An implication is 
that each audit firm  will be identified  with a single level of  credibility at any 
moment in time, but may offer  a multiplicity of  control levels and, perhaps, 
product scope levels.13 In the next section, we analyze the auditor choice 
decision given this information  asymmetry and develop more precisely our 
notions of  credibility, brand name, and reputation. 
With respect to the product location decision of  auditors, the first  step is to 
identify  the analogues of  transportation, production, and relocation costs. Note 
that transportation costs are incurred whenever suppliers and customers are 
physically separated. Thus, in a characteristic space, an analogous cost arises 
if,  given the equilibrium distribution of  characteristic vectors of  suppliers, top 
management incurs an opportunity loss of  wealth or utility. For example, 
suppose managers rationally want to purchase an audit of  near zero credibility, 
but no such service is available on the market. Acquiring a credible audit 
implies an opportunity loss or transportation cost.14 Or suppose management 
wants an audit of  certain credibility from  a supplier who also specializes in a 
certain type of  consulting service, but no such supplier exists. Again, an 
opportunity loss is incurred. From the previous discussion, note that such 
opportunity losses will arise only if  there are fixed  costs of  producing at certain 
locations, that is, particular characteristic vectors. 
Since very little is known about the production functions  of  public account-
ing firms,  we can only speculate about the importance of  fixed  costs in 
producing a level of  control, credibility, and product scope. However, it seems 
likely that there are significant  fixed  costs associated with a firm's  capital 
commitments. The most important of  these will be the technology adopted and 
the human capital (expertise) of  professional  staff.  For example, Kinney [1985] 
has argued that auditing firms  can be categorized on an audit technology 
81 
dimension into "unstructured" vs. "structured" firms.  The first  group tends 
to minimize the constraints imposed on professional  judgment whereas the 
second uses statistical methods, decision aids, etc. to constrain and "improve" 
judgment. It seems plausible that fixed  costs increase as "structure" in-
creases. Fixed costs are also likely to increase as the professional  staff 
becomes more specialized (narrow). For example, the offering  of  a specialized 
consulting service to clients, such as industrial engineering for  plant design and 
cost control, no doubt adds to an audit firm's  fixed  costs. 
Two conclusions follow  from  this discussion. First, auditing firms  probably 
vary in the level of  fixed  costs they incur. Second, the higher the fixed  cost 
commitment, the less flexible  the firm  will be in producing a variety of 
characteristic vectors. This seems to be the basis for  the often  heard claim that 
small audit firms  are more flexible  in meeting a client's demands, although large 
firms  may be more efficient  in performing  specific,  complex tasks. With respect 
to the three audit service characteristics, fixed  costs can be important in all 
cases. As a result, all possible combinations of  control, credibility, and product 
scope are not likely to be available in the market. 
Finally, consider the costs incurred by an audit firm  when attempting to 
move from  one characteristic vector to another vector. Typically, relocation 
costs are those fixed  production costs which are "sunk" at a specific  location. 
These costs may be particularly high when information  about characteristics is 
conveyed by the brand name. Schmalensee [1978] points out that, for 
consumer goods, the "repositioning" of  brands can be so costly that it is 
frequently  cheaper to simply abandon an established brand whose sales have 
fallen  to low levels and introduce a new brand. Again, while there is no 
empirical evidence on the point, such costs are likely to exist in auditing. For 
example, if  an audit firm  invests in structured technologies which facilitate  the 
production of  high levels of  control and credibility but are unnecessary for 
producing low levels of  these characteristics, an attempted move from  the high 
level will be costly. Or, if  a firm  enters into an employment contract with a 
specialized consultant, firing  the consultant will be costly. Perhaps most 
important, as with consumer goods, it may be very costly for  a firm  to change 
the credibility level associated with its brand name. In fact,  high costs of 
directly relocating a brand may be an important motivation for  mergers 
between CPA firms. 
If  costs of  relocation are substantial (therefore  locations more or less fixed), 
the characteristic vectors of  audit firms  will tend to be separated. For example, 
there will be an array of  credibility levels associated with firm  brands. Thus any 
grouping of  suppliers into broad classes such as Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight is 
necessarily arbitrary and should be tested for  within-group homogeneity. Note, 
however, that audit firm  product vectors will  tend to be clustered in response 
to concentrations of  client demand. 
2.5 Welfare  Implications  of  Product  Differentiation 
When dealing with differentiated  products, a social welfare  question which 
can be asked is this: given a location equilibrium, will the variety of  characteris-
tic vectors offered  for  sale in the market be optimal?15 This evaluation involves 
a trade-off.  On the one hand, the greater the variety of  characteristic vectors, 
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the better the market caters to diverse consumer tastes and preferences.  On 
the other hand, the assumption of  differentiated  products (imperfect  sub-
stitutes) implies that the demand curves faced  by suppliers are downward 
sloping and equilibrium must occur where average production costs are still 
falling.  Thus differentiated  products imply a loss of  efficiency.  Unfortunately, 
the welfare  properties of  the free  market solution depend on the specific  values 
of  parameters. That is, in general too many or too few  product varieties may be 
produced and sold [Friedman, 1983]. Hence beyond these general statements 
the economic literature offers  no conclusion about the welfare  implications of 
product differentiation  in auditing from  the usual perspective. 
However, a somewhat different  question appears to be more relevant here; 
namely, is it socially desirable for  auditors to offer  differentiated  services at all 
to their clients? Since the demand for  auditing is not a consumption demand but 
rather is derived from  top management's objective function  which is assumed 
to be maximization of  own wealth or utility, are demand differences,  in some 
sense, socially legitimate? There is no special problem if  top management's 
objective is consistent with the objectives of  shareholders and creditors. Such 
mutuality of  interests would occur with respect to the characteristics control 
and product  line scope. That is, all three parties are presumably interested in 
efficient  monitoring of  organization subordinates and efficient  acquisition and 
utilization of  consulting services. However, the credibility characteristic is 
clearly different  in that the purpose of  auditor credibility is to ameliorate an 
agency problem between top management and the other two groups. Thus, the 
legitimacy of  product differentiation  on this dimension is likely to be a 
controversial, but interesting question. To answer the question, we must 
analyze the nature, role, and demand for  credibility in more detail. 
III. Auditor Credibility and Auditor Choice 
3.1 Nature  of  Audit  Service  Credibility 
Dopuch and Simunic [1982] describe auditor credibility as follows  (p. 407): 
An auditor's attestation to the authenticity of  financial  statements adds 
credibility to these top management assertions. Credibility is judged by 
users. More credible reporting simply means a report is more likely to 
be truthful  or lack intentional misrepresentation. . . . Shareholders will 
rationally expect that attestation by a credible auditor reduces the 
probability that management is able to successfully  conceal 'self-serving 
behavior.' 
This is consistent with both Watts and Zimmerman [1980] and De Angelo 
[1981(b)] who argue that the ex ante value of  an audit to shareholders and 
creditors depends on these individuals' (or "the market's") perception of  the 
joint probability that a given auditor will discover errors and irregularities in a 
set of  financial  statements and report those findings  truthfully  (without 
omission or bias).16 Recall that this is also De Angelo's definition  of  audit 
quality. 
The concept can be made more precise by considering a simplified  Bayesian 
model of  an auditor's decision problem. Assume an auditor faces  a two-action, 
two-state reporting decision where the states of  nature are: (s1) — the financial 
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statements are correct, and (s2) — the financial  statements are materially 
incorrect. The available actions are: (a1) — give an unqualified  opinion, or (a2) 
— give an appropriately qualified  or adverse opinion. Assume the auditor has 
performed  all the usual audit tests at a certain intensity level, measured by n, 
which yield possible signals, t. Further, the test results, t, indicate the 
presence of  only immaterial errors. Then the posterior probability of  s 2 will be: 
p"(s2|t,n) = 
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2) 
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2) + 1(t|n,s1)(1 -p'(s2)) 
where 
p" = a posterior distribution on the states 
p' = a prior distribution on the states 
1 = a likelihood function 
This expression can be simplified  if  it is assumed that the auditor cannot commit 
a Type I error. That is, if  the auditor receives a signal, t, which indicates 
material errors are present, he will keep sampling. If  the state of  nature is s1, 
additional evidence should lead to the discovery that sampling error is 
responsible for  the faulty  signal. Thus, 1(t|n,s1) = 1 and17 
p"(s2|t,n) = 
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2) 
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2) + (1-p '(s2)) 
Assume that, given p"(s2), the auditor will take action a1. 
A measure of  the credibility of  the financial  statements  (the "package") 
reflecting  all available information  about management, the auditor, and organi-
zational and environmental factors  would be 1-p"(s2). On the other hand, a 
measure of  the credibility of  the auditor,  or audit service, is 1 - 1(t|n,S2), which 
is the power of  the auditor's tests (the complement of  the probability of  a Type 
II error). 
3.2 Demand for  Credibility 
It is generally agreed that a major purpose of  financial  statements is to 
provide information  which is useful  in assessing a company's future  cash flows 
[e.g., Beaver, 1981]. It is also reasonable to assume that when top manage-
ment has agency relationships with creditors and shareholders, errors in 
financial  statements (both historical statements and those to be delivered in the 
future)  will not be merely random or capricious. Rather, such errors will tend to 
reflect  top management's own expected utility maximizing motives, which will 
typically be to induce financial  statement users to overestimate  these flows. 18 
The probability that such errors are detected ex ante (before  users assess the 
firm's  cash flows)  increases with the credibility of  the audit. 
The cash flows  of  the firm  are important because the wealth of  users will be 
a function  of  such flows  and any errors in their assessment. For example, 
unrecorded liabilities may cause a banker to assess a downward biased 
probability of  the borrower's bankruptcy and hence, charge too low an interest 
rate. Or, overstated historical revenues may cause a purchaser of  common 
stock to pay an inflated  price relative to the true value of  shares. Of  course, if 
the error is subsequently discovered, an injured user will seek to recover his 
losses from  any person who, through negligence or fraud,  created the error or 
failed  to detect and report it. But such ex post compensation is not likely to be 
complete. As a result, users will value a credible audit ex ante and, ignoring the 
costs of  auditing, prefer  more credibility to less. 
In order to transform  the ex ante value of  credibility to users into an 
effective  demand for  credibility by top management, it is necessary to identify  a 
mechanism through which costs to users from  possible financial  statement 
errors are imposed (at least partially) ex ante on top management. A reasonable 
assumption is that users of  financial  statements are rational and "price protect'' 
themselves in transactions with management. That is, they anticipate the costs 
that top management, acting in its own self-interest,  can impose upon them, 
and adjust the terms of  contracts accordingly. An extreme form  of  "price 
protection" is refusal  to transact. For example, a bank may demand a high rate 
of  interest on a commercial loan where the application is supported by 
unaudited financial  statements, or may simply refuse  to make such a loan. Or a 
prospective shareholder will submit a low bid for  stock if  the company's 
financial  statements have not been verified  by a credible auditor, or may refuse 
to buy such shares. Thus, under the rational user assumption, top managers 
will demand credible auditing in their own interests. 
The auditor's decision problem from  the previous section can be extended 
to provide insights into the demand for  credibility. Assume a particular user 
assesses the present value of  a company's future  cash flows,  given all the 
available information,  including a set(s) of  unaudited  financial  statements, as the 
value, ø.19 However, if  these statements contain a material error(s), actual cash 
flows  will yield a lower present value of  ø-w. The user's wealth is some 
increasing function,  g, of  the firm's  cash flows.  Thus, the user's expected 
wealth is 
[1-P'(s2)]g(ø) + p'(s2)g(ø-w) {3.1} 
where p' is his assessed prior distribution on the states. 
Note that a credible but costless audit can benefit  the user in two ways: 
1) The audit can induce a Bayesian revision of  p' to a posterior distribution, 
p". If  p"(s2) < p'(s2), the user's expected wealth is increased. 
2) If  the user is risk averse, the auditor may function  as an insurer against 
the risk of  loss of  w, thus increasing the user's expected utility. 
However, after  assuming the risk, the auditor will himself  be motivated 
to minimize the insurance premium by performing  an audit examination. 
This will lead to a Bayesian revision of  the auditor's  prior, p', to a 
posterior distribution, p". 
In both cases, if  audit credibility were costless, a perfect  audit, which reduced 
p"(s2) to zero, would be demanded.20 
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3.3 Determinants  of  the Level of  Credibility  Demanded 
However, credibility is not a free  good and its cost is normally borne by the 
audited company. Given the other audit service attributes, the auditor's fee  for 
credibility is X2c2q and for  a specific  company (fixed  q), an increase in c2 
requires an increase in audit intensity, n. Thus, choice of  credibility can be 
conceptually reduced to choice of  n. 
The ideal way to proceed at this point would be to specify  a model of  the 
determination of  audit intensity in a multiple person setting, obtain an optimum 
solution, and perform  comparative static analysis to identify  demand determin-
ants. However, this approach is not possible as no such model exists. 
A more restrictive but useful  approach is to consider the choice of  n by a 
representative risk neutral user in a single-person decision setting. That is, the 
user either performs  the audit himself  or delegates its performance  to an 
auditor whose interests are perfectly  aligned with his own. Assume there is an 
audit technology and an associated cost function,  γ(n). Given p', g(w), and a 
loss from  Type I error,21 all assessed by the user, an optimum audit intensity, 
n*, can be calculated by performing  a Bayesian preposterior analysis. It is well 
known (e.g., see Kinney, 1975) that, in this setting, n* is an increasing function 
of  two key parameters of  the problem, the loss from  Type II error, g(w), and 
the value of  p'(s2). Assume the "auditor" performs  this optimum examination, 
receives the signal t, which indicates no material errors exist, and issues an 
unqualified  opinion. Then the representative user's expected wealth after  the 
audit is 
[1-p"(s2|t,n*)]g(ø-γ(n*)) + p"(s2|t,n*)g[ø- w-γ(n*)] {3.2} 
where γ(n*) is also the auditor's fee,  λ2c2q. The net gain from  auditing, and 
receiving an unqualified  opinion, to the risk neutral user is {3.2} minus {3.1}. 
This must be positive, since n* was computed optimally by equalizing the 
marginal value of  information  to marginal audit cost. 
This analysis suggests that users' demand for  credibility will depend on two 
factors: 
1) the larger the loss from  material financial  statement error, the higher the 
level of  audit service credibility demanded, and 
2) the higher the prior probability users assess that the financial  statements 
will be materially in error, the higher the level of  credibility demanded. 
If  users can price protect themselves in transactions with management, these 
factors  can also be expected to drive top management's demand for  audit 
credibility. 
Before  proceeding further,  it is useful  to consider the exact sources of  the 
benefits  from  credibility implicit in our analysis of  the problem. Expression 
{3.1} states that user wealth is lower in state s2 than in s1. It is the avoidance of 
this loss which drives the demand for  credibility. In some cases, by detecting 
material errors when they exist, an audit can simply shift  a cost from  users to 
top management. However, in the majority of  cases, when no material errors 
are detected (or detected errors are corrected), an audit can overcome an 
information  asymmetry between management and users about the presence of 
material errors in the. financial  statements. This is valuable to managers whose 
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statements (unknown to users) are, in fact,  "fairly  presented." Finally, the 
knowledge that an audit will be performed  can have a direct productive  effect, 
resolving a "moral hazard" problem [e.g., Baiman, 1982] thus reducing 
agency costs in the relationship between top management and users. This will 
occur if  managers anticipate that a credible audit will reduce their ability to 
conceal actions (e.g., shirking) that are not in the best interests of  users. 
In addition to these effects  an audit may also have some insurance value to 
risk averse users. But such a role is dubious, since auditors are not strictly 
liable for  losses to users; even under the most severe liability statutes, an 
auditor can invoke a "due diligence" defense.  However, recent court decisions 
[e.g., Collins, 1985] suggest that this insurance role of  auditors may be 
increasing in importance. 
3.4 Effect  of  Information  Asymmetry About Audit  Service 
Production 
If  one assumes that users can observe the production function  of  the 
auditor, hence the power of  the auditor's tests and the level of  credibility 
delivered, any auditor could supply any level of  credibility demanded by top 
management.22 But this is clearly not the case. The auditor has complete 
information  about his production process, and top management may be able to 
observe audit production imperfectly.  However, users are precluded from 
directly observing the performance  of  the audit. As stated in the last section, 
this information  asymmetry will cause users to rely upon the auditor's brand 
name or reputation as a surrogate measure of  audit service credibility. We now 
develop this argument. 
A possible method which could be suggested to overcome the information 
asymmetry would be simple disclosure of  the details of  the auditor's examina-
tion. In fact,  one could even argue that the current stylized claim to audit 
performance  "in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards" is 
sufficient,  since the reader is informed  that the auditor "did what he should 
have done" in the circumstances. However, the auditor is an economic agent 
who can be expected to pursue his own self-interest,  and such disclosures and 
claims are in themselves meaningless. This is so because the information 
asymmetry is associated with a moral hazard problem between the auditor and 
users. In the absence of  observation, the user has no reason to believe that the 
auditor has performed  the examination he claims to have performed. 
Note that users (as principals) can attempt to resolve this moral hazard 
problem by contracting with the auditor on mutually observable information  of 
some sort. This approach is taken in two agent analyses of  the auditing 
problem, such as in Antle [1982]. However, these models are of  little empirical 
relevance because, in the real world, such contracting simply does not occur. 
Moreover, even the terms of  any contract between the top management and 
the auditor are not observable to users. 
Hence, because an auditor cannot directly communicate, in a meaningful 
way, variations in the power of  his tests and users value different  levels of 
credibility in different  circumstances, auditors  must specialize in the delivery of 
credibility levels. That is, while an auditor's credibility may change over time, it 
must be fixed  at a moment in time across engagements. Returning to the 
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fertilizer  example, an auditor cannot combine different  proportions of  nitrogen, 
phosphorus, and potash as required by users and sell these different  products 
in uniform,  unlabeled bags! 
As a result, each auditor's brand name or reputation will imply delivery of  a 
certain level of  credibility and, at any moment, there is a fixed  rank ordering of 
auditors based on perceived credibility. Top management's choice among 
different  credibility levels thus requires a choice among auditors. 
3.5 Reputation  Investments,  Audit  Failure,  and Auditor 
Liability 
An auditor can acquire a reputation to perform  audits of  a certain level of 
credibility through various means. For example, it is likely that he must invest 
in technology, physical facilities,  personnel and their knowledge, organization 
control systems, etc. to efficiently  produce a credibility level. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to assume that efficient  production of  more powerful  audit tests 
requires a higher level of  such investments. Thus users could infer  the 
auditor's credibility level by observing these investments directly, through 
advertising, or through informal  communication of  various sorts. Note that 
auditor specialization imposes a far  lower information  burden upon users than 
would a need to infer  varying credibility for  each auditor  for  each audit!  Note 
also that the higher the level of  fixed  investments which are specialized to 
production of  a certain credibility level, the higher the relocation costs and the 
more stable the auditor's brand name over time. 
A potentially useful  source of  information  about brand name is the rate of 
audit failure  for  which an auditor is held to be liable. However, the connection is 
not a direct or simple one. Consider the following  descriptions of  four  possible 
engagements: 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
P'(s2) .2 .5 .5 .5 
g(w) $1 $1 $2 $2 
n n1 n2 n3 n1 
(n2>n1) (n3>n2>n1) 
1-β .90 .95 .99 .90 
Auditor X Y Z Z 
P"(s2) .02 .05 .01 .09 
In Case #1, the user's assessment of  the prior probability of  material error and 
the loss from  such an error leads to a demand for  audit credibility of  1 — β 
(where β is the conditional probability of  a Type II error) of  .90. The user 
believes this power of  a test will be delivered by auditor X and, after  observing 
an unqualified  opinion signed by auditor X, will assess a posterior probability of 
undetected material error, of  .02. Note that 1 -p"(s2) or .98 is the user 
assessed credibility of  the financial  statement package. In Case #2, since the 
user assesses a higher prior probability of  material error, he demands a higher 
power test which, he believes, is supplied by auditor Y. Case #3, with a higher 
assessed error cost, motivates a demand for  a still higher level of  credibility, 
which the user believes is supplied by auditor Z. 
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An audit failure  occurs when there is actual ex post discovery of  a material 
error in a set of  audited financial  statements. Note that, when auditing is costly, 
a rational user anticipates this possibility whenever p"(s2)>0. However, if  an 
error is actually discovered, a user who relied on the auditor's brand name is 
motivated to seek recovery of  losses suffered  on account of  the error and may 
file  suit against the auditor (and top management). The auditor, on the other 
hand, will raise a due diligence defense  and maintain that he was not negligent 
in the performance  of  the audit.23 If  the auditor complied with generally 
accepted auditing standards and obtained evidence deemed by the court to be 
sufficient  and appropriate in the circumstances, he will not be liable to the user. 
If  the user, the auditor, and the court all have homogeneous assessments of 
p'(s2) and g(w), then auditors X, Y and Z should not be liable in Cases #1 to 3. 
In each instance, the auditor promised to deliver a certain level of  credibility 
through his brand name and did so. However, in Case #4, auditor Z is expected 
to deliver a test whose power is .99 but fails  to perform  such a test. The user 
believes the posterior probability of  loss is .01, but faces  an actual probability of 
loss of  .09. If  an audit failure  occurs, a lawsuit is filed,  and the court agrees with 
the user's parameter assessments (i.e., that a .99 audit was appropriate in the 
circumstances), the auditor should be found  negligent and liable to the user for 
losses.24 
Given this process, what rates of  successful  litigation can users expect to 
observe with respect to auditors and what is the information  conveyed by these 
rates? Because of  the inherent uncertainties surrounding the audit and litigation 
process, the auditor's credibility level which is assessed as delivered ex post 
can be viewed as a drawing from  a probability distribution, whose mean is the 
current credibility level associated with a brand name. Under these circum-
stances, the normal rate of  successful  litigation  across all  credibility  levels  should 
be approximately  uniform.  Any auditor can be found  negligent in supplying a 
service, no matter what the exact specification  of  that service. Thus auditor 
"hit rates" provide no information  about the absolute or relative (across 
auditors) powers of  auditors' tests as such. However, if  an auditor experiences 
an unusually high "hit rate" during a period, this may be evidence that he is 
reducing his delivered credibility level to a lower value. That is, the rate 
provides information  about deterioration (intentional or unintentional) of  the 
auditor's reputation. Conversely, if  the auditor experiences an unusually low 
rate, this may be evidence that he has increased the power of  his tests beyond 
expected levels and is repositioning his brand name by investing in reputation. 
3.6 Implications  of  the Analysis  for  Auditor  Behavior 
An auditor's brand name or reputation is the basis on which users predict 
the level of  credibility he will deliver. A wealth maximizing auditor can be 
expected to position his brand in the market seeking to maximize his monopoly 
rents. That is, he will seek a niche where there is high demand and few 
competitors. In addition, if  there are sunk costs associated with a particular 
credibility level, his return on these immovable investments is a quasi-rent 
[Klein, Crawford  and Alchian, 1978]. To protect his rents an auditor is 
motivated to maintain intertemporal stability in his delivered credibility level. 
Other things being equal, the higher the rents, the greater the motivation to 
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maintain the level of  service [Klein and Leffler,  1981]. However, note that rents 
can exist at any credibility level in the market. 
It is useful  to contrast this result with De Angelo's claim, discussed in 
Section 1, that larger audit firms  will report more truthfully  than smaller firms 
for  fear  of  losing their larger aggregate quasi-rents. Note that De Angelo 
focuses  on the second aspect of  credibility, that an auditor will report  his findings 
honestly, rather than the probability of  discovery  of  errors in audit testing which 
is the focus  of  our analysis. This is an important difference  because an auditor 
who fails  to report a known material error commits a fraudulent  act, not mere 
negligence. Penalties for  fraud,  if  discovered, tend to be severe no matter what 
the circumstances. In particular, potential penalties an auditor faces  personally, 
such as a jail sentence and loss of  certification  and license to practice, probably 
override any concerns with rents. Thus, one can reasonably argue that the 
probability of  deliberate misrepresentation by auditors is constant, regardless 
of  the auditor's brand name. However, a reporting issue may well arise when 
the criteria determining what constitutes an error and/or materiality are 
ambiguous. These situations require the exercise of  professional  judgment and 
the ability to make decisions deemed to be "correct" ex post can vary among 
auditors. Such abilities can readily be encompassed in the concept of  power of 
test and hence auditor brand name. 
Returning to De Angelo, our analysis then differs  from  hers in two basic 
ways. First, her focus  on the probability of  misrepresentation as the element of 
credibility on which audit firms  differ  casts an unnecessarily pejorative tone on 
product differentiation.  Second, she makes an extreme assumption about 
relocation alternatives—namely, if  an auditor is caught cheating, he will lose his 
other clients. Thus her quasi-rents from  multi-period pricing motivate stability 
of  location, but the auditor's choice is simply the current location (which is a 
mechanistic function  of  audit firm  size) and being out of  the market! By 
contrast, in our analysis, the prospect of  earning monopoly rents motivates an 
auditor's brand name location while the desire to maintain monopoly rents and 
quasi-rents from  any immovable resources motivates an auditor to remain in 
that location over time. 
To summarize and illustrate these ideas, consider how auditors are 
expected to match-up with a set of  available clients. Assume three companies 
where users value low, medium, and high levels of  auditor credibility, 
respectively, and three auditors (X, Y and Z) exist. Assume the auditors agree 
with user assessment of  p'(s2) and g(w) and hence with the power of  tests 
appropriate in each situation. Also, the auditors have homogeneous production 
functions  and can produce the three levels of  auditing for  $100, $200, and $300, 
respectively. The possible auditor-company pairings are shown below: 
Credibility Demanded 
Auditor Low Medium High 
X $100 $200 $300 
Y $100 $200 $300 
Z $100 $200 $300 
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Assume audit services are differentiated  but an auditor can "tailor" an 
examination to the demands of  users through explicit contracting. Now if  the 
audits were put up for  bid, each auditor's bid would at least cover his costs for 
each client and, in a competitive setting, auditor choice would be indeterminate. 
Now assume auditors have brand names in the eyes of  users where X — 
low, Y — medium, Z — high. The bids on the main diagonal are clearly 
acceptable to users. However, the upper right hand off-diagonal  bids are not 
acceptable because the production process is not observable. Moreover, even 
if  auditors are liable for  negligence, these bids are still not acceptable so long as 
users value credibility ex ante because litigation is not a perfect  substitute for 
loss prevention (i.e., users do not expect full  loss recovery from  the auditor). 
The off-diagonal  bids at the lower left  are somewhat more problematic. 
Given the brand names, the bids are acceptable to users, who would appear to 
be receiving a free  good from  auditors Y and Z. Moreover, since auditors agree 
with users as to the power of  tests appropriate in the circumstances, there is 
no expected auditor liability problem! The difficulty  here arises from  the 
assumption that production functions  are homogeneous. If,  in fact,  there are 
fixed  costs of  producing a particular credibility level and higher credibility 
production is associated with higher fixed  costs, then these off-diagonal  bids 
would tend to be higher, for  a given company, than those on the main diagonal. 
Thus auditor choice would be determined consistent with the perceived brand 
name. 
Finally, note that in this example since there is only one auditor appropriate 
for  each company, auditors will earn monopoly rents. However, in general, 
there can be many auditors at a particular location in the limit driving monopoly 
rents to zero [see Rosen, 1974]. 
3.7  An Alternative  View:  Credibility  As a Posterior  Probability 
In previous subsections, auditor credibility has been identified  with the 
power of  the auditor's tests. An alternative possibility is to associate it with the 
posterior probability of  financial  statement error, or 1 -p"(s2). Note that this 
corresponds with what has previously been labeled the credibility of  the 
financial  statement package. This alternative view is attractive because it 
assumes that users care about the possibility of  financial  statement errors and 
their consequences, but not about the separate contributions of  the auditor and 
top management. Consistent with this assumption, auditors may be liable for  all 
undetected material financial  statement errors, but users still value credibility 
ex ante because expected loss recovery is not complete. In this setting, an 
auditor's brand name would imply a level of  1-p"(s2). That is, different 
auditors would be associated with a different  posterior probability that the 
financial  statements were erroneous. However, the Bayesian revision would be 
performed  only by the auditor; users would be concerned only with p"(s2). In 
effect,  the user delegates to the auditor the responsibility for  performing  tests 
consistent with various prior probabilities of  error. 
The demand for  different  levels of  1-p"(s2) can be derived from  the 
different  dollar (or utility) consequences users face  in different  circumstances. 
That is, the greater is g(w), the higher the level of  credibility demanded. Since 
auditor tests and p"(s2) are not observable directly, users must still rely upon 
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the auditor's brand name which must be assessed from  various sources of 
information,  including advertising, levels of  fixed  investment, etc. However, 
the rate of  successful  litigation against an auditor can now be associated more 
directly with a brand name. 
As before,  an auditor is motivated to deliver 1 -p"(s2) consistent with his 
brand name to preserve rents at that location. However, since auditors are 
liable for  all undetected errors, the "hit rate" observed will be a proxy for 
p"(s2). Note that each auditor expects to incur a particular "hit rate" and such 
rates are expected to vary. But since auditing is costly, so long as there are 
variations in dollar consequences, variations in auditor credibility and "hit 
rates" are desirable from  an economic point of  view. Again, being a low 
credibility auditor does not have pejorative implications! If  auditors in this 
situation were allowed to invoke a negligence defense,  then the above 
implications would still go through, so long as the success of  such defenses 
were randomly distributed across auditors and engagements. 
While this alternative view of  auditor credibility seems to capture certain 
aspects of  reality (e.g., the delegation for  responsibility to the auditor) better 
than when credibility is identified  with the power of  the auditor's tests, both 
scenarios have essentially the same implications for  auditor choice. 
3.8 Auditor  Choice  by Top  Management 
In the previous section we identified  three audit service characteristics, 
control (c1), credibility (c2), and product line (c3), which top management may 
value. Levels of  control and product line will be demanded through manage-
ment's desire to maximize corporate profits  or firm  value as a determinant of 
management's own compensation. Since there is no conflict  between users and 
management with respect to these two characteristics, the choice can be 
expected to be optimal from  both groups' point of  view. 
There is a conflict  between users and management with respect to auditor 
credibility, and management can be expected to make an optimal choice, given 
its own interests. However, if  users are rational and price protect themselves 
when transacting with management, this choice can be expected to at least 
directionally reflect  users' demand determinants. 
Formally, top management's problems of  choosing an optimum set of  audit 
service characteristics for  a period can be described as follows: 
where Ө is some benefit  function  to top management and F is the audit fee 
function.  Note that the audit service determines an expected present value of 
net cash flows  to the firm  as perceived by financial  statement users. If  users 
are "price protected'' then top management expects to gain from  the purchase 
of  credibility. Also, a constraint is included to recognize that control and 
credibility are likely to be joint products in production and hence not 




Ө[ø(c1,c2,c3) - wp"(s2|c2) - F(c1,c2,c3)] 
{3.3} 
c1 - k(c2) = 0 
92 
Management's solution to this problem determines an optimum character-
istics vector, (c1*, c2*, c3*). However, there is no guarantee that this vector of 
characteristics will be available in the market since, we have argued, production 
of  all three characteristics likely involves fixed  costs. Thus, the final  step will 
be a choice of  the specific  auditor who minimizes opportunity cost (i.e., the 
"transportation cost") associated with the suboptimal choice. 
3.9 Illustrative  Example 
To illustrate some of  the ideas concerning auditor choice developed in this 
section, consider the simple case of  a company with no debt solely owned by a 
100 percent owner and manager who wishes to sell 50 percent of  his common 
shares to an outsider or "user" who will assume an active role in future 
management. (That is, no external agency relationship is created. The situation 
when a new agency relationship arises is examined subsequently.) Assume the 
company has been in business for  one year and the owner has prepared a set of 
unaudited financial  statements which show a net operating cash flow  of  $10,000 
for  the year. The user is risk neutral and has an opportunity rate of  return on 
investment of  10 percent. Assume that the user believes the company's cash 
flows  will follow  a random walk in perpetuity. Thus, the best point estimate of 
future  cash flows  is simply the level earned last year. 
If  the user knows the financial  statements to be accurate, the assessed 
value of  the firm  will be $100,000 and the user should be willing to pay up to 
$50,000 for  a 50 percent interest. However, this is not likely to be the case. 
Rather, the user will recognize that the owner-manager has an incentive to 
overstate the reported cash flows  of  the firm,  but not all owner-managers will 
necessarily do so. If  the financial  statements are in fact  erroneous (assume the 
true cash flows  were only $8,000 last year), the true value of  the firm  is 
$80,000. 
Suppose the user assesses a prior probability of  .3 that the financial 
statements are in error. Since the user can price protect himself  through his 
offering  price for  the shares, it would appear that he would be willing to pay no 
more than 50 percent of  the expected value, or $47,000. Since the manager 
who prepared the financial  statements knows their true state, he knows that 
this price is too high. Thus, he would gladly accept the offer  of  $47,000 if  the 
statements were erroneous, but would reject it if  the statements were correct 
and auditor credibility was available to convince the user of  their truthfulness. 
Assume, for  the moment, that the statements do not contain material 
errors. Suppose an optimum audit, which maximizes {3.3}, costs $3,000 and 
induces a Bayesian revision of  probabilities by the user from  p'(s2) = .3 to 
p"(s2) = .1. Such an optimum audit implies an optimum level of  credibility, or 
c2*, purchased by the manager or (suppressing c1 and c3) 
max .5[$100,000 - $20,000 p"(Si|c2) - F(c2)] = 
.5[$100,000 - $20,000 (.1) - $3,000] = $95,000. 
Note that Ө = .5 in this case is the fraction  of  equity being sold to the user. 
Thus, if  the financial  statements are correct and the auditor cannot commit a 
type I error, he will issue an unqualified  opinion. Having seen this opinion and 
the identity of  the auditor, the user is willing to pay up to $47,500 for  the 
93 
shares. Since the user is price protected both with or without the audit, it is the 
manager who gains from  the purchase of  credibility. 
Returning to the question of  the appropriate offering  price if  there is no 
audit, consider the transaction in a market context. Suppose, for  example, that 
ten investment opportunities of  identical characteristics are available to the 
user. Furthermore, his prior probability of  error is correct in the sense that 
three managers have overstated their reported cash flows  while seven have not 
done so. If  the user, without seeing an audit, offers  to purchase a 50 percent 
interest in some firm  at $47,000, he can be certain that only a manager who 
misrepresented his cash flows  will accept! Thus, he would not, in fact,  offer 
$47,000, but only $40,000. At this price he will be fully  protected against loss 
and managers whose financial  statements are correct will be motivated to 
purchase auditor credibility, as described above. Thus, in a market context, 
where there are many similar potential users, there will be a distribution of 
auditor - client pairings, with perhaps some managers, who misrepresented 
their cash flows,  purchasing no auditor credibility. 
This example illustrates only one possible situation in which auditor 
credibility is valued by managers. The case is referred  to in the literature as an 
"adverse selection problem" [e.g., Baiman, 1982] and credibility here serves 
as a signal of  a manager's honesty, which itself  is exogeneously given. 
However, since the user is fully  price protected against manager misrepresen-
tation, auditor credibility may also change the reporting behavior of  a manager. 
For example, since the manager whose statements are unfair  has fooled  no one 
in this illustration, he may be motivated to correct existing errors and submit to 
a credible audit to increase the selling price of  the shares. 
Now consider the same situation, except that the user does not intend to 
assume an active role in the management of  the firm,  but will retain the former 
owner as the manager. Thus an agency relationship, and an attendant moral 
hazard problem arises. To forecast  future  cash flows  as simply a continuation of 
the historical flow  (either $10,000 or $8,000) would be naive, since the future 
agency costs which can be expected to result from  the manager's reduced 
ownership interest in the firm  are being ignored. Given the manager's known 
future  trade-off  between firm  value and perquisite consumption, assume the 
user forecasts  maximum agency costs to be $1,000 per year. 
In the absence of  the agency relationship, the user would have assessed a 
prior probability of  error of  p'(s2) = .3. However, knowing that the agency 
relationship will be created, we argue that the user is likely to assess a higher 
prior probability that the financial  statements are erroneous. This is so because 
it is in the manager's interest to try to induce the user to bear some or all of  the 
future  agency costs through an initial overvaluation of  the firm.  Moreover, the 
larger  the expected future  agency costs, the larger  the difference  between the 
true and reported cash flows  is likely to be. Returning to the example, if  the 
manager still reports $10,000 and the user believes cash flows  could have been 
$8,000 with a probability of  p'(s2)= .4, he will offer  ½ [($8,000 - $1,000) ÷ 
.1] = $35,000. Again, managers who have not misrepresented their cash flows 
are motivated to hire auditors of  appropriate (and relative to the previous case, 
higher) credibility. Conversely, given the user's complete price protection, 
managers who have initially misrepresented their cash flows  may be motivated 
to change their reporting and purchase a credible audit. 
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Finally, in this case, if the user views a credible audit now as a commitment 
that such audits will continue to be obtained in the future, he may reduce the 
amount of his forecasted future agency costs below $1,000. This is so because 
a credible audit prevents (imperfectly) managers from concealing the effects of 
such behavior (e.g., shirking, consuming excess perquisites, etc.) by overstat-
ing the cash flows reported in future financial statements. Depending upon the 
manager's utility trade-off between firm value now and the present value of 
future perquisite consumption, it may be optimal for the manager to commit to 
such future audits, thereby increasing the elling price of the shares. 
IV. Concluding Comments 
In this paper, we have analyzed the nature of differentiated audit services 
and the determinants of auditor choice. The perspective on the audit services 
market developed here differs ignificantly from the typical textbook view of 
auditing where any auditor can do anything, and also, we believe, from th  
conventional thinking of auditing practitioners and academics. Two  conclusions 
in particular should be emphasized: First, we have argued that differentiation on 
an auditor credibility dimension arises from differences in demand which are 
themselves a function of differences in company characteristics. Thus, a 
ranking of audit firms on acredibility dimension has no pejorative implications. 
Second, given such differences in demand and auditor location, we expect to 
observe a relatively stable distribution f auditor-client pairs which reflects the 
optimum decisions of top management under existing circumstances. As we 
have seen, both the relationship between top management, the auditor, and 
financial statement users, and the characteristics of the audit service are quite 
complex. Our objective has been to develop a logicalstructure for this complex 
reality as a basis for understanding different auditor choices by top manage-
ments of different companies. 
End  Notes 
1. Note that in his study of Australian audit fees, Francis [1984] found no evidence of low-
balling. Also, while De Angelo demonstrates that "low balling" in first period bids is an equilibrium 
strategy in a world of certainty, it is not obvious that this bidding strategy is necessarily an 
equilibrium under uncertainty. However, even if low-balling does occur, the "strength" of the 
collateral bond will decrease over time as the initial fee discount is recovered through quasi-rents. 
Since auditor-client pairings tend to be long-lived (about 20 years on average), the motivational 
impact of the residual collateral bonds that will exist at any moment  in time is not obvious. 
2. Let qi denote the quantity of product of the it h firm and pj denote the price of the product of 
the jt h firm, then the cross elasticity coefficient is 
n ij = (∂qi/qi)/(∂pj/pj) 
where qi = fi(p) is the d mand  function faced by firm i and p1 = (p1.. .pm) is the vector of prices for 
the products of the m firms in the industry. 
3. However, as noted earlier, there is a further complicating factor in such studies in that an 
audit fee is not a  simple price,  but rather the product of price times quantity of service purchased. 
4. The standard assumption is that managers' utility functions include both wealth and effort as 
arguments. Managers  are assumed to derive utility from wealth and disutility from effort. 
However, auditors and their services do not  enter directly into the utility function. 
5. The agency relationship has a long history as a form of social interaction. Ross [1973] 
characterizes the agency relationship as arising "between two (or more) parties when one, 
designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the 
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principal, in a particular domain of  decision problems." Because the agent is himself  an expected 
utility maximizing individual, it is unrealistic to assume that he will always necessarily act so as to 
maximize the expected utility of  the principal. However, the principal can limit the divergence of 
interests by establishing incentives for  the agent and by incurring monitoring costs. Likewise the 
agent may incur bonding costs to guarantee to the principal that he will not take certain actions. But 
these mechanisms are unlikely to perfectly  align the divergent interests of  the principal and 
agent(s)—it is, in fact,  unlikely to be optimal to try to do so—with the result that there will still be 
some residual loss. Note, however, that the expanded opportunity set which the agency 
relationship allows must yield a net benefit  to the principal (and perhaps the agent), else the 
relationship would simply not arise [see Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. 
6. In addition to this potential "asset substitution" problem, Smith and Warner [1979] list 
three other sources of  conflict  between an owner-manager and debtholders: 
1) dividend payment—increasing dividend payout after  the debt issuance (in the extreme, 
paying a liquidating dividend to shareholders, leaving the debtholders with a worthless claim). 
2) claim dilution—unexpectedly issuing additional debt of  equal or higher priority after  the 
current debt issuance. 
3) underinvestment—refusing  to invest in positive net present value projects whose 
primary benefit  accrues to the bondholders. 
7. While only 15 percent of  the companies voluntarily purchased a full  audit, another 69 percent 
purchased either a review or compilation service, which are lower cost partial substitutes for  the 
audit service. Moreover, as with the audit, the primary and secondary reasons given (with 
essentially the same frequencies)  for  the purchase of  these audit substitutes were "control'' and 
"credibility." 
8. In this data set, consulting services were defined  to include any non-audit service except 
corporate tax work (i.e., return preparation, planning, etc.). 
9. Throughout this monograph, the term "client'' refers  to the top management of  a company. 
10. A complete discussion of  the exact nature of  audit credibility is deferred  until Section 3. 
11. More precisely, it is the purchase of  the best form  of  audit opinion (i.e., unqualified, 
qualified,  or adverse) which management can expect given the characteristics of  the financial 
statements being audited. 
12. A related question is—how does the model compare to the way audit fees  are ostensibly 
determined in practice? Audit services not performed  under a fixed  fee  arrangement are normally 
billed using a set of  hourly rates for  the various grades of  professional  labor utilized. Even with a 
fixed  fee,  the amount bid can be conceived as a function  of  expected labor usage and the billing rate 
structure. But this process only defines  a "standard fee"  or upper bound on the amount collected. 
The standard fee  may be discounted for  a variety of  reasons including perceived inefficiencies  in 
labor usage, because the job utilizes resources which would otherwise be idle or underemployed, 
or under the pressure of  competition. In addition, of  course, the process through which standard 
billing rates are set is not known, hence the (billing rate x time) model is not a particularly useful 
way to view the process of  audit fee  determination. 
13. Product scope would be measured by the expertise of  the firm  in supplying various types of 
consulting services. At a moment in time, the total level of  such firm  expertise is fixed.  Note that it 
is the fixed  costs associated with maintaining an expertise level for  sale as needed which will cause 
the implicit price of  scope (λ3) to be positive. However, only certain subsets of  the total service 
package may be relevant and therefore  priced to certain subsets of  clients. For example, the ability 
to design and install computerized hospital accounting systems will be relevant to some clients but 
irrelevant to others. Hence, an audit firm  may simultaneously offer  different  levels of  c 3 to different 
types of  companies. 
14. The offering  of  "near audit services," such as reviews and compilations, by public 
accounting firms  represents an attempt to reduce client opportunity losses in this situation. 
15. The criterion of  optimality normally used is whether the sum of  consumer's surplus plus 
producers' excess profits  is maximized [Schmalensee, 1978]. In an auditing context, consumer 
surplus can be interpreted in the normal way except that the demand curve is derived from  top 
management's objective function. 
16. Auditors frequently  distinguish between "errors," which are mechanistically caused by 
deficiencies  in financial  reporting systems, and "irregularities," which are the result of  intentional 
attempts to bias, conceal, or otherwise misrepresent financial  information.  We make no distinction 
between these situations. However, it has been suggested that optimum audit program design, 
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given the possible presence of  "irregularities," must recognize the gaming nature of  the situation 
[Fellingham and Newman, 1985]. 
17. This is essentially the audit risk model proposed by the Canadian Institute of  Chartered 
Accountants [CICA, 1980]. 
18. Auditors have long recognized that the greatest risk with respect to the financial 
statements of  publicly held companies (and companies with significant  debt) is that assets, and 
hence net income, are overstated. The reasonableness of  this concern was confirmed  by St. Pierre 
and Anderson's [1984] study of  129 lawsuits filed  against auditors in the U.S. during the 1960's and 
1970's. Of  the 334 alleged errors in these suits "none. . .concerned errors in undervaluing  assets, 
recognizing inadequate  amounts of  revenue, or recognizing excessive expenses" (p. 242). 
19. To focus  on the essential auditing aspects of  the problem, assume a world of  certainty, 
except for  the state of  the financial  statements. 
20. This statement assumes that the audit evidence indicates that no material errors exist. 
Presumably, if  top management knew that a perfect  audit would be performed,  they would not 
attempt to deceive users. However, if  this were not the case, the perfect  audit still would resolve 
all uncertainty. Knowing that p"(s2) = 1, users could behave accordingly. 
21. If  the user falsely  rejects the null hypothesis that the financial  statements do not contain 
material errors, he may choose not to transact with top management or may request contract 
terms which will not be acceptable to management. In either case, the user loses whatever net 
benefits  were available to him in the "trade." 
22. Assuming the auditor was technically capable of  performing  an audit of  the company—given 
its size, complexity, geographic dispersion of  operations, etc.; that is, he can deliver the required q, 
efficiently.  Also, efficient  production of  higher levels of  credibility may require higher fixed  costs. 
This is discussed in Section 3.5. 
23. This is, in fact,  his "worst case" defense  under statutes such as the Securities Act of 
1933. Under the Securities Exchange Act of  1934, and probably under common law appealing to 
the Ultramares decision, the auditor can claim a mere absence of  gross negligence or fraud  as his 
defense. 
24. For what amount of  damages should the auditor be liable? In principal, since the auditor 
increased the user expected loss by $.16 through his negligence, this should be the amount of 
damages assessed each time the auditor  is negligent.  However, not all instances of  negligence are 
likely to be discovered ex post. While negligence by the auditor increases the probability  of 
undetected material error (e.g., from  .01 to .09 in case #4), negligence need not result in an actual 
audit failure.  For example, assume auditor Z performs  100 audits in a given year (such as case #4) 
where users expect .99 credibility but only .90 is delivered. Users expect three audit failures  and 
losses of  $6. However, suppose nine audit failures  occur causing losses of  $18. Users will 
presumably seek damages of  $18 but only $12 should be awarded, else the auditor is being 
implicitly held to a perfect  audit standard. Conversely, if  users are only awarded the increase in 
expected loss in each case filed  or $.16 x 9 = $1.44, they are grossly undercompensated. How 
much would actually be awarded is, of  course, an open question but there is no apparent mechanism 
which would motivate a court to award the correct amount of  $12. 
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Discussant's Response to 
"On the Economics of  Product 
Differentiation  in Auditing" 
Howard R. Osharow 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Good afternoon  ladies and gentlemen. First let me express my appreciation 
to the Symposium organizers for  inviting me to start the discussion of  such a 
difficult  topic as product differentiation  in auditing. I also want to express my 
appreciation to Dan and his coauthor for  making this such a challenging 
opportunity. It has been a long time since I have thought of  differentiation  in 
auditing in terms of  formulas  like they use. While I have used some advanced 
mathematical techniques such as regression analysis to determine the reason-
ableness of  inventory levels for  a chain of  400 drugstores, it has been many 
years since I have had to deal with sentences like "Given P', and a loss from 
Type I error, all assessed by the user, an optimum audit intensity, N*, can be 
calculated by performing  a Bayesian preposterior analysis." 
Many of  you are familiar  with the television program Star Trek. I want to 
tell you that after  reading the paper several times I could finally  sympathize 
with Dr. McCoy of  the Starship Enterprise every time he had to try to treat an 
injury to Mr. Spock. Dr. McCoy was a very talented physician, but Mr. Spock 
was a rather unusual character. While, other than his famous  ears, he looked 
human, we know his blood was green and his heart was where your liver might 
be. His various other physical differences  from  a normal human being made him 
quite a challenge to the doctor. I almost feel  like I am playing Dr. McCoy to the 
paper's Mr. Spock. 
In spite of  these deficiencies  in my upbringing, I am going to try to give you 
what I believe is a practitioner's view on product differentiation  in auditing, with 
particular emphasis on the definition  of  the product itself.  Unfortunately,  time 
did not permit me to discuss the contents of  the paper with Dan prior to this 
meeting. If  I had, some of  my comments and questions might be unnecessary. 
But, since our purpose here is to generate a discussion of  the paper and its 
applicability to the world of  auditing, I guess we will still be able to meet our 
objectives. 
We should recognize that the academician and the practitioner tend to come 
at any problem from  different  perspectives. To paraphrase what they say about 
the English and the Americans, academics and practitioners are two profes-
sions separated by a common interest. I have personally found  trying to read 
and understand most academic papers to be an extremely frustrating  experi-
ence, especially when the topic seems to have applicability to what I am 
interested in, but the content leaves me absolutely dumbfounded.  I have been 
heading our firm's  audit research and development efforts  for  the last three 
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years, and have found  very few  academics that I can discuss audit methodology 
with who speak a language that I am capable of  understanding or applying to our 
practice. Maybe that is a deficiency  on my part, but perhaps it is just 
symptomatic of  the different  backgrounds and perspectives of  the academician 
and the practitioner. I do wish there was a more coordinated effort  between the 
academic and practice sides of  our common interests that could make much of 
the research more valuable to the practitioner. 
Let me start the discussion of  the paper by presenting what I call the 
Auditor's Dilemma of  Interests. The auditor, as we are all painfully  aware, 
really has at least two parties interested in the nature of  his services. One of 
these parties is the client, or client management, that engages the auditor to 
report on financial  statements or render other services as may be required. 
The other is the public that looks to the auditor as a "guardian of  the public 
interest.'' Our discussion earlier this morning on the legal liability of  account-
ants touched heavily on this matter. 
One of  my concerns about the paper is that I believe it tends to deal 
unrealistically with the public's attitude toward the auditor and the auditor's 
responsibilities and thus glosses over a major problem of  our time. That 
problem is that the public does not assess ex ante and ex post probabilities in 
determining whether, when there has been a business failure,  they should try 
to sue the auditor. Let us be realistic about it. When a business fails,  investors 
have very few  sources to look to for  recovery of  their funds.  A legal system 
such as we have in the United States tends to make it easy for  an investor to 
look for  someone associated with the company who has funds  to become a 
target of  litigation to recover the lost investment. I do not want to discuss the 
U.S. legal system, but I believe it is unrealistic to say that, in the real world, 
only mismatches between the public's expectation of  an auditor and the 
auditor's actual performance  on the engagement will result in "hits" as they 
are called in the paper. I believe that, in spite of  what the profession  would like, 
the public does perceive the auditor as an insurer of  its investment and 
someone who has the responsibility to signal when that investment might be 
turning sour. 
I believe this has serious implications to the differentiation  model when you 
balance it against the clients who engage the auditor. These clients have 
interests, too. The paper implies that the client (meaning top management of 
the client) will always take the position on issues that will most favorably  reflect 
management's wishes as to the outcome of  the issue. It almost, but not 
directly, implies that management will always select a course of  action that is 
opposite the interest of  the public when it comes to reporting bad news. While I 
am sure that such cases do exist, I do not believe it is always the case. 
Management is not stupid and it does not like to have the auditors waving red 
flags  in front  of  the bull. Neither management nor the auditor would like to see 
an auditor's disclosure become a self-fulfilling  prophesy. Therefore,  it is up to 
the auditor and the client together to agree that the public interest has been 
served without destroying the whole economic system because of  incomplete 
and imperfect  information. 
Thus the auditor's dilemma . . . how does he serve the interests of  the 
client and the public at the same time while serving the other interest which 
thus far  has not been mentioned, that is, the self-interest  of  the auditor in 
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practice? I believe this is where the issue of  differentiation  comes into play. It 
also means it is time that I focused  on a definition  of  the product that the auditor 
produces. 
I believe that the product differs  depending upon your point of  view. For the 
public, the product is the auditor's report, and I agree with most of  the material 
in the paper that tends to indicate that the public's only means of  assessing the 
quality of  that report is by the reputation, or at least the public's perception of 
the reputation, of  the auditor involved, versus the reputation of  auditors as a 
whole. Of  course, the public is working with imperfect  information,  because 
even two audit reports signed by the same firm  do not necessarily carry the 
same amount of  real quality with them. Auditing firms  consist of  people, and 
people do not always react the same way in the face  of  similar information.  So 
while the general marketing of  a firm's  name in the public eye is important, I 
believe it is only important from  that standpoint, that is, a marketing 
standpoint. 
The real key to differentiation  is to understand that the product the auditor 
delivers to the client and client management is not the auditor's report. It is the 
whole relationship of  the auditor with the client. It is the auditor understanding 
what the client expects of  him and what is important to that client, and then 
delivering against those measured objectives. 
Differentiation  takes on another aspect also. It's a different  perspective that 
the potential client or client has on an auditing firm  depending upon whether 
they are an incumbent firm  or whether the company is involved in investigating 
the engagement of  new or different  auditors. It is much easier for  a firm  to 
differentiate  itself  in the mind of  its client when it has been the firm's  auditor for 
a few  years. The incumbent auditing firm  knows the client, its strengths and 
weaknesses, and has hopefully  identified  any "hot points." The rest of  the 
auditing firms  represent a vague world to the client. I think that we have found 
that the only real way to begin to tickle a potential client's fancy  for  selecting 
you as their auditors is to have developed a personal relationship, through 
outside activities or otherwise, with top management of  the potential client. 
This is why accounting firms  devote so much time, effort  and expense to the 
outside activities of  their partners. An accounting firm  cannot differentiate  itself 
through its audit process nor through anything else that another firm  can 
duplicate. What those other firms  cannot duplicate are its individual people and 
the impressions those people leave in the minds of  the clients they serve and 
the potential clients they contact. 
Unfortunately,  there is not sufficient  time today to provide a detailed 
discussion of  client values, but let me conclude this section of  my discussion 
with a comment: the auditor that does not respond to the client's values, and 
indeed respond to the client's highest value, will be unsuccessful  in attempting 
to differentiate  himself  through any of  the tools that he uses on the audit. I 
would propose that the client does not know nor does the client care about the 
audit process. He does not care if  the auditor uses a microcomputer, has a 
pyramid of  six to one or ten to one, or uses yellow or green paper. What he 
does care about is that he has a good working relationship with an audit partner 
who really understands his company. That understanding can be demonstrated 
by being responsive to the company's needs, understanding the company's 
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operations, organization, terminology and management style, and delivering 
the audit in an efficient  manner. 
Let me make one more point about responding to client values and 
differentiation.  Good performance  in a client value area by the practitioner is 
usually not sufficient  to satisfactorily  transfer  the differentiation  impression to 
the client's mind. The auditor's exemplary performance  in meeting the client's 
values must be adequately communicated  so the client is fully  aware of  the 
auditor's accomplishments and his efforts  to satisfy  the client's needs. 
Remember that attempts at differentiation  amongst auditing firms  is irrelevant if 
buyers of  the firms'  services cannot distinguish the differentiating  factors.  The 
auditing firm  must transfer  the differentiation  knowledge to the client and be 
sure the client acknowledges and is aware of  the factors  involved. Again, this is 
much easier for  the incumbent firm  to do than for  a potential auditing firm.  In a 
proposal situation, the client must look to criteria that are indicative of  future 
performance,  such as reputation, industry experience and apparent business 
sense. This is the best alternative available since the client has no actual 
experience working with the firms  being evaluated, except for  the limited 
exposure obtained during the proposal process and any prior personal rela-
tionship with the firm's  personnel. 
In the short time I have, it is not possible to discuss all aspects of  the paper, 
but let me talk about some points that are of  the most concern to me. On page 
100, the authors conclude that "the higher the fixed  cost commitment, the less 
flexible  the firm  will be in producing a variety of  characteristic vectors." It 
implies that a firm  is less flexible  in meeting the real needs of  its client and its 
public if  it has more structure to its audit process than another firm.  I do not 
believe this is necessarily true. I believe it depends on the nature of  the 
structure imposed into the process. If  those things that are required to be done 
on every audit, regardless of  the shape or size of  the company, can somehow 
be put into a structure so they can be dealt with more efficiently,  I believe this 
gives the structured firm  the advantage over one with less structure. Structure 
does not always have to be viewed in a negative sense. In fact,  if  the firm  can 
put positive structure into the process, it could actually spend more time doing 
a better job responding to the client's real values and not have to spend 
significant  amounts of  time dealing with constant elements. If  the auditor can 
spend less time on the audit process, of  which his client and the public care 
very little, more time is available for  responding to that client's real values 
which will differentiate  the auditor in the client's eyes. 
Let me come to the item in the paper that has given me the most trouble. A 
conclusion in the paper states: "A ranking of  audit firms  on a credibility 
dimension has no pejorative implications." Now, to tell you the truth, the first 
thing I had to do with that conclusion was look up the meaning of  "pejorative" 
in the dictionary. And Webster's  tells me that means "having negative connota-
tions." What that conclusion says to me is that, if  an auditor has a name which is 
associated with a low credibility level as far  as the public is concerned, that does 
not have any significant  implications to that auditor. I may have interpreted the 
meaning of  that conclusion wrong, but if  I have not, I find  it very difficult  to 
understand. I cannot understand how you can have a negative reputation in the 
business community as to the quality of  the intrinsic value of  your report versus 
someone else's report and it not have implications for  your practice or your 
103 
relationship with your client. During our discussion period, perhaps we can 
explore whether I have interpreted the conclusion properly and what the 
implications are for  actions that an accounting firm  might take in establishing its 
reputation. 
Finally, let me summarize my comments by putting differentiation  in what I 
think is its proper context in the entire auditing process. The auditing firm 
which does the best job of  balancing the three factors  that must be considered 
when providing service to clients—management of  risk, efficient  conduct and 
reporting of  the audit, and delivering values that are held in the highest regard 
by that client—is the auditing firm  that, in the long run, will be able to 
differentiate  itself  from  its competition. This differentiation  involves hiring the 
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Classical variables techniques can be usefully  employed in certain audit 
situations. They may be useful,  for  example, when auditing high error rate 
populations or accounts with numerous negative balances or when the auditor is 
concerned about both over arid under-statement errors. Classical variables 
techniques may also be useful  when the auditor is concerned with assessing the 
reasonableness of  proposed adjustments in light of  statistical test results. This 
paper reviews several issues associated with the evaluation of  classical 
statistical hypothesis testing results in auditing. Though presented in terms 
relevant to classical statistical testing, some of  the issues reviewed may be 
germane to other statistical or non-statistical approaches to audit sampling as 
well. 
Some of  these issues have been isolated and examined in greater detail by 
other studies. This paper mainly deals with the comparison and reconciliation of 
certain alternative evaluation strategies which can be employed when achieved 
allowances for  sampling risk differ  from  planned levels. This situation can occur 
when the apparent achieved efficiency  of  a sample estimator is different  from 
the level on which the auditor based the audit sampling plan. 
Comparative Evaluation Strategies 
Several strategies are available for  use in evaluating the results of  a classical 
variables hypothesis test. Conclusions drawn from  the evaluation of  sample 
results may vary depending upon which strategy is employed. Three of  these 
strategies are explained and compared in this paper. 
No one of  the three strategies is uniformly  dominant or necessarily superior 
to the others in all situations. However, they can lead to different  conclusions. 
Therefore,  it is important to understand how they differ.  In this respect, the 
selection of  an appropriate evaluation strategy is similar to the dilemma 
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encountered in selecting an appropriate error bound in probability-proportional-
to-size sampling applications (see Felix, Leslie & Neter, 1982). 
We shall identify  the three strategies as: the acceptance risk control 
strategy, the rejection risk control strategy, and the balancing strategy. Figure 1 
depicts and compares the decision sequences associated with the first  two 
strategies. The decision sequence for  the balancing strategy is presented 
separately in Figure 2. Where possible the symbols and terminology used will 
conform  to the AICPA audit sampling literature (e.g. Roberts, 1978; SAS 39; 
and Accounting and Audit Guide—Audit  Sampling,  1983). 
Both approaches described in Figure 1 are relatively well-known strategies 
for  evaluating the results of  classical statistical samples. Evaluation strategies 
based on both approaches appear in the AICPA's publication Audit  Sampling  as 
well as auditing literature and firm  procedure manuals. 
The acceptance risk control strategy for  evaluation of  the results of  classical 
variable hypothesis tests appears in the AICPA publication, Statistical  Auditing 
[Roberts, 1978]. This approach is also referred  to, but not described in detail, 
by the AICPA's guide on audit sampling which supports Statement on Auditing 
Standards #39 (SAS 39) [Auditing Standards Board, 1981]. Sample evaluation 
approaches based on this strategy can be found  in the auditing literature, e.g. 
Guy and Carmichael [1986]. 
The rejection risk control strategy is described in detail in the AICPA 
publication Audit  Sampling  and the audit and accounting guide prepared by the 
Statistical Sampling Subcommittee to support SAS 39. Sample evaluation 
approaches based on this approach can be found  in the accounting literature, 
e.g. Arens and Loebbecke [1981] and Bailey [1981].1 
The balancing strategy which is depicted in Figure 2 was explored by 
Thompson [1982] and is rooted in the work on the utility of  various schemes for 
reporting or summarizing hypothesis testing results done by Leamer [1978]. 
Using this balancing strategy, the auditor would employ an epistemic loss 
minimizing criterion. It could be used as an alternative to the two better known 
traditional strategies. 
In order to set the stage for  the sample evaluation strategies portrayed in 
Figures 1 and 2, it may be useful  to briefly  consider the sample planning 
process. In most descriptions of  audit sampling, in the planning stage, sample 
sizes are determined which will control the risk of  incorrect acceptance (TD) 
and the risk of  incorrect rejection (a) to levels that are acceptable to the auditor 
given ex ante (before  sampling) information  about the population and planned 
statistical estimator. In this regard, the estimated standard error is important. 
The ex ante (planned) allowance for  sampling risk associated with the 
amount A can be compiled based on an estimate of  the standard deviation of  the 
population under examination or the related population of  auxiliary values 
(differences  or ratios between audited and book values, etc.) and on auditor 
decisions about appropriate levels for  the risks of  incorrect acceptance and 
incorrect rejection and about the amount of  tolerable error for  the account or 
balance, TE. Discussions of  this process and factors  affecting  it can be found  in 
the audit sampling literature, especially Guy and Carmichael [1986], Arens and 
Loebbecke [1981], Roberts [1978], SAS 39 and the associated AICPA audit 
guide. The auditor will plan a sample such that if  B ε X ± A, the reported 
amount will be accepted as fairly  presented, whereas if  B is not in the interval X 
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± A, the reported amount will not be accepted as fairly  presented. In each 
instance, B is the book value of  the account or balance and X is the audit 
sampling estimator of  the correct value. The sampling plan will be established 
such that the risk of  incorrect acceptance and the risk of  incorrect rejection of 
the decision interval, X ± A, in relation to TE will be at levels planned by and 
acceptable to the auditor. 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, if  the ex post (after  sampling) information 
agrees with the ex ante estimates (A' = A), then the auditor faces  no special 
evaluation problem, and the three evaluation schemes are the same. That is, 
the decision rule is to accept the book value if  B ε X ± A'. Since this is 
equivalent to B ε X ± A, the associated risks of  incorrect acceptance and 
rejection should be the same as the planned levels. A' is the monetary amount 
which equates the risk of  incorrect rejection associated with this decision rule 
with the planned level for  α. 
Usually, however, after  the sample has been selected and audited, the ex 
Post assessment of  the standard error will be different  from  the ex ante 
assessment, i.e., A' ≠ A. When this is the case, no decision strategy 
discussed in the auditing literature reviewed here will retain the risk of 
incorrect acceptance and the risk of  incorrect rejection at the planned levels. 
For any given sample result, there is a trade-off  between the two risks. In fact, 
there are infinitely  many α and TD risk level pairs that could be established for 
the sample evaluation. In this circumstance, the issue to resolve is how to 
devise an evaluation strategy which will contain risk levels which are preferable 
or acceptable to the auditor. The three strategies discussed here handle the 
balancing of  these risks in different  ways. By understanding the approach and 
the results of  these strategies, the auditor may select one (or devise another 
strategy) that is consistent with his or her preferences. 
The essential differences  among all the strategies reviewed in Figures 1 
and 2 can be traced to different  philosophies about risk control. In our 
discussion we shall highlight the manner in which each strategy deals with this 
dilemma and attempt to explain what the various options imply about the 
relative utility of  incorrect rejection and incorrect acceptance. 
Acceptance Risk Control 
The acceptance risk control strategy, as detailed by Roberts [1978], will be 
reviewed first.  Like each of  the other strategic options discussed, the principal 
purpose is to provide a framework  for  rational evaluation of  a classical statistical 
sample. The objective is to accept or reject the amount being tested, given the 
ex ante specification  of  the risk of  incorrect acceptance, TD, and risk of 
incorrect rejection, α, and the achieved sampling test results.2 
If  the estimated standard deviation used in planning and the sampling 
estimator of  standard deviation are identical, then the potential for  variability in 
sampling results can be properly controlled by relying on the critical limits 
associated with the ex ante allowance for  sampling risk. In such instances, 
A' = A, and an appropriate decision rule is to accept the amount being tested B, 
if  B ε X ± A'. Otherwise it is appropriate to reject the amount being tested. In 
this situation, the planned risks of  incorrect rejection and incorrect acceptance 
are also the levels achieved. 
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In most instances ex post estimates of  the standard error of  the estimator 
will vary from  planned levels, i.e., A' ≠A. In pursuing the "acceptance risk 
control" option as shown in Figure 1, the auditor confronted  with a difference 
between ex ante and ex post estimates of  variability will establish an ex post 
allowance for  sampling risk by relying on an initial decision rule which calls for 
acceptance of  the amount under examination if  that amount exists in the region 
X ± A". In this case, A" is the monetary amount which necessarily equates the 
risk of  incorrect acceptance associated with the new decision rule (TD') with 
the planned level for  TD. In other words, the risk of  incorrect acceptance 
associated with the decision interval X ± A" is equivalent to the level originally 
planned by the auditor. The acceptance risk control approach does not explicitly 
control the risk of  incorrect rejection. At this point, the risk of  incorrect 
rejection may be higher or lower than the planned level, α. In other words, TD 
is fixed  at the planned level and α varies, either higher or lower than the 
planned level. 
The strategy as described so far  can only lead to an acceptance decision 
where B ε X ± A". The preeminence of  TD is justified  because at this point the 
initial decision rule allows only for  acceptance of  the reported amount. If 
acceptance is not possible, then rejection based on statistical evaluation alone 
cannot take place without considering the level of  control over the risk of 
incorrect rejection. 
In fact,  if  the auditor is unable to accept based on the test involving A", then 
this strategy as described by Roberts (1978) calls for  reassessment of  both 
risks. The reassessed values of  these risks are reflected  in Figure 1 as TDR 
and αR. 
Presumably, the failure  to accept based on the analysis of  evidence to this 
point would not lead to an increase in the acceptable level of  either risk when 
this reassessment takes place; however, decreases in either may occur. A 
reduction of  the risk of  incorrect acceptance might be appropriate if,  in the 
auditor's judgment, the sample evidence casts doubt on the appropriateness of 
the level of  reliance on internal control used when initially assessing TD. 
Similar reassessments of  that risk might be made because of  changes in the 
perception of  inherent risk, or the risk associated with other audit test results 
as compared to those used in the initial assessment of  TD. The appropriate 
level for  a revised risk of  incorrect rejection might be lower than initially 
planned because a significantly  larger than expected number of  errors have 
been observed. The likelihood of  encountering circumstances requiring adjust-
ments may indicate that a reduction in the risk of  incorrect rejection is 
warranted. 
After  reassessment of  the two risks, this strategy, as described by 
Roberts, calls for  a test of  conclusiveness. The objective of  such a test is to 
determine whether the sample evidence is sufficient  to control both risks to 
their reassessed levels.3 If  the sample evidence is conclusive, an audit 
conclusion to reject the amount under examination is justified.  Otherwise, the 
auditor will conclude that the sample evidence alone is insufficient  for  a final 
decision and some fallback  option must be pursued. Generally these options 
may include: 1) expansion of  the sample, where feasible;  2) performance  of 
additional substantive procedures to provide additional evidence useful  in 
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fulfilling  the audit objectives for  which the statistical sample is germane; or 3) 
requesting that the client adjust or reconstruct the amount being examined. 
Rejection Risk Control Strategy 
In contrast to the audit planning and evaluation strategy described above, 
statistical testing in many contexts other than auditing are based on direct 
control of  the risk of  incorrect rejection with the risk of  incorrect acceptance 
not explicitly considered. As a result much nonauditing-statistical sampling 
literature is based on direct control of  the risk of  incorrect rejection. Therefore, 
many computer programs that may be useful  for  sample evaluation provide 
output based on control of  the risk of  incorrect rejection. The AICPA audit and 
accounting guide, Audit  Sampling,  considers sample determination and evalua-
tion in this situation. In addition, sample evaluation strategies conceptually 
based on direct control of  the risk of  incorrect rejection and indirect control of 
the risk of  incorrect acceptance can be found  in the auditing literature [e.g. 
Arens and Loebbecke, 1981 and Bailey, 1981]. 
The sample size calculation described in Audit  Sampling  (pp. 93-94) 
permits control of  the risks of  incorrect acceptance and incorrect rejection to 
desired levels by varying the ratio of  the desired allowance (A) to the tolerable 
error based on the table of  ratios in Appendix C of  the guide (p. 115). If  the 
sample statistics are reported in the context of  incorrect acceptance (i.e., A') 
or if  the evaluation process is to focus  on A', the audit guide discusses an 
evaluation strategy that may be used (pp. 94-99). This strategy is pictured in 
Figure 1 and is termed the "rejection risk control option.'' The first  step in this 
process is to ensure that the ex post level of  control of  sampling risks can be at 
least equal to the planned level of  control by determining that the condition A' 
< A exists. If  not, the sample is regarded as insufficient  and fallback  options 
must be considered. If  A' < A, a direct test can be employed. If  B ε X ± A', 
the reported value can be accepted. In contrast to the acceptance risk control 
options, the rejection risk control option strategy initially tests with the risk of 
incorrect rejection set to the original planned level. In this case, the risk of 
incorrect acceptance is allowed to vary, and it will be at a lower level than 
planned (except in the rare case where A' = A, when it will be at the planned 
level). If  B ε X ± A' is not true, additional steps are suggested by the audit 
guide. They are described below. These steps ensure that the reported amount 
will not be rejected simply because sample estimators are more efficient  than 
planned. 
If  A' < A but B does not exist in the region X ± A', the auditor may still be 
able to accept without computing an allowance for  sampling risk related to the 
risk of  incorrect acceptance. To do so, two conditions must be met. One 
condition requires that α < 2TD. This condition ensures that an allowance for 
sampling risk based on α will also be associated with a risk of  incorrect 
acceptance that is no more than TD. To ensure that such is the case, the 
reliability coefficient  used in computing the (far)  end of  the range X ± A' in 
relation to book value must be greater than the reliability coefficient  which 
would be used in determining A" and the associated allowance for  sampling risk 
as related to TD. Because the reliability coefficient  for  α risk is associated with 
two-tail testing, that coefficient  will be greater than the reliability coefficient  for 
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TD only if  the condition α < 2TD exists. Satisfying  this condition effectively 
eliminates the possibility that B - (X - A') could be less than TE or that 
(X + A') - B could be less than TE even though B does not exist in X ± A". 
Without the first  condition the situation which follows  could arise, when 
α > 2TD: 
X-A' X + A' 
< X > A" 
< • 
ft  ft 
Book Value Book Value 
- Tolerable Error 
This would indicate acceptance even though the risk of  the incorrect accept-
ance is greater than TD. 
The second condition requires that X ± A' exist in the region B ± TE. In 
other words, it requires that the difference  between the book value and the end 
of  the range X ± A' farther  from  the book value be less than the amount TE. 
When this condition is met, the risk of  incorrectly rejecting the notion that the 
proper value of  the account or balance in question is not materially different 
from  the book value is less than (or equal to) the level α initially established for 
control of  the risk of  incorrect rejection. 
If  either of  these two conditions fails  to be met, computation of  an allowance 
for  sampling risk based on TD should be undertaken. Sample evaluation is then 
conducted in accordance with the acceptance risk control option steps 
previously discussed. 
The Two Strategies Contrasted 
As discussed, the acceptance risk control option will permit an initial 
acceptance test regardless of  the relationship between A' and A. If  A' < A 
then the sample size is sufficient  to control the risks of  incorrect acceptance 
and incorrect rejection to the planned levels. On the other hand, if  A' > A, 
then the sample is not sufficient  to control both risks to the planned level, and 
the initial decision process holds the risk of  incorrect acceptance to the planned 
level by using the decision interval X ± A". The auditor will not permanently 
reject the reported amount based on this decision process; however, if 
rejection were allowed, the risk of  incorrect rejection would be greater than 
planned where A' > A. 
The sufficiency  test within the rejection risk control strategy prevents such 
an occurrence. This is accomplished by declaring the sample to be inclusive and 
then pursuing fall-back  options in any instance for  which A' > A. In all other 
instances A' < A. 
Without the sufficiency  test, classical statistical hypothesis evaluation using 
the acceptance risk control option is more likely to lead to acceptance than 
would the rejection risk control or sufficiency  test options. Two conditions are 
necessarily associated with those sampling outcomes that lead to acceptance 
under the one strategy but not in the other. First, the ex post estimate of 
variability must exceed the level used in sample size determination. Second, 
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the allowance for  sample risk associated with ex post control of  the risk of 
incorrect acceptance at the planned level must be small enough to warrant 
rejection of  the alternative hypothesis (i.e., B ε X ± A"). 
It is possible to employ the acceptance risk control strategy with a 
sufficiency  test by including the sufficiency  test option with the acceptance risk 
control option as shown in Figure 1. In this case, the condition A' < A would 
always exist under both approaches, and rejection could be held to levels equal 
to or less than originally planned under either strategy. However, the two 
strategies differ  as to which risk to hold at the original level. 
The acceptance risk control option with its decision rule based on the 
interval B ε X ± A" holds the risk of  incorrect acceptance to the originally 
planned level. If  we assume the sufficiency  test, then the risk of  incorrect 
rejection will be allowed to vary and will be smaller than originally planned. 
By contrast the rejection risk control option with its decision rule based on 
the interval B e X ± A' holds the risk of  incorrect rejection at the planned level, 
and the risk of  incorrect acceptance is allowed to vary and will be smaller than 
originally planned. 
Thus both strategies will hold one risk at the planned level and allow the 
other risk to vary to a level lower than originally planned. The rationale for 
holding either risk at the planned level and allowing only the other risk to vary 
has not been adequately discussed in the literature. The rationale for  either 
approach may appear to be questionable if  we assume that the auditor 
considered, even in an intuitive way, the possible losses that might be 
associated with incorrect rejection or acceptance. 
Both risks α and TD can be reduced by increasing sample size, but for  any 
size sample α and TD have a wide range of  trade-offs.  These factors  must be 
considered, at least intuitively, in deciding on planned levels of  α, TD and 
sample size. Presumably the auditor balances the expected loss from  each risk 
in some way when attempting to minimize the total expected loss from  testing. 
The fact  that the level of  α and TD are often  not the same may imply that the 
associated losses are also not equal. If  so, it is not clear that either ex post 
strategy of  holding one risk at the planned level will be optimal from  an 
expected loss perspective. 
By now it is clear that the choice of  an appropriate evaluation strategy is less 
than obvious. A more formal  examination of  the implicit preferences  employed 
when judging the sufficiency  and competence of  evidence using alternative 
strategies follows.  An additional strategy is then developed. This additional 
strategy—the balancing strategy—seems logically defensible  in relation to the 
formal  analysis of  the differences  in extant strategies. 
One means of  more formal  examination is to consider the expected value of 
the alternatives suggested by the alternative options. For simplicity we assume 
risk neutrality. In turn, we shall examine each of  the two primary decision 
rules. 
Within the context of  the necessary conditions for  different  sample 
evaluation outcomes, the probability of  incorrect acceptance is, of  course, TD, 
if  the acceptance risk control option is employed. If  there is no error in the 
amount being tested then the probability of  (correct) acceptance is the 
complement of  the risk of  incorrect rejection associated with A". We designate 
this probability as 1 - α". The numeric value of  α" may be determined after 
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computing the associated reliability coefficient.  The appropriate two-tailed 
reliability coefficient  can be computed by determining the number of  standard 
errors of  the estimator contained in A" (A" ÷ SX). 
Under the assumption that the auditor will act rationally to minimize 
maximum expected loss, acceptance using the primary rule from  the accept-
ance risk control option implies that α"l1> TDl2, where is the loss 
associated with incorrect rejection and l2 is the loss associated with incorrect 
acceptance. Under this assumption a"l1 is the maximum expected loss 
associated with a decision to reject the book value and TDl2 is the maximum 
expected loss associated with a decision to accept. The relation, a"l1 > TDl2, 
holds true without regard for  the specific  value of  a" since the value of  a" does 
not influence  the decision rule calling for  acceptance when B ε X ± A". The 
rule is based on TD alone. In the extreme, this implies that even as the risk of 
incorrect rejection disappears (α" — 0), or simply becomes very much smaller 
than TD, the consequences of  incorrect rejection heavily outweigh the 
consequences of  incorrect acceptance at the planned level. Such a conclusion 
requires that l1> > l2, which is counter-intuitive. It demands that the negative 
consequences of  incorrect rejection far  exceed the negative consequences of 
incorrect acceptance. This seems a particularly undesirable artifact  of  any audit 
strategy since, in the extreme, it may favor  accepting client results when the 
probability of  their being correct  is significantly  smaller than the probability that 
they are without material error. 
On the other hand, this decision rule seems to have greater intuitive appeal 
when α"- 1 or whenever α" > > TD. In such circumstances the primary 
decision rule from  the acceptance risk control option implies that αl1< TDl2 
and hence that l1 < < l2. This result seems intuitively more appealing. 
As a prima facia  matter, this observation seems to favor  the more liberal 
acceptance strategy associated with the acceptance risk control option. On 
those occasions when the other option employs this decision rule as a 
secondary criterion it is subject to the same criticism concerning the conse-
quences of  α"—0 or α" becoming much smaller than TD because of 
unanticipated efficiency  of  the sampling process. On the other hand, because 
this option employs the adequacy criterion (A' < A) as a necessary condition for 
acceptance, it prevents the rule from  operating and hence from  indicating 
acceptance in those very circumstances where the rule seems intuitively most 
appealing. This occurs because α" is less than the reliability coefficient  for  α. 
This can occur only when the allowance for  sampling risk based on ex post 
control of  TD at the planned level forces  the range of  estimators which leads to 
acceptance to be contained in a quite small region about the book value. Such 
limits on the range of  acceptable estimators will approach the book value from 
above and below only as the variability of  sampling results increases from 
planned levels. Of  course this is the very condition which will cause the 
adequacy criterion test to nullify  use of  the decision rule by screening out the 
sample result as unacceptable. 
Acceptance using the primary rule of  the rejection risk control option 
requires exploration of  the adequacy criterion. The adequacy criterion rule 
suspends judgment when A' > A. Suspension is called for  regardless of  the 
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relationship between the projected audit value and the acceptance region about 
the book defined  by controlling the risk of  incorrect acceptance at the level TD. 
Obviously, this suggests that the expected loss associated with (a, TD') for 
all TD' greater than TD exceeds some maximum acceptable level (where TD is 
the ex post probability of  incorrect acceptance associated with the region X ± 
A', which controls for  α at the planned level). In addition the sufficiency  test 
suggests that the maximum acceptable expected loss associated with reliance 
on sample evidence should be αl1 + TDl 2. If  this condition cannot be achieved 
based on results of  a sample, then incurring the costs associated with fallback 
option(s) becomes necessary. Any such fallback  should be planned to produce 
sufficient  additional competent evidential matter. Theoretically, planned fallback 
should reduce the risk of  incorrect acceptance to the level TD while 
maintaining α at the planned level. 
Conversely, the acceptance risk control option, without the sufficiency  test 
as a primary screen, may permit acceptance without regard to the implicit level 
of  the risk of  incorrect rejection associated with its primary test which is based 
on TD alone. As pointed out above, this may implicitly allow α" to become quite 
large when the variability of  sample results exceeds planned levels. Therefore 
it might be inferred  that α"l 1 + TDl 2 is small enough to negate the cost benefit 
of  fallback  procedures even when α"—-1. This seems an undesirable result. It 
suggests that either available fallback  options are 1) extremely costly, 2) 
inefficient,  or 3) ineffective  at reducing risk of  incorrect rejection (e.g. α"l1 < 
αl1 + cost of  employing feasible  fallback  option(s)); or that the loss associated 
with incorrect rejection is trivial (l1 0). 
If  the latter were true, there would be no reason to have controlled 
incorrect rejection risk in the first  place during sample size planning. If 
something from  the former  set of  conclusions is true then no cost effective 
practical means for  further  reducing risk is available after  sampling nor were 
such procedures considered subsequently available prior to sampling. Had they 
been considered subsequently available then the risk of  incorrect rejection 
would have been worth controlling explicitly in formulation  of  the primary 
decision rule. 
These results seem to favor  use of  the acceptance strategy associated with 
the rejection risk control option rather than the more liberal acceptance 
strategy of  the acceptance risk control option. Of  course, this finding  is in direct 
conflict  with the prior prima facia  results which favored  the logic of  the 
acceptance risk control option. This paradox suggests that another strategy for 
sample evaluation be contemplated. 
The Balancing Strategy 
As depicted in Figure 2, the balancing strategy begins with and employs the 
same straightforward  decision rules as the other strategies when A' = A. 
When A' ≠ A, the adequacy criterion rule (as employed by the rejection risk 
control and sufficiency  test options) is invoked as a primary screen. When 
results indicate that the variability of  sample observation exceeds the planned 
level (A' > A), the sample is deemed inconclusive and appropriate fall-back 
options are considered. This is also consistent with the other adequacy 
criterion options. 
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The balancing strategy takes its unique character from  its next stage 
decision rule. When invoked, the rule calls for  acceptance of  the amount being 
tested if  the book value falls  in the region X ± Ab, where Ab is the monetary 
amount which balances the ex post risks of  incorrect rejection, αb, and incorrect 
acceptance TDb, such that α/TD = αb/TDb = l2/l 1. This condition is 
equivalent to αbl1 = TDbl2. When the expected losses of  incorrect rejection 
and incorrect acceptance balance one another in this fashion,  the critical limits 
based on control of  αb and TDb respectively will be equivalent. In each case 
these limits are X ± Ab. The determination of  Ab requires simultaneous 
solution of  the following  equations: 
2FN(Zαb/2)/FN(ZTDb)= C 1 
T E / S X = Zαb/2 + ZTDb = C 2 
where C1 = α/TD = l2/l1 and C2 = the number of  standard deviations of  the 
sampling distribution in the region bounded by the null and alternative 
hypotheses. FN(•) is the cumulative standard normal density function  for  the 
specified  standard deviate. Z /2 is the number of  standard deviates which 
αb 
provide for  control of  the risk of  incorrect rejection at level αb and ZTDb is the 
number of  standard deviates which provide for  control of  the risk of  incorrect 
acceptance at level TDb. 
There is no closed formed  analytical solution to these two equations 
because the FN(•)'s are integrals of  a normal probability function.  However, as 
a practical matter, numerical approximate functions  (e.g., see Abramowitz and 
Stegun, 1964, p. 299) can readily be employed to produce FN(•) values. Other 
numerical algorithms may be used in conjunction with these approximations to 
compute Z αb/2.  Once a solution for  Zαb/2 computed then Ab = Z αb2/2  Sx. 
is available and the decision rule can be employed based on whether B ε X ± 
Ab. 
By employing both the sufficiency  test rule and balancing rule, the balancing 
strategy avoids the pitfalls  associated with prior strategies. The sufficiency 
test, as a primary rule, assures that consideration of  fall-back  procedures will 
not be ignored and that the consequences of  incorrect rejection will not be 
treated as trivial. In this sense, it is equivalent to the rejection risk control 
option and sufficiency  test option which dominate the acceptance risk control 
option with respect to primary rule selection. 
If  A' < A, the balancing rule, when allowed to operate, will reduce both 
risks below planned levels. Therefore,  A" > Ab > A'. Acceptance will occur 
less frequently  with the balancing strategy than either of  the other strategies. 
The balancing strategy has a higher potential for  failing  to accept than the 
acceptance risk control option because it employs the sufficiency  screen and 
because the critical acceptance region for  secondary testing is smaller, X ± Ab, 
than the region of  acceptance, X ± A", associated with the acceptance risk 
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control option. It is also more conservative than the other sufficiency  test 
options with which it shares the primary rule because they also rely for 
secondary testing on the larger region X ± A". 
The more efficient  the sample in relation to planned efficiency  the closer Ab 
will be to the midpoint between the alternative hypotheses. (When α = 2TD, 
Ab = A without regard to sample size because the reliability coefficients  for 
both risks will be equal, before  and after  sample results are available.) For α < 
2TD, Ab and hence the acceptance region X ± Ab will become smaller as 
sampling efficiency  improves. For α > 2TD the acceptance region X ± Ab 
becomes larger as sampling efficiency  increases. 
By converging on the midpoints between hypotheses as critical limits, the 
rule assures that as αb approaches 0 so too will TDb (and vice versa), thus 
permitting the expected loss from  either error to be reduced from  αl1 + TDl2 
to αbl1 + TDbl2 with αb < α and TDb < TD, while maintaining control of  both 
risks. 
The balancing strategy concludes with the same decision rules as the other 
strategies, except that the balancing strategy rebalances Ab, in accordance with 
the ratio of  αR/TDR when considering the adequacy of  adjustments in relation 
to statistical results. 
Other Issues 
The previous sections have been concerned with a single issue—the merits 
of  alternative strategies that are available to the auditor when the ex post 
efficiency  of  the statistical estimator appears to be different  from  the planned 
level of  efficiency.  More specifically,  what is the nature and result of  the trade-
offs  between the risks of  incorrect acceptance and incorrect rejection that are 
implied by several commonly available alternatives? In addition, we considered 
a possible strategy for  determining levels of  these risks by incorporating the 
losses that might be associated with these risks. 
We also briefly  consider some other unresolved issues in classical auditing 
sampling in the following  sections. These issues have only recently been 
recognized by researchers in the audit sampling literature, and may prove to be 
fertile  ground for  future  research. 
Assessing the Risk of  Incorrect Acceptance 
A good deal of  work has been produced suggesting that the assessment of 
TD is a tricky task and that current models of  determining that risk level for 
sample evaluation purposes are overly simplistic. Both Leslie [1984] and 
Kinney [1984] and implicitly the CICA study, Extent  of  Audit  Testing  [1980], 
point out that the current SAS 47 approach for  developing TD may be viewed 
as intending TD to be a conditional risk. Under this view, the SAS 47 approach 
invokes TD as a conditional posterior risk. This is the risk, given that material 
error exists, that the auditor will incorrectly accept. This may be significantly 
less than the Bayesian type posterior risk of  incorrect acceptance which would 
consider the conditional probability for  incorrect acceptance in relation to the 
marginal probability of  acceptance, where the marginal is the probability of 
sample results leading to acceptance without regard to whether that decision to 
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accept is correct. Among other problems associated with risk assessment are 
the need to contend with the impact of  artificial  specification  of  simple rather 
than complex hypotheses [Dacey & Ward, 1986] and the potential benefit  of 
considering extension of  Bayesian type models to include posterior considera-
tion of  correct and incorrect acceptance in relation to the results of  all evidential 
procedures rather than only detailed sampling procedures. In addition, as 
highlighted by Cushing and Loebbecke [1983], nonsampling risks may not be as 
limited in their potential impact as current practices would suggest. 
Ex Post  Sampling Risk 
Beck and Solomon [1985] have observed that the achieved sampling risks 
may be dependent upon the decision rule used and the estimator selected when 
highly skewed populations force  defacto  violation of  the normality assumptions 
associated with the sampling distribution. This observation suggests that the 
auditor faces  different  ex post risks exposures and hence different  audit 
consequences when the statistical assumptions are violated. Under such 
conditions, it becomes important for  the auditor to choose an appropriate 
estimator and an appropriate decision rule for  evaluating the sample results so 
that he can minimize his risks exposure. The Beck and Solomon study provides 
suggestions for  meeting this objective by pairing decision rules with statistical 
estimators based upon an ex post analysis of  the sample evidence (e.g., error 
pattern). 
The (two) decision rules that Beck and Solomon refer  to are based on the 
two alternative hypothesis testing approaches. Under one approach the auditor 
tests null hypothesis that the account book value is fairly  presented (the 
decision rule based on this approach has been referred  to as Elliott and Roger 
(E & R) decision rule). In essence, this is a test of  the type associated with the 
rejection risk control option described above. Under the second approach the 
null hypothesis being tested is that the account book value is misstated by an 
amount greater than tolerable error. This approach was used in Statement on 
Auditing Procedure (SAP) 54. This is a test of  the type associated with the 
primary decision rule from  the acceptance risk control option as discussed 
above. It should be mentioned here that the E & R and SAP 54 decision rules 
are equivalent for  planning purposes as demonstrated by Roberts [1974] when 
normality of  the sampling distribution is assumed. 
Beck and Solomon then illustrate how the achieved sampling risks are 
changed when the decision rule used is changed. Assume that the accounting 
population is highly skewed (as is often  the case usually, see Stringer, 1963) to 
the right and the estimator used is the ordinary mean per unit (MPU) estimator. 
Since the accounting population is highly skewed, the MPU estimates are likely 
to exhibit skewness, and in the presence of  skewness the estimator of  the 
population mean and the estimator of  the standard error are found  to be highly 
positively correlated (see Neter and Loebbecke, 1975). Suppose now that the 
client's asset account book value is fairly  stated, but the auditor's sample 
estimate of  the account mean (total) value is drawn from  the lower region of  the 
sampling distribution and thus is less than the actual mean (total) value of  the 
account. Since the estimator of  the mean is positively correlated with the 
estimator of  the standard error, a smaller than average mean estimate would be 
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accompanied by a smaller than average standard error estimate. In this 
situation, the two-sided confidence  intervals computed under the E & R 
decision rule would be centered below the actual mean and also would be too 
narrow. Consequently, the risk of  efficiency  error would be higher than what 
was planned. However, when the SAP 54 decision rule is used, because of 
small estimates of  the mean and standard error, a large estimate of  monetary 
error would result and with a smaller achieved precision measure the risk of 
efficiency  errors would become smaller than the risk determined using E & R 
decision rule. A similar argument can be presented for  the risk of  effectiveness 
which also is lower under the SAP 54 decision rule than under the E & R 
decision rule when the mean estimate is such that a larger than average 
estimate of  standard error is projected from  sample results. 
Asymmetric Materiality Thresholds 
There is empirical evidence suggesting that decisions about materiality may 
not be symmetric. In some circumstances auditors may be less tolerant of 
overstatement than understatement and wish to establish audit testing hypoth-
eses accordingly (Ward, 1976). Recently, Srivastava and Ward [1986] have 
developed a methodology that incorporates such an asymmetry for  variable 
sampling. Their preliminary results show that the auditor can achieve a 
significant  reduction in the sample size when the asymmetric materiality 
thresholds are used in the planning stage. It is interesting to note that the 
sample size reduction is achieved without sacrificing  the two-tail test for 
control of  the risk of  incorrect rejection. 
Conclusion 
The objective of  this paper was to identify  and discuss some unresolved 
issues in classical audit sample evaluations. The selection of  which issues to 
consider was not random and, in fact,  was very biased. The bulk of  the paper 
was devoted to a discussion of  the implications of  common evaluation strategies 
that are presented in the audit sampling literature for  situations where the 
achieved efficiency  of  the estimator appears to be different  from  the planned 
efficiency.  When this occurs, both the acceptance risk control and the rejection 
risk control strategies create a decision interval such that one risk (TD or α) is 
held to the originally planned level and the other risk is allowed to vary from  the 
planned level. Little discussion is presented in the literature concerning the 
rationale for  selection of  one or the other risk to hold at the planned level, or 
why it is so logical to allow the other to vary from  the planned level. In fact,  this 
type of  trade-off  process may seem contradictory if  there is at least a rough, 
intuitive balancing of  expected losses from  the two risks when the acceptable 
risk levels are initially planned. From this viewpoint, a strategy was presented 
which attempts to balance the expected losses for  the two risks based on ex 
post information.  This process would appear to have some conceptual merit and 
to warrant further  investigation. In addition, brief  comments on several other 
recently discussed issues were presented. Although these issues have just 
been identified  and thus are perhaps further  from  solution, they merit mention 
and probably future  discussion and investigation. 
117 
End Notes 
1. Much of  the discussion of  evaluation of  samples in Bailey is based on the same premise as 
the audit guide option approach; however, he recognizes the alternative approach similar to the 
acceptance risk control strategy in footnotes. 
2. Guidance for  establishing the two risk levels, TD and a, is available elsewhere. See, for 
example, Arens & Loebbecke [1981, p. 136] and SAS 39. A significant  amount of  prior effort  has 
been expended to assist the auditor in understanding how to establish an appropriate level for  TD. 
Some issues and problems raised by these studies are reviewed in a separate section of  this paper. 
3. The statistical evidence may be considered conclusive if  the number of  standard errors of 
the estimator contained in the tolerable error amount, TE, for  the account being tested exceeds 
the sum of  the number of  standard errors of  the estimators required to control αR and TDR at the 
reassessed levels. 
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Discussant's Response to 
"Unresolved Issues in Classical 
Audit Sample Evaluations" 
Abraham D. Akresh 
Laventhol & Horwath 
I am happy to be here at Kansas to discuss the paper by Nichols, Srivastava 
and Ward. Our firm  uses an assertion based audit approach; we use classical 
variables sampling when we expect to find  many errors or when we perform 
accounting applications. In general, I have little question that the authors 
understand the mathematics of  classical variables sampling and the various 
approaches. While their mathematics are generally right, I am not sure they 
have considered all of  the practical aspects. I will discuss some of  the practical 
problems that are based on the many telephone calls received in our National 
Accounting and Auditing Department from  our practice offices. 
Discussion Points 
1. The paper places equal emphasis on the risks of  incorrect rejection and 
acceptance when evaluating sample results. For accounting applications, 
these risks might be equally important. For auditing applications, 
however, auditors are much more concerned about the risk of  incorrect 
acceptance. Incorrect acceptance leads to audit failures.  Incorrect 
rejection leads to audit inefficiencies.  In today's environment, with 
insurance difficult  to obtain, incorrect acceptance and audit failures  are 
"unacceptable." Incorrect rejection is a cost of  doing business that is 
directly or indirectly passed on to clients. In the short run, we may even 
realize revenue when there is incorrect rejection. 
Audit efficiency  can be controlled by means other than sample size; 
for  example, proper planning and supervision, analysis of  error risks and 
determination of  materiality levels, selection of  nonsampling procedures 
when justified,  and use of  modern technology to reduce clerical time. 
Thus, auditors do not rely solely on risk of  incorrect rejection levels to 
control audit efficiency. 
We recognize that the rejection method is conservative and may 
yield higher than necessary sample sizes. We also recognize that 
teaching people the more efficient  method will be expensive, more so 
than the sampling cost to be saved. 
As a result, auditors determine the risk of  incorrect acceptance for 
sampling applications, then select a somewhat higher risk of  incorrect 
rejection. This selection is somewhat arbitrary and is based primarily on 
the difficulty  of  extending procedures if  unacceptable results are 
obtained. For example, an auditor might select a 10 percent risk of 
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incorrect rejection (and a larger sample) for  difficult  to extend pro-
cedures (accounts receivable confirmations  or inventory test counts). 
For easy to extend procedures (inventory price tests, additions to 
productive assets), the auditor might select a 20 to 30 percent risk of 
incorrect rejection (and a smaller sample). Thus, the emphasis is on not 
making a costly mistake (the need to extend difficult  tests, incorrectly 
accepting a population that is misstated materially), rather than keeping 
sample size to the minimum. 
We recognize that the risk of  incorrect rejection has to be higher 
than the risk of  incorrect acceptance! More practical guidance is needed 
on selecting an appropriate risk of  incorrect rejection. 
2. In most cases, auditors will use ratio and difference  estimation rather 
than the direct projection method of  classical variables sampling. Ratio 
and difference  estimation requires a minimum number of  differences, 
either overall if  the combined ratio method is used, or by strata if  the 
separate ratio or difference  method is used. As a result, the auditor 
needs to choose a sample size large enough to provide enough 
differences. 
Further, most applications of  classical variables sampling require a 
minimum sample size to obtain an accurate measure of  the standard 
deviation of  the variable of  interest. Thus, for  example, we require a 
minimum of  30 per strata if  two or more strata are used and 75 if  one 
strata is used. This means that if  the test is easy to extend, it does not 
pay to worry about incorrect rejection. Instead, one approach that is 
often  used is to select a minimum sample size, say 75 items if 
unstratified,  or 30 items per strata, plus perhaps some larger, 100 
percent tested items. The test is done and the auditor calculates the 
point estimate and the distance to the limit the auditor is interested in at 
the appropriate risk of  incorrect acceptance. If  the auditor can accept, he 
does not have to worry about rejection. If  the auditor cannot accept, he 
decides whether to investigate the errors or to expand the test. If  he 
expands the test, he might consider risk of  incorrect rejection or he 
might just arbitrarily expand the test a fixed  number, say, an additional 
50 items. While this is far  from  scientific,  for  many auditors it is much 
simpler than trying to understand the mathematics of  acceptance and 
rejection. 
3. The paper implies that the auditor places reliance on internal control and 
other substantive tests when determining risks of  incorrect acceptance 
and rejection. Because classical variables sampling ordinarily is used in 
high error rate situations, the auditor ordinarily does not rely on 
controls. The auditor considers inherent error risk in determining the 
population to sample, how to select the sample and what supporting 
documents to examine. 
This high error expectation also means a Bayesian approach might 
be difficult  to apply because the auditor will have difficulty  expressing 
prior expectations. 
4. In evaluating sample results, the paper suggests that the auditor control 
either the risk of  incorrect acceptance or rejection at the planned level, 
or balance the risks and compute achieved precision accordingly. In 
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practice, the auditor ordinarily is concerned with a one-sided evaluation 
based on the planned risk of  incorrect acceptance. 
In our assertion based audit approach, our auditors consider the 
inherent risk of  error and the inherent direction of  risk. For example, 
auditors might conclude that overstatement of  inventory is much more 
risky to them than understatement and is much more likely given the 
client's controls and the nature of  the business. In that case, they would 
be interested primarily in measuring the maximum overstatement (the 
existence error). They would use analytical review to consider under-
statement (completeness). Accordingly, they would want to know that 
the distance to the lower limit (the maximum existence overstatement) 
is less than materiality or tolerable error at the appropriate one-sided 
risk level. In that case, the auditor could accept and the risk would 
measure the risk of  incorrect acceptance. If  the auditor could not accept, 
he would have to consider expanding the test and at that point might 
measure risk of  incorrect rejection. 
Two-sided evaluations generally are limited to accounting situations 
and situations in which the auditor is concerned about both overstate-
ment and understatement errors (because he has little feel  for  the 
inherent risk). Auditors are not concerned about controlling the rela-
tionship between the risks of  incorrect acceptance and rejection. 
5. The authors talk about a balancing approach, using estimates of  the cost 
of  acceptance and rejection. It is extremely difficult  to calculate these 
costs, especially cost of  incorrect acceptance. Since we know that 
acceptance risk is much more costly, the balancing approach seems 
unnecessary. 
6. Auditors in practice need more guidance on how classical variables 
sampling can be used simply, without statistical formulas  or complicated 
computer programs. 
As this paper has amply demonstrated, classical variables sampling 
can become complicated unless the approach is easy for  the auditor to 
understand. Thus, for  example, many firms  have adopted a rule of 
thumb setting precision equal to one-half  of  materiality. This causes risk 
of  incorrect rejection to be twice the risk of  incorrect acceptance and 
provides a simple way of  calculating sample sizes. Although it is 
inefficient,  the costs of  training auditors to understand a more complex 
approach far  outweigh the savings resulting from  auditing fewer  items. 
While I am hopeful  that the academic world can better train auditors to 
understand classical variables sampling, until that happens, we will have 
to use simplified  rules to reduce both our training costs and the risk of 
auditor error. 
7. In the same way, the authors of  the Audit Sampling Guide were faced 
with the need to simplify  and to deal with various computer programs. 
Although there may be a more efficient  approach (from  the sampling risk 
viewpoint), I believe the Audit Guide approach is understandable to 
most auditors. 
8. Classical variables sampling can be complex. Auditors often  avoid using 
it even where they know it might yield a lower sample size (or a tighter 
precision) than alternative methods, such as dollar unit sampling. We 
122 
need a relatively simple method of  classical variables sampling that 
auditors can learn as quickly as dollar unit sampling and apply without 
risk of  making a major error in the situations where it should be 
applied—high error rate situations where a reasonably tight precision is 
needed and adjustment is possible. 
To summarize, the authors' understanding of  the math is fine,  but it is 
essential to consider the practical impact in the audit environment. 
123 
5 
The Impact of  Technological Events and Trends 
on Audit Evidence in the Year 2000: Phase I* 
Gary L. Holstrum 
Theodore J. Mock 
Robert N. West 
University of  Southern California 
Introduction 
This research project is an exploratory study that attempts to identify  and 
analyze: 
(1) the most significant  changes in information  technology that will affect 
future  audit evidence, 
(2) the impact of  such changes upon auditing, and 
(3) the nature of  audit evidence in the year 2000. 
The success of  items two and three is contingent upon results obtained in 
the first  phase of  the study, which is reported in this paper. Phase I is designed 
to identify  not only the relevant future  events and trends but also the likelihood 
that these events may occur at various points in time in the future.  To 
accomplish this goal, the researchers have performed  an extensive review of 
the technological literature, interviewed experts in auditing and various 
technical areas, and solicited expert opinions via a questionnaire. A Delphi 
study will also be conducted to elicit and analyze experts' predictions of 
important future  information  technology events and trends. 
Using these data, phase II of  the research will identify  and analyze the 
effects  of  predicted technological events and trends on audit evidence and the 
audit process. Scenarios will be developed to extract potential new strategies 
for  dealing with future  audit evidence, audit technology, and auditor roles. 
This paper is divided into six sections as follows: 
1. Statement Of  Problem And Need For Research 
2. Review Of  The Information  Technology Literature 
3. Research Issues And Proposed Methodology 
4. Preliminary Findings Concerning Information  Technology 
5. Preliminary Findings Concerning Audit Evidence 
6. A Tentative Scenario Of  Future Audit Evidence 
* The Institute of  Internal Auditors Research Foundation is providing funding  and other assistance 
for  the research described in this paper. 
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Statement of  the Problem and Need for  the Research 
The basic problem addressed in this project is that changes affecting  the 
nature and availability of  audit evidence are occurring so rapidly that auditors 
have difficulty  making practical plans to gradually adapt their auditing tech-
niques and processes to deal effectively  with future  forms  of  audit evidence. 
Consequently, the auditing profession  needs research that (1) identifies  the 
most significant  future  events and trends expected to affect  future  audit 
evidence; (2) indicates when such events and trends are expected to occur; and 
(3) analyzes their impact on audit evidence, audit technology, and the role of 
auditors. For example, in planning future  auditing techniques, auditors would 
likely give more attention to a particular new form  of  information  processing if  a 
consensus of  experts indicates that it will be technologically and economically 
feasible  by the year 2000 than if  a consensus indicates that it will not be feasible 
or if  no consensus exists. 
The audit environment is greatly affected  by technological change. The 
means by which information  is captured, entered, retrieved, modified,  and 
distributed has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. The state-of-the-
art of  computer auditing is clearly superior to that which existed at the 
beginning of  this decade but probably not adequate for  the highly sophisticated 
innovations in information  technology that are likely to occur in the next 10 to 
15 years. 
The nature of  auditing will undoubtedly continue to undergo substantial 
changes as the level of  technology improves. Experts are forecasting  continued 
improvement in the power and flexibility  of  computers and communication 
devices, while costs are expected to decrease over the next 15 years. A 
proliferation  in the number of  computers and terminals is expected over the 
next decade. 
Numerous social, economic, and political factors  are likely to be important 
to the future  of  audit evidence and auditing; consequently, they will be 
considered in the study. However, we have chosen to place less emphasis upon 
specific  predictions of  these factors  because they seem to be inherently more 
difficult  to predict reliably and somewhat less important to the future  of  audit 
evidence than changes in information  technology. 
Given the need for  reliable predictions of  future  information  technology and 
of  other factors  that will likely affect  future  audit evidence, our research is 
designed to address the following  two basic research questions: 
1. What will be the status of  information  processing technology in the 
year 2000? 
2. How is the information  processing environment in the year 2000 
expected to impact the nature and adequacy of  audit evidence? 
The basic research approach for  the first  question includes: (1) a review of 
the literature concerning future  information  technology, (2) interviews with 
information  technologists and auditors, (3) an open-ended questionnaire survey 
of  information  technologists and auditors, and (4) a Delphi study of  information 
technologists to predict the likelihood of  future  technological events and 
trends. 
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The basic research approach for  the second question includes: (1) discus-
sions with a relatively small panel of  auditors concerning the audit impact of 
predicted information  technology changes, (2) preparation of  narrative descrip-
tions of  likely audit impacts, and (3) a survey of  a larger panel of  auditors to test 
and validate the descriptions and scenarios. 
Review of  the Literature on Future Information  Technology 
The first  research step was a review of  the literature concerning future 
information  technology. The objective of  this literature review was limited to 
identifying  potential  future  information  technology events and trends that may 
occur. At this stage of  the research, it would be premature to make assertions 
about when these events or trends are likely to occur or even whether they are 
likely to occur. Potentially important events and trends that are identified  at this 
stage will be included in the Delphi survey of  information  technology experts. 
Research inferences  about the degree of  consensus among experts will be 
based upon the Delphi study results. 
The three major components of  the literature review are: (1) computer 
hardware, (2) computer software,  and (3) data communications and office 
automation. A brief  overview of  that literature is presented below. 
Computer  Hardware 
Computer hardware improvements continue to outpace software  improve-
ments. Computer processing has become much faster  due to advances in 
integrated circuit technology. Computers are becoming smaller, more power-
ful,  and less expensive which has led to a tremendous surge in end-user 
computing. AT&T (International Data Corp., 1985) estimates that available 
computer power is doubling each year. Just three years ago, Lewis M. 
Branscomb, a Vice President and chief  scientist at IBM, estimated that 
computer power was increasing at a rate of  40 percent per year (Branscomb, 
1982). 
Proliferation  of  Computers—Where  is this increased computer usage 
coming from?  Of  the three broad categories of  computers—mainframes, 
minicomputers, and microcomputers—the growth has largely come from  the 
microcomputer segment. In 1975, the market for  microcomputers was 
virtually non-existent. The U.S. market for  personal computers used in 
business or professional  purposes has grown to $11 billion, counting multi-user 
supermicros. The dollar volume of  microcomputer sales is now nearly equal to 
the market (in dollar sales) for  mainframes.  By 1989, the market will be more 
like $39 billion. The number of  personal computers used for  business or 
professional  purposes in the U.S., either stand-alone or multi-user, will 
increase to 59 million in 1989 (IDC, 1986). The number of  personal computers 
used for  business or professional  purposes was 7.5 million in 1984. The key 
trends causing the shift  to personal computers are shift  to hard disk storage, 
faster  micros, multi-user systems, and higher resolution graphics. 
The number of  terminals is also expected to increase dramatically through-
out the 1980s and 1990s. International Data Corp. offered  several projections 
in the April 15, 1985 issue of  Fortune  magazine. 
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1. In 1970, there were less than 200,000 remote terminals. In 1980, 
there were two million remote terminals, a ten-fold  increase. By 
1990, 100 million remote terminals will be in use. 
2. There were 20 million digital keyboard devices in the U.S. workplace 
in 1984. By 1989, 80 million are expected to be in use. 
3. Expected sales of  Voice/Data terminals in 1987 are 250,000 units, a 
ten-fold  increase over the actual number of  units sold in 1983. 
All of  these projections point to a proliferation  of  computers and a business 
environment saturated with computers in the year 2000. 
Parallel  Processing—Machines  like Japan's Teradata systems, part of  their 
fifth  generation project, have a high level of  parallelism; that is, several 
microprocessors read different  sections of  the database at the same time. 
Present computers can read hundreds of  transactions per second, but by 1990 
some of  the large banks will need a computer that can read thousands of 
transactions per second. With a computer that can read several records at a 
time, this desired tenfold  increase in processing speed may be attainable. 
Computer  Software 
In an interview in Computer  Decisions (Kull, 1984), James Martin, a noted 
writer, lecturer, and consultant on information  technology, discussed a wide 
range of  topics including programming, fourth  and fifth  generation languages, 
Database Management Systems (DBMSs), operating systems, spreadsheet 
packages, and expert systems. Since the issues raised by Martin are indicative 
of  those raised in the literature on the future  of  computer software,  they are 
discussed briefly  below. 
Automation of  Systems  Analysis and  Programming—Martin  believes the 
jobs of  programmer and systems analyst will be automated. We are evidently 
heading in the direction of  a "syntax-less" programming language. He favors 
replacing languages altogether with diagrams because no syntax is required. 
Fourth generation languages are much more English-like, but Martin does not 
feel  that there are any top-rate languages yet. It is difficult  to replace existing 
languages such as COBOL because companies have so much invested in them. 
End-User  Programming—Massive  growth in end-user programming is 
predicted in the next ten years. For example, current end-users of  spreadsheet 
software  on a PC can use sophisticated financial-analysis  tools to perform 
faster,  more accurate, and more complex calculations than were performed 
previously by fulltime  analysts on mainframe  computer programs. Martin 
believes that spreadsheet graphics will move from  two dimensions to three 
dimensions (with cubical structures) and that, eventually, four  and more 
dimensions will be available. 
The expected growth in end-user programming and decentralized com-
puter processing raises auditability concerns. In his book, EDP Auditing, 
Weber states: 
With the rapid growth in the use of  minicomputers and microcomputers, 
the unavailability of  generalized audit software  that runs on these 
machines may be a problem confronted  increasingly by the auditor. 
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Further, at least in some cases, it is unlikely generalized audit software 
vendors will make major attempts to increase the availability of  their 
packages on new hardware/software  configurations.  Increased availabil-
ity means increased maintenance costs, decreased efficiency,  and a 
greater risk of  the integrity of  the software  being compromised. (1982, 
p. 433) 
New  Database Structures—Continued  rapid growth in database construction 
by professional  programmers and end-users is predicted by several experts. 
Many experts believe that relational systems are far  superior to CODASYL/ 
hierarchical based systems, but there is a vast financial  investment in the older 
systems. For example, Martin states: "By 1990, only a small percentage of 
major database systems will be relational" (Kull, 1984). 
Operating  Systems—A  clear need exists for  increased standardization of 
operating systems. The lack of  program portability is inconvenient and 
expensive. Martin stated that in ten years we may standardize on an entirely 
different  operating system, one without a UNIX pedigree. UNIX is weak in the 
human factors  area and in machine performance.  Furthermore, UNIX is 
research oriented and is ten years old. 
Expert  Systems—Many  experts are predicting widespread applications of 
expert systems. Several companies such as Teknowledge, Intellicorp, and 
Xerox have developed "shells" for  building expert systems that are some-
times described as expert system generators. Building expert systems, 
however, is very time consuming and requires a heavy investment of  capital 
and human expertise. Illustrating the scarcity of  human expertise necessary to 
build expert systems, Martin states: "By 1990, there probably won't be more 
than 5,000 professionals  in the U.S. who can build an expert system, compared 
with the one million programmers we have presently" (Kull, 1984). 
On the other hand, Technology Forecasts (Anonymous, 1984) states that 
artificial  intelligence applications are seen propelling the AI market from  its 
current annual level of  $250 million to at least $11 billion by 1990. Expert 
Systems is one aspect of  AI. Expert Systems will probably be the area of  AI 
which has the greatest impact upon the business arena. Sales of  expert 
systems reached $216 million in 1985. Industry analysts project a $3.5 billion 
market by 1990 (IDC, 1986). 
In a personal interview, a Vice President from  Information  Builders 
(creators of  Focus) stated that artificial  intelligence in ten years will be where 
PCs are today. The development of  AI knowledge-based systems will make 
software  truly "user-friendly." 
Anne Lampert, staffwriter  for  Computer Decisions (January, 1985) com-
ments that expert systems are finally  out of  academe and into the business 
world. She commented on the expert systems presently in use and concluded 
her article by stating: "The expert system does not supplant human involve-
ment in the problem-solving process. The system merely makes the problem-
solving more efficient  and accurate." 
The auditing and accounting profession  is making a substantial investment 
in expert systems evident by the attendance of  220 academics and practitioners 
at the 1986 USC Audit Judgment Symposium which focused  on expert 
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systems. Expert systems have the potential to change both the way we 
account for  economic and social events and the way we audit information 
systems and reports. 
Types  of  Information  Input 
The sophistication of  computer input is also expected to improve through-
out the next 15 years. Papageorgiou (1983) predicted by the mid 1980s 
computers would be able to optically scan hand-printed information.  David 
Terrie, manager of  International Data Corp.'s office  automation services, says: 
"The machine will adjust to the user instead of  the user to the machine." 
Terrie also believes that computers will be accepting unstructured voice input 
before  the turn of  the century (Pilla, 1982). Other respected individuals in this 
field  are not as certain of  this prediction as Mr. Terrie. In that same article, 
AT&T stated that voice recognition will not have a major impact upon non-
routine decision making before  the year 2000. Brian Blackmarr, a principal with 
the management consulting firm  of  Lifson,  Hermann and Blackmarr in Dallas, 
Texas, believes it would take a major breakthrough to make it work well. 
The Naisbitt Group assisted the Colorado CPAs on an auditing futures 
project. They concluded: "By 1990, a document will not only include text, but 
also data, image, and voice" (Colorado Society of  Certified  Public Accountants, 
1984). Forecasters may not agree on the year, but they do agree that these 
changes are coming. Computers with voice recognition capabilities could 
substantially impact the nature of  auditing. Detailed audit testing and flowchart-
ing are almost completely document oriented. The profession  needs to prepare 
for  the changing nature of  audit evidence in a paperless society. 
Data Communications  and Office  Automation 
Improvements in the data communications industry will also have a 
substantial effect  upon the audit environment. Technological innovations such 
as communication satellites and fiber  optics have increased data transmission 
speeds dramatically. Papageorgiou states that with this improved speed and 
reliability the electronic desk is expected to become standard equipment. An 
electronic desk is defined  differently  by various technologists. Papageorgiou 
believes that it is comprised of  a large display screen, a keyboard, a pointing 
device, a local processor, a local file,  a storage unit, a local printer, and a link to 
the rest of  the system. Computerized Private Branch Exchange (PBX) 
technology allows electronic mail, voice, and word processing to communicate 
with one another. 
In addition, video teleconferencing,  telecommuting, and picturephone are 
all expected to make revivals now that the technology has improved. Electronic 
mail is already being used, but it will become far  more pervasive. Electronic 
communication between organizations will also expand significantly  according to 
Omar Sawy of  University of  Southern California's  Center for  Futures Re-
search. Some companies have installed terminals connected to their mainframe 
computer at customer plants to facilitate  inventory ordering (McFarlan, 1984). 
The main function  of  the mainframe  will be to handle anything that people 
want to share, according to several experts. The micro-to-mainframe  links will 
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have to get better. We need standards for  data representation so a user can 
easily download information  from  the mainframe.  Eventually users will not 
know whether they are using data on the PC or the mainframe,  especially if 
they have a Local Area Network (LAN). 
International Resource Development, Inc. estimates the office  automation 
market to be $36 billion by 1990. Much of  this money will go toward 
networking (Pilla, 1982). In addition, multifunction  terminals will come of  age. 
A multifunction  terminal can do jobs such as word processing, electronic mail, 
electronic filing  and data processing from  one workstation. Gerald Maskovsky, 
Vice President of  MIS for  Home Insurance Co., believes that the biggest 
challenge ahead of  us is not technological, rather it lies in changing the 
operational and organizational patterns of  organizations. "Everything is de-
signed around a physical piece of  paper and now that paper will disappear and 
drastically change the system" (Pilla, 1982). 
LANs which allow individual users to pursue tasks independently from 
separate PCs while calling on shared resources, such as hard disks, high speed 
printers, and shared data bases, are expected to increase substantially in the 
next several years. According to Future Computing, a market research firm 
specializing in the personal computer marketplace, shipments of  personal 
computer LANs will increase to 166,000 in 1988 from  10,000 in 1983 
(Guttman, 1985, p. 43). 
The PC has helped to decentralize the information  processing within a 
company. Tim Sammons, director of  a computer consulting firm,  says that: 
"Control and centralization of  information  processing are compelling reasons to 
get a LAN. I think we'll see some companies go back to a centralized 
operational structure. Others will centralize locally so a given manager will be 
able to review the work done by his or her staff"  (Luhn, 1985, p. 79). 
Many experts predict that the networks and PCs that we know today will 
soon be obsolete. For example, Sammons predicts: 
The future  lies in very high-speed networks that integrate voice and 
data and blur the distinctions between the telephone and the computer. 
The whole notion of  stand-alone vanishes. That's why I think broad-
band, fiber-optic-based  networks are the future.  You'll have a machine 
that delivers your morning newspaper, the Sears catalog, shopping 
services, and more (Luhn, 1985, p. 80). 
Videotex, the generic label applied to home information  retrieval systems, 
is growing significantly.  Management Horizons Inc. predicts that 20 percent of 
all U.S. retail sales will be done via videotex by 1990. More than eight million 
U.S. homes are predicted to use videotex by 1990 (Anonymous, Business 
Week,  1981). Transaction processing in financial  services appears to be the 
trigger application (of  videotex) that the public would be willing to pay for. 
However, Edward J. Atorino, a securities analyst for  Smith Barney, describes 
some of  the current limitations: "Videotex is providing a service which has too 
many alternatives that are cheaper and easier. It requires the consumer to 
perform,  to go through too much effort,  to get the services" (Granelli, 1986). 
Various communication channel options are available. Big users like Seattle-
based Boeing Co. are building their own corporate phone networks instead of 
leasing from  the telephone company. Demand is soaring for  transmission lines 
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that carry huge quantities of  digital voice and data over one line, such as the so-
called T-1 transmission lines. Companies also can continue to ship smaller 
quantities over separate lines, or send information  between buildings with 
microwaves and their own transmitting and receiving dishes (Simpson, 1986). 
Fiber optics is growing at about 25 percent a year, and that growth is 
expected to accelerate (Bartons, 1985). Fiber's favorable  characteristics 
include a digital nature, small size, light weight and low heat, wide capacity,and 
immunity to electromagnetic interference  and eavesdroppers. The telephone 
companies, especially the long-distance carriers, buy roughly 80 percent of 
what is produced. Fiber optics has approximately 20 times the bandwidth 
(capacity) of  coaxial cable. However, a worry to the fiber-optic  industry is the 
lack of  standards for  components. 
Limitations  of  the Existing  Literature 
Despite the fact  that a wide variety of  sources have been examined, there 
are some weaknesses in the literature. The most notable weakness is the 
limited time-span of  the forecasts.  Nearly all of  the experts confine  themselves 
to a five-to-ten  year time horizon. Only the most recently published articles 
dared to venture into the 1990s. John C. Papageorgiou, the author of  the article 
"Decision Making in the Year 2000," states at the outset of  his article that 
"[forecasting  is almost impossible nowadays" (Papageorgiou, 1983, p. 77). 
This statement is particularly appropriate for  the forecasting  of  technology. 
However, forecasters  can offer  projections that can give guidance to the 
auditing profession  for  the 1990s and beyond. 
The preliminary review of  the published literature shows that auditors need 
more current  forecasts.  Science  magazine devoted an entire issue to all aspects 
of  the computer world in February of  1982. The issue was extremely insightful, 
but the articles were written over four  years ago and there have been many 
major changes in computer and communication technology since that time. 
Given the lag between collecting data and publishing a report, most forecasts 
are several years old. In addition, none of  the reviewed studies specifically 
addressed the implications for  business and auditing. 
Research Issues And Proposed Methodology 
Research Question No. 1 is: What will be the status of  information 
processing technology in the year 2000? The first  three of  the four  research 
steps for  Question No. 1 which are listed below have already been performed. 
1. A review of  the technological literature to identify  the probable 
status of  information  processing technology in the year 2000. 
2. Interviews with a sample of  EDP audit specialists and directors of 
internal audit. 
3. A survey of  a sample of  information  technologists, internal auditors, 
and external auditors using an open-ended questionnaire to validate 
the findings  of  the literature review and to identify  other potential 
changes. 
4. A Delphi study of  technologists to ascertain the likelihood of  future 
technological events and trends. 
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To address the first  research question, a number of  methodologies for 
"futures  research" were considered. Fowles (1978) gives a detailed discus-
sion of  ten related approaches in the Handbook  of  Futures  Research. Sackman 
and Citrenbaum (1972) list and rank order 26 "futures-creating"  methods. The 
methods that were given the most serious consideration for  this study were: 
Delphi technique, cross impact analysis, scenarios, simulation gaming, simula-
tion modeling, technology assessment, technology forecasting,  and brain-
storming. 
The most appropriate methods to identify  possible future  technological 
events and trends seem to be review of  appropriate literature and interviews 
with experts, particularly those in research environments where future 
implementations of  technology are already on the drawing boards. The most 
appropriate methods to assess the likelihoods of  future  events and trends seem 
to be Delphi and Cross-impact analysis. The literature in the area of  futures 
forecasting  leans strongly toward using the Delphi method. The Delphi method 
has been used successfully  in several past forecasts  of  information  technology. 
The Delphi method is a highly cost-beneficial  technique for  obtaining the 
opinions of  leading experts in a given field.  However, the Delphi approach has 
been criticized because it does not take into account interdependencies of 
events/trends. Cross-impact analysis does incorporate interdependencies. 
However, a recent Delphi study by Eschenbach and Geistauts (1985) did 
incorporate interactions through a scenario approach in the final  round of  the 
Delphi. 
The Delphi Method was suggested as an appropriate research tool for 
forecasting  technological changes affecting  auditing in a recent article by 
Garsombke and Cerrulo (1984, p. 6), as follows: 
Since there is little reason to believe the rate of  technological innova-
tions will decrease, the auditor is faced  with the problem previously 
described (i.e., how should auditing adapt to changing technology). We 
believe the auditor's best response to the challenge is to try to predict 
future  changes, rather than simply react to changes as they occur. . . . 
The primary goal of  any research project designed to address the 
problem outlined above should be to predict the future  direction of 
change in certain relevant computer technologies, to the extent the 
change may affect  auditors. We suggest using a technological forecast-
ing tool, such as the Delphi Method, which enables one to determine 
the consensus of  views of  the future  held by experts. Our expectation is 
that knowing experts' views, auditors will be able to better prepare for 
changes that are foreseen. 
Research Question No. 2 is: How is the information  processing environ-
ment in the year 2000 expected to impact the nature and adequacy of  audit 
evidence? The research steps to be performed  for  Question No. 2 include: 
5. Preliminary discussions with a selected small number of  auditors to 
identify  the likely effects. 
6. Documentation of  the proposed likely effects  in a narrative or 
questionnaire format. 
7. Validation of  the documented effects  by surveying a larger number of 
practicing auditors and obtaining their responses. 
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8. Analysis of  the responses. 
Preliminary Findings Concerning Information  Technology 
Nature  of  the Open-Ended  Questionnaire  Survey 
As recommended in the literature on the Delphi technique, we sent open-
ended questionnaires to small groups of  experts prior to the preparation of  the 
actual Delphi questionnaire. This procedure was designed to help ensure that 
the questionnaire would be as complete as possible. We used two sets of  open-
ended questionnaires because we believed that it was important to obtain 
information  from  both technologists and auditors. We performed  a more 
extensive open-ended preliminary survey with auditors because there was 
very little literature available that referred  to the future  of  auditing. Some of  the 
comments made by auditors did, in fact,  influence  the questions included in our 
Delphi instrument for  technologists. A copy of  the questions included in our 
Delphi questionnaire is included in Appendix A at the end of  the paper. 
Open-ended questionnaires were developed at this phase of  the project to 
obtain an unbiased list of  responses from  our expert respondents. One of  the 
primary concerns of  questionnaire surveys is that the wording of  the questions 
may bias the respondent. Using an open-ended questionnaire format  at the 
initial "event identification  phase" is favored  by most futures  researchers. 
The questionnaire and methodology for  this milestone phase of  the study 
were reviewed by consultants from  the USC Center for  Futures Research, 
who made several important suggestions. For example, due to their sug-
gestions, the questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first  part of  the 
questionnaire asked respondents to identify  the five  most important changes/ 
events/trends (within their area of  expertise) that they believed would occur by 
the year 2000. The questionnaire for  the auditing and accounting groups was 
modified  slightly. It asked respondents to indicate those changes that would 
have the most impact upon the nature of  audit evidence. 
The second section of  the questionnaire asked the experts to indicate two 
"less likely, but still possible," events. Prior experience of  futures  researchers 
has indicated that the responses from  most experts are similar (identifying  the 
more obvious events) unless respondents are asked to consider "the unex-
pected" or potential surprises. In many cases, these unexpected events or 
plausible surprises do in fact  occur over a long time horizon such as 15 years. 
Type  of  Technical  Experts  Surveyed—We  surveyed 30 technologists using 
mailed questionnaires and in-person interviews. Our sample included experts 
in the areas of  artificial  intelligence/expert systems, applications software, 
database systems, data communications, computer hardware, and office  auto-
mation, including information  technology researchers at Bell Labs. In addition, 
we interviewed experts who made presentations on various emerging informa-
tion technologies at a computer conference  in Los Angeles. 
We interviewed two experts in organizational structure and behavior. This 
area is important to the present study because future  organizational structures 
are expected to have a significant  impact on future  information  flows  and audit 
evidence. 
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The preliminary findings  relating to changes in information  technology are 
divided into the following  sections: 
a) Office  Automation and Transaction Automation 
b) Data Communications 
c) Computer Hardware 
d) Computer Software. 
Office  Automation  and Transaction  Automation 
Electronic  (Paperless)  Transactions  and  Records—The  computerization of 
the business office  paperwork and accounting records could be the most 
significant  concern of  the auditors whom we surveyed in our open-ended 
questionnaire. Some of  them expressed difficulty  in auditing electronic funds 
transfers  at present. The potential lack of  an audit trail from  a paperless 
business office  could have the greatest impact on auditing of  any of  the changes 
being predicted. Already, some companies are ordering inventory from 
computer to computer with no purchase order involved. Electronic checking 
and home banking have been explored in a number of  areas. Most of  the 
auditors we surveyed responded that a paperless or near-paperless business 
office  would occur by the year 2000. Many believed that the change would 
occur first  in the large (Fortune 500) companies. 
Voice  Recognition Input—Voice  input of  data before  the year 2000 is 
predicted by some of  the technological experts. It is being used in some cases 
by inventory counters at present. Questions are included in the survey 
concerning the expected usage level and reliability level of  various input 
mediums including voice, keyboard, and optical scanning devices. 
Data Communications 
Data Sharing—Data  sharing appears to be a primary goal in business today. 
Local area networks and multiuser systems seem to be dominating the hi-tech 
spotlight at present. Most experts agree that there is a tradeoff  between data 
sharing and data security. A truly secure network has not been designed to 
date. Loss of  data integrity is one issue that is exacerbated in the networking/ 
multiuser environment. The physical design of  the network can impact the 
security of  the information  system. There are presently three common types of 
LAN designs—star, token ring, and bus. A technical discussion will not be 
addressed at this time, but the star is considered to be the most secure design 
followed  by the token ring, and then the bus. IBM has adopted the token ring 
design so it is expected that this design will dominate in the future.  A question 
concerning LAN design is included in our Delphi instrument. 
Communication  Channel  Options—Another very important communica-
tions issue is the selection of  a communication channel. Using the channel 
already in existence, the telephone system, is certainly one option. Telephone 
wire (technically, twisted-pair wire) is slower and slightly less reliable than 
other wire/cable options. Coaxial cable is faster  and more secure than twisted-
pair; however, fiber  optic cable is much faster  and even more reliable yet. A 
major disadvantage of  fiber  optic cable (concerning networks) is that the wire 
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cannot be spliced to add a new node. T-1 lines are massive (1.5 megahertz) 
communications channels that are extremely popular with large companies. 
Wireless communication can be achieved via either microwave or satellite. 
Microwave is usually considered a local communication option. Inclement 
weather and static discharge can affect  the reliability of  the signal. Weather 
does not usually affect  satellite communication. Questions concerning local and 
long-distance communication channels are included in the questionnaire. 
Data Security—The  security of  data travelling over communication channels 
is a major concern. Data encryption is one possible solution. A question 
concerning encryption of  confidential  data is included in the instrument. 
Communication  Among Computers—Another  important issue is the level of 
communication among computers. Will microcomputers, minicomputers, and 
mainframes  be able to communicate with one another? Will computers made by 
different  manufacturers  be able to communicate with one another? Many 
companies have a variety of  computers within the departments of  their 
company. Although some departments may desire to share certain data, often 
they cannot. Data sharing may improve efficiency  and effectiveness,  but it 
could result in an exposure to data security risks. 
Computer  Hardware 
Proliferation  of  Computers—Our  preliminary findings  indicate that there will 
be a proliferation  of  computers, especially microcomputers. The computers will 
be faster,  more powerful,  smaller in size, and less expensive. In other words, 
the trend of  the early 1980s is expected to continue. These findings  do not 
raise many new audit concerns; however, they do intensify  our existing 
concerns. The problems of  unauthorized data access, program access, and 
hardware access are certainly not going to go away and certainly could get 
worse. Separation of  duties, one of  the cornerstones of  effective  internal 
control, is becoming less and less attainable. Hardware failure  and lack of 
adequate hardware backup will become increasing concerns as we become 
more dependent upon computers. Vastly improved processing speeds are 
likely to result from  parallel processing and other innovations. 
Backup Storage—A  number of  questions arise concerning the types of 
primary and backup storage mechanisms for  accounting data and the location of 
the backup data (stored off-site/on-site).  Some experts have predicted that 
microcomputer storage will be measured in terms of  gigabytes (billions of 
bytes) in the very near future.  Storage and backup of  data on microcomputers 
with this much information  will be critical. Microcomputer users are generally 
not as conscientious in backing up data, which could be a major data security 
risk. The trend is clearly toward a decentralized computing environment. One 
concern is that in this type of  environment there might be a lack of  standard 
operating procedures at some locations (e.g., backing up data daily). 
Data Access—Preventing unauthorized access to data is a critical internal 
control issue. Password systems have evidenced vulnerability to unauthorized 
employees and outside hackers in recent years. Technology for  biological 
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"passwords" such as fingerprints  and voiceprints has already been developed. 
A question concerning the nature of  access control mechanisms in the future  is 
included in the Delphi instrument. 
Computer  Software 
Resistance to Change—In  spite of  the predicted proliferation  of  new 
programs, change is not easily achieved in the software  arena. Such resistance 
has been encountered with COBOL programming language and hierarchical 
database management system software.  Supposedly "better" languages and 
database designs have been introduced. However, due to the level of 
investment in terms of  money and trained manpower, it is difficult  to replace 
"adequate" software.  We are beginning to witness similar occurrences at the 
microcomputer level. DOS is the most widely accepted operating system 
software  (for  business purposes). Perhaps UNIX has some better features,  but 
to invest the additional manpower and money, the improvements will have to be 
substantial. In application, software,  DBASE III is certainly vastly superior to 
DBASE II, yet many individuals continue to use DBASE II. Will any new 
spreadsheet software  be able to replace Lotus 1-2-3 (on a large scale)? 
The benefits  of  new software  must be substantial for  a company to reinvest 
the money and training needed to make a change. Artificial  intelligence based or 
natural language based software  offers  those potential benefits.  Questions 
regarding the likelihood of  these occurrences are included in our questionnaire. 
Natural  Language Programming  and  Expert  Systems—Natural  language 
programming and expert systems could have substantial audit implications if 
they become feasible  on a large scale. Program review by the EDP auditor 
would become more simplified,  but unauthorized tampering with programs 
written in natural language (or close to natural language) could become a 
greater problem. 
Preliminary Findings Concerning Audit Evidence 
The  Open-Ended  Questionnaire  and Expert  Auditors  Surveyed 
Prior to formally  surveying expert technologists, an open-ended question-
naire was sent to various experts in accounting. This questionnaire was used to 
obtain a list of  the concerns of  the professional  accountant as input for  the 
eventual survey of  technologists. 
The (non-random) sample of  accounting professionals  surveyed included 
ten directors of  internal audit of  Fortune 500 companies, 20 partners of  large 
CPA firms,  and ten controllers of  Fortune 500 companies. The questionnaire 
simply asked the respondent to list the five  trends/changes/events that would 
have the greatest impact upon auditing which he/she expected would occur 
within the next 15 years. 
Overview of  Predicted  Trends 
The comments obtained centered on approximately ten different  catego-




(N = 20) 
1. Trend toward a paperless society with a reduced audit 
trail. 19 
2. Increased governmental intervention in auditing. 10 
3. There will be an increased number of  business failures 
and audit failures.  Auditors will be more responsible for 
predicting these failures.  Increased litigation concerns 
for  external auditing firms.  7 
4. The financial  reporting package will place a greater 
emphasis on forecasts  over historical reports. 6 
5. Increased prominence of  internal control reporting. 6 
6. Changes in financial  reporting and information  required 
(e.g., disaggregated data replacing financial  statements, 
current value based reporting). 6 
7. Expert Systems used in auditing. 5 
8. Increased competitive pressures among external audit-
ing firms.  3 
9. Increased trend toward a world economy. 3 
10. Trend toward a "Decision Support System" environ-
ment. 3 
The three categories receiving the most responses—(1) paperless society, 
(2) governmental intervention, and (3) business/audit failures—are  not unre-
lated. As the computerized accounting environment becomes more complex, 
auditing becomes more difficult.  As auditing complexity increases, the like-
lihood of  audit failures  increases. And if  audit failures  occur, government 
intervention becomes more likely. 
There are also several legal, regulatory/governmental, macroeconomic, 
and reporting issues that are of  much concern. However, the primary focus  of 
comments was with the impact of  changing technology upon audit evidence and 
internal accounting controls. Therefore,  the thrust of  our research will be 
directed toward that area. 
Potential  Future  Effects  on Types  of  Audit  Evidence 
The following  section informally  discusses some suggested possible effects 
of  potential information  technology changes on future  audit evidence. Informa-
tion technology changes will likely have a significant  effect  on all seven basic 
types of  audit evidence: physical examination, observation, confirmation, 
vouching or documentation, inquiries of  client, tests of  mechanical accuracy, 
and analytical tests. 
Physical Examination—The most common types of  physical examination 
are inventory observation and examination of  securities. One possible change in 
this area is that inventory taking could be done "on-line" with voice input or 
laptop computers. Actually, this may help to improve auditing because a 
physical inventory listing could be available at the time of  observation. 
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Physical examination of  marketable securities could undergo significant 
change if  the physical piece of  paper, the certificate,  is eliminated. Obviously, 
other audit procedures will have to be performed  to establish validity and 
perhaps value as well. 
Confirmation—Two  of  the respondents in our open-ended audit question-
naire stated that the reliability of  confirmations  would decrease in the future. 
Outside confirmations  are one of  the strongest forms  of  audit evidence at 
present. It would conceivably take significantly  more audit effort  to establish 
the validity of  the asset or liability presently being confirmed.  Further, despite 
additional audit effort,  it is unlikely that the evidence gathered internally would 
be nearly as persuasive as the external confirmation. 
Vouching/Documentation—It  seems obvious that auditing in a world without 
cancelled checks (or even checks), invoices, purchase orders, time cards, etc. 
would be much different  than it is today. Several partners from  large accounting 
firms  surveyed in our open-ended questionnaire argue that continuous controls 
monitoring, auditing at the time of  occurrence of  the transaction, will become 
essential. With a reduced audit trail, strong internal controls become more 
essential. A greater understanding of  the computer, accounting controls, and 
management control systems will be required of  the auditor. 
Inquiries  of  the Client—  Client inquiries are considered a relatively weak 
form  of  evidence that must be substantiated if  possible. Substantiation can be 
difficult  even now. In a more electronic environment, the situation may even 
worsen. 
Mechanical  Accuracy—In one respect, the mathematical accuracy of  vir-
tually all tab runs, spreadsheets, invoices, etc. should improve. However, 
client prepared electronic spreadsheets, for  example, might be an area of 
concern. Electronic spreadsheets "look" correct, but the assumptions under-
lying the spreadsheets must be audited. At present, this is a very difficult 
procedure and audit judgment problems concerning spreadsheets are just 
emerging. Perhaps the software  will improve in that regard. 
Analytical  Tests—It  seems possible that we will be placing more reliance 
upon analytical review procedures as "hard" evidence becomes less available. 
More creative uses of  analytical procedures may have to be developed to meet 
the need for  audit evidence. 
Observation—Observation  is generally considered one of  the weakest forms 
of  audit evidence. However, observation of  computer environment and general 
computer and office  procedures may give added information  of  the strength of  a 
client's internal controls. 
Summary  of  Preliminary  Findings  about Audit  Evidence—Three  of  the 
currently strongest forms  of  evidence—physical examination, confirmation,  and 
vouching—could possibly all deteriorate in reliability and persuasiveness. It is 
unknown at this time whether other forms  of  evidence, or other types of  audit 
procedures, can compensate for  these potential losses. 
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This potential deterioration of  evidence is occurring at a time when the 
complexity of  business transactions (especially financial)  and accounting rules is 
increasing. At the same time, Congress and other regulatory bodies are 
applying increased pressure for  improved auditing. 
A Tentative Scenario of  Future Audit Evidence 
The following  tentative scenario of  future  information  processing and audit 
evidence is offered  merely as an attempt to provide a stimulus for  discussion at 
the Symposium. In the final  research report, such a scenario will be based upon 
more extensive empirical evidence from  the Delphi study information  tech-
nology experts and the survey of  audit experts. In this tentative scenario we 
distinguish "highly likely events and trends" from  "important contingencies," 
which are not highly likely but which would be important if  they occur. 
Highly  Likely  Events and Trends 
Based upon the research to date, some of  the highly likely events and 
trends that are expected to have an important impact on the future  of  audit 
evidence and auditing are: 
1. Vastly increased computer power, reduced cost, and miniaturized 
size. 
2. Commonplace usage of  small, highly portable, powerful  computers 
that telecommunicate without a hard physical connection or coupling 
to a network. 
3. Commonplace usage of  voice data entry and image processing and 
ultra high-speed printers. 
4. Vastly increased practical use of  expert systems for  a wide variety of 
audit tasks. 
5. Commonplace usage of  imbedded audit monitors to flag  items of 
audit interest on a continuous basis. 
6. Vastly increased computer and information  processing sophistication 
by management and employees. 
Important  Contingencies 
Events and trends that are not highly likely to occur but that would have a 
significant  impact on future  auditing if  they occurred are regarded as important 
contingencies. Some of  the important contingencies that are suggested in the 
research to date are: 
1. Uncertainties about the specific  type(s)  of  (a) computer hardware, (b) 
software,  or (c) networks that will prevail. 
2. The degree of  assurance that can be delivered by future  systems 
with respect to (a) information  security, (b) guaranteed privacy, or 
(c) backup reliability. Technological advances will greatly enhance 
both the sophistication of  security measures and the tools available 
for  overcoming those security measures. 
3. The prevalence of  expert systems and the specific  arena or role of 
individual human judgment in auditing. Individual human judgment is 
likely to be used interactively with expert systems. 
4. The extent of  legal liability of  auditors—both external and internal. 
The presently exploding liability costs may continue to rise or may 
140 
be controlled by various legislative, legal, social, or economic 
remedies. 
5. The level of  governmental regulation or intervention into the 
auditing and/or business environment. This could be affected  by any 
major failures  related to business enterprises, audits, or databases. 
6. The degree of  public acceptance of  (or disillusionment toward) 
pressures for  higher and higher levels of  computer and technological 
sophistication. 
7. The prevalence of  the "electronic cottage" or working at home and 
telecommuting. 
Conclusion 
In summary, this paper reports on Phase I of  a research project that 
attempts to identify  and analyze the most significant  information  technology 
changes and other factors  that are likely to have a major impact on audit 
evidence, the audit process, and the role of  auditing in the next 10 to 15 years. 
The literature review, interviews, and open-ended questionnaires used in this 
phase of  the research tentatively identified  numerous events and trends that, if 
they occur, will have a significant  impact on the future  of  audit evidence. In the 
remaining phase of  the research, a Delphi survey will be used to measure and 
analyze more rigorously the predictions of  a panel of  information  technology 
experts. The audit implications of  these predictions will then be further  tested 
through use of  another panel of  auditing experts. 
In concluding this paper, we are requesting that Kansas Auditing Sym-
posium participants—in addition to critiquing the paper in any way they deem 
appropriate—also provide feedback  concerning (1) specific  factors  likely to 
affect  future  audit evidence that may have been omitted from  our discussion 
and (2) the most likely scenario of  audit evidence and the audit process in the 
year 2000. 
Appendix A 
Questions Included in the Delphi Survey 
Estimation  of  Trends 
Data Communications 
1. What percentage of  microcomputers and terminals will be able to commu-
nicate with any mainframe  or minicomputer made  by the same manufacturer 
(in the following  years)? 
2. What percentage of  microcomputers and terminals will be able to commu-
nicate with any mainframe  or minicomputer? 
3. What percentage of  microcomputers used for  BUSINESS purposes will be 
used. . . ? 
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a) As stand-alone devices 
b) As part of  a Local Area Network or a Wide Area Network 
4. What percentage of  local  data communication will be transmitted over the 
following  channels? (Use whatever your definition  of  LOCAL is.) 
a) Twisted-pair wire 
b) Coaxial cable 
c) Fiber optic cable 
d) Microwave 
e) "T-1" type lines 
f)  Other 
5. What percentage of  long-distance  (i.e., NON-LOCAL) data communication 
will be transmitted over the following  channels? 
a) Twisted-pair wire 
b) Coaxial cable 
c) Fiber optic cable 
d) Microwave 
e) "T-1" type lines 
f)  Satellite 
g) Other 
6. What percentage of  local area networks will utilize the following  architec-
tures? 
a) Star design 
b) Token Ring design 
c) Bus design 
d) Other 
7. Certain data are considered confidential.  What percentage of  the data 
which you consider confidential  will be encrypted when transmitted over 
communication channels? 
Office  Automation  and Transaction  Automation 
8. What percentage of  payments will be conducted electronically by the 
following  entities? 
a) Large (Fortune 500) corporations 
b) Medium-size companies 
c) Small businesses 
d) Individuals (consumers) 
9. What percentage of  invoicing and billing will be done electronically by the 
following  entities? 
a) Large (Fortune 500) corporations 
b) Medium-size companies 
c) Small businesses 
11. What percentage of  business-related transaction data will be input using 
the following  mechanisms? 
a) Keyboard 
b) Voice 
c) Communication channels 
d) External data sources (e.g., from  another company's computer) 
e) Optical scanning device 
f)  Other 
142 
12. What percentage of  business office  employees in America will telecom-
mute? (The employee does not have to work all five  days of  the week at 
home. His/her schedule might call for  working at home every other day, for 
example.) 
13. What percentage of  business and accounting data will be backed up on the 
following  devices? 
a) Magnetic Tape 
b) Floppy Disk 
c) Hard Disk 
d) Laser Disk 
e) Tape Streamer 
f)  Other 
14. What percentage of  companies will store back-up data at off-site  premises? 
15. What percentage of  back-up business data will be stored on "Read Only" 
devices? 
Hardware,  Software,  Other 






17. What percentage of  user identification/authentication  schemes for  gaining 
access to hardware or files  will use the following? 
a) Personal characteristics (e.g., fingerprint,  voiceprint) 
b) Possessed objects (e.g., card, key) 
c) Remembered information  (passwords) 
d) Dialog (typed or spoken) 
e) Other 
18. What percentage of  business application software  for  the mainframe  will be 
programmed using the following  categories of  languages? 
a) Higher level languages (e.g., COBOL, FORTRAN, etc.) 
b) Fourth generation languages 
c) Fifth  generation languages (i.e., natural language based) 
d) Other 
19. What level of  reliability will voice input of  data achieve? 
20. What percentage of  each category of  computers listed below will have 




WHAT IS/ARE THE PRIMARY SOURCE(S) OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE FOR 
RESPONDING TO THE QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION OF THE SUR-
VEY? (Please rank them if  your knowledge comes from  more than one source.) 
First-hand; personal involvement in the area related to these trends. 
Professional  literature. 
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Oral communication; information  from  knowledgeable persons whose 
opinions you respect. 
Popular literature. 
RATE YOUR LEVEL OF EXPERTISE ON THESE TRENDS (0 TO 10) 
(0 = No Expertise; 10 = Very highly qualified) 
Estimation  of  Events 
Specify  probability of  occurrence for  the following  (0-100%) 
1. SOFTWARE: Sophisticated software  is developed capable of  creating 
computer programs that solve complex analytic problems specified  by a 
user who has only minimal computer literacy. The software  system 
identifies  the inputs needed, elicits these inputs from  the user and writes 
the program. 
2. AI: Breakthroughs in the so-called fifth  generation computers result in the 
development of  a complete artificial  intelligence capability. These units 
speak several languages, and respond to oral questions in a wide variety of 
subject areas. 
3. HARDWARE: Microcomputer storage capacity is measured in gigabytes 
(billions of  bytes). 
4. OFFICE AUTOMATION: Office  automation reaches a level in which 
elimination of  all paper-work from  repetitive tasks is feasible  for  the 
following  items: 
a) Payroll time-cards 
b) Accounts payable vouchers 
c) Expense reports 
d) Purchase requisitions 
e) Purchase orders 
f)  Invoices 
g) Job Sheets (for  production) 
Appendix B 
Sample Page from  Delphi Questionnaire 
Estimation  of  Trends 
Data Communications 
1. What percentage of  microcomputers and terminals will be able to communi-
cate with any mainframe  or minicomputer made  by the same manufacturer  (in 
the following  years)? 
BY: 1990 1995 2000 NQ 
% % % 
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2. What percentage of  microcomputers and terminals will be able to communi-
cate with any mainframe  or minicomputer? 
BY: 1990 1995 2000 NQ 
% % % 
3. What percentage of  microcomputers used for  BUSINESS purposes will be 
used. . . . ? 
BY: 1990 1995 2000 NQ 
As stand-alone devices % % % 
As part of  a Local Area 
Network, or a Wide 
Area Network % % % 
4. What percentage of  local data communication will be transmitted over the 
following  channels? (Use whatever your definition  of  LOCAL is.) 
BY: 1990 1995 2000 NQ 
Twisted-pair wire % % % 
Coaxial cable % % % 
Fiber optic cable % % % 
Microwave % % % 
"T-1" type lines % % % 
Other % % % 
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Discussant's Response to 
"The Impact of  Technological Events and Trends 
on Audit Evidence in the Year 2000: Phase I" 
Stephen M. Paroby 
Ernst & Whinney 
My compliments go to authors Holstrum, Mock, and West for  a well-
written and well-thought-out paper and a project that will have a significant 
impact on all of  us. Mark Twain once said, "It's all right to make predictions, 
but not about the future."  Technological forecasting  tends to be optimistic in 
the short run and pessimistic in the long run. Had this paper been written in 
1970, I truly wonder if  it would have predicted today's environment. However, 
the authors have taken a compilation of  speculations that are often  difficult  to 
quantify  or fully  support and put them in a perspective that will certainly jar 
today's auditor. 
Computerized systems benefit  all of  us in several ways. Computers process 
transactions with much greater consistency than is possible in a manual 
system. In addition, the speed and flexibility  of  computer processing provide 
wide-ranging capabilities for  a timely, reliable reporting of  high volumes of 
information.  These capabilities give management greater opportunity to make 
informed  business decisions and allow management to react quickly to and 
capitalize on business developments. 
As the number of  on-line systems and paperless transactions continue to 
increase, new products will continue to emerge to provide auditors with more 
sophisticated computer-assisted audit techniques. Advancing technology such 
as micro-to-mainframe  communications, down-loading of  information  from 
centralized or decentralized sites, expert systems, and artificial  intelligence 
probably will not change basic audit techniques of  review and verification.  What 
this technology will change significantly  is the way auditors evaluate and test 
systems. The traditional approach of  examining "hard" copies is neither 
adequate nor feasible.  Computerized techniques have been developed to deal 
with this task. Various software  programs and utilities can provide exception 
reports and other audit-related information.  Embedded audit modules can 
select and verify  all or a sample of  transactions and generalized audit software 
performs  calculations faster  and much more accurately than we could manually. 
However, the consistency, speed, and flexibility  of  the computer can pose 
additional control concerns for  us as auditors. These concerns include: 
1. The effect  of  errors may be compounded. For example, the 
computer may prepare sales invoices by taking the quantity input 
and extending it by price on the sales price master file.  If  the 
program is not functioning  properly (e.g., selecting incorrect prices, 
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performing  extensions improperly), all sales invoices may be incor-
rect. 
2. The reduction of  manual involvement resulting from  the presence of 
the computer in the process could lead to inadequate segregation of 
duties. 
3. Audit trails may be reduced or eliminated, or may exist for  only short 
periods of  time in computer-readable form. 
4. Changes to data and programs may be made by individuals lacking a 
sufficient  understanding of  the overall system of  internal control and 
standard operating policies. Also, such changes may be made 
without adequate testing by a quality assurance group or without the 
consent of  management. 
5. More individuals may have access to data, a critical corporate 
resource. These individuals may be authorized or unauthorized. 
Authorized access could still lead to either errors or irregularities, 
and unauthorized access usually leads to computer fraud. 
As recently reported by the FBI, computer fraud  ranges from 
three to five  billion dollars annually. The average return to the 
perpetrator in reported crimes has been calculated at $615,000, 
quite a difference  from  the $23,000 average for  manual embezzle-
ments. As evidenced by these figures,  computers can greatly 
facilitate  the misappropriation of  assets and the manipulation of 
information  under certain circumstances. 
Therefore  we should keep in mind that while a computer's involvement in 
the accounting system or in a production process often  has a positive impact, 
this does not necessarily mean the data it generates are correct, nor that 
adequate controls are in place. In most cases, control procedures will exist. 
However, we need to identify  and test them before  relying on them, just as we 
would in a manual system. 
Also, all auditors will have to increase their understanding of  computerized 
systems. In order to plan and execute an audit effectively,  auditors will have to 
determine the impact of  the computer on the data they are examining. In 
addition, they will have to gain an understanding of  the controls over the 
processing of  the data. Specifically,  this will include controls over the develop-
ment and maintenance of  programs and controls over access to data files  and 
programs. 
Having painted the picture of  what the future  that is here today holds, let 
me focus  on some of  the significant  changes in information  technology and the 
paper presented by the authors. Essentially, the authors take current tech-
nology and project it forward,  anticipating no new significant  technological 
break-throughs. Clearly, in an area evolving as rapidly as computer technology, 
such an approach could be risky. For example, had this paper been written ten 
years ago, the authors may have failed  to predict the revolutionary impact of 
microcomputer technology. 
I agree with the authors that the micro-to-mainframe  links and local area 
networks will become much more common. In addition, these links and 
networks will present control challenges. The more difficult  task will be to 
predict how these technological trends will affect  auditing. A clear distinction 
should also be made between big, unusual transactions and little, normal ones. 
Although the authors state that three of  the currently strongest forms  of 
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evidence—physical examination, confirmation,  and vouching—could possibly all 
deteriorate in reliability and persuasiveness, it is unclear now whether other 
forms  of  evidence—or other types of  audit procedures—will be able to 
compensate for  these potential losses. 
Computer-based information  is intrinsically more reliable than printed 
information.  Perhaps the most important effect  of  new computer technology 
will not be in a reduction in the quality of  audit evidence, but a greater emphasis 
on computer controls to assure its accuracy and the avoidance of  unwarranted 
reliance on computer-generated data. 
Audit failures  usually result from  not understanding a particular transaction 
or class of  transactions and the related processing and control systems rather 
than because the inventory listing does not foot.  New information  technology is 
not likely to alter this situation but in fact  may compound it. 
When you relate the changes in information  technology that will affect  future 
audit evidence and the impact of  those changes on auditing, certain issues come 
to mind. Some of  the specific  issues that should be addressed include: 
1. How to make computer technology and computer tools accessible to 
general auditors. In broad terms, audit evidence is what auditors 
examine. If  auditors cannot understand computer technology, com-
puterized files  will not be considered audit evidence. 
2. It seems likely that analytical review will become the centerpiece of 
most audits within ten years. An important aspect of  increased 
computer technology is that clients can now accumulate and analyze 
a much larger amount of  information  than previously possible. That 
information  makes possible much more detailed and persuasive 
analytical reviews. Also, through the use of  artificial  intelligence, 
more information  will be gathered, synthesized, and put into useful 
form  faster  than ever before. 
3. Audit coverage will increase dramatically. For example, when we 
test inventory extensions manually, we typically select a small 
sample of  inventory items to recompute. If  we use software  tools to 
check the same computation, we generally test all inventory items. 
As we move toward more computerized auditing, the percentage of 
transactions we examine will increase. If  we had to do it manually, 
audit fees  would be astronomical. 
4. The authors cite Weber and suggest that generalized audit software 
may be unavailable to run on microcomputers and minicomputers for 
many years to come. At Ernst & Whinney we are now using a 
multimachine generalized audit software  package that runs on a 
microcomputer, as well as microcomputer software  that gives us the 
ability to extract data from  essentially any minicomputer or main-
frame.  That technology is here today. 
Given the rapid change in technology in just the last few  years, it will be 
almost impossible to project what the computerized auditing environment will 
be in the year 2000. Aside from  the obvious concerns and those already 
mentioned (e.g., data security, lack of  audit trails), some additional pervasive 
considerations are (1) what financial  statements will look like 10 to 20 years 
from  now and how financial  information  will be distributed and (2) how audits 
will be performed  then. 
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Regarding presentation of  financial  information,  several questions come to 
mind. For example, will shareholders and other financial  statement users have 
continuous access (via their own computer terminals or other devices) to a 
company's financial  information?  Will audits be done entirely by computers 
from  the auditor's office,  in which case "field  work" would virtually disappear 
except for  some inquiries and observations? 
Another major question is how the sophisticated technology of  the future 
will affect  the structure of  CPA firms  and the staffing  of  audit engagements. A 
related issue is the impact on accounting and business schools. Accounting 
students will need to have a much more detailed background in information 
systems before  joining a CPA firm,  and the firms  themselves will need to 
provide increased training to supplement normal development programs. We 
have recently released an interactive computer-based training course, EDP 
Concepts  for  Auditors,  designed to raise the level of  computer literacy for  all 
auditors. 
How will smaller CPA firms  adapt? The impact of  technological change 
generally is not felt  as quickly by the smaller firms,  since their clients tend to be 
the last ones to adopt sophisticated technology. However, in 10 to 20 years 
even small businesses likely will place substantial reliance on the computer. 
Accordingly, the smaller firms  will need to invest in the necessary hardware 
and software  to keep pace with their clients and the rest of  the profession.  This 
increased sophistication definitely  will place more emphasis on the system of 
internal controls. Companies will need to turn increasingly to EDP managers to 
make sure that adequate control systems are installed and then to their auditors 
for  assurance that the controls are functioning. 
Better communication between external and internal auditors would seem 
to be a necessity for  coping with the changes in technology. The authors refer 
to "continuous control auditing." Not only would this cause us to place more 
reliance on internal audit, but it would seem to change dramatically the nature 
and timing of  our tests. The authors state that "Changes affecting  the nature 
and availability of  audit evidence are occurring so rapidly that auditors have 
difficulty  making practical plans to gradually adopt their auditing techniques and 
processes to deal effectively  with future  forms  of  audit evidences." Frankly, 
what we are doing now in terms of  researching and testing new hardware and 
software  and training personnel seems to be the appropriate course of  action. 
Although long-range planning is important, we can realistically look only to the 
short term because of  the rapid advancement of  technology. 
With tomorrow's technology here today, management's and audit commit-
tees' concerns about the computer are intensifying.  Management and audit 
committees are increasingly asking their auditors to provide answers to such 
questions as: What information  is being processed on our computer; why; for 
whom; by whom? What would happen if  our computer system went down for  a 
day, a week, or a month? What would happen if  our key data processing 
personnel left  tomorrow? Can someone with a telephone and a home computer 
access our confidential  files?  Within our organization, can only people with the 
need to know gain access to confidential  data? Are there proper segregation-of-
duty policies? To answer these and other questions effectively,  it is imperative 
for  all auditors to be more computer literate. 
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As an auditor, how do you respond when you ask the data processing 
manager how things are going and he replies: 
I had just arrived in town to bring the on-site on-line. No sooner had I 
brought it up than it went down. Rising to the occasion, I went 
downstairs and gathered my tool kit: Time Domain Reflectometer,  logic 
probe, comm lube, and spare low-order bits. 
Going to the SOURCE, I TC'd the packet with some spare protocols 
until the EtherLink locked up TS0 and broke the SYSGEN. I slipped a 
Turbo Accelerator into the PC and revved it up until it executed an 
infinite  loop in under three seconds. 
Coming in the back door under VMS, I broke the UNIX shell and 
released the ASCII characters in the error traps. Applying CSMA/CD 
brought the recovery rate safely  below the BIOS buffer  overflow.  DOS 
recovered, and the crisis was over. . . . 
Many of  the skills previously reserved for  a few  high priests in the data 
processing center are now required of  all of  us. 
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Is the Second Standard of  Fieldwork Necessary 
Thomas P. Bintinger 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Introduction 
Today's generally accepted auditing standards were primarily framed  in 
1947 by the Committee on Auditing Procedure (Committee) of  the American 
Institute of  Accountants, the predecessor bodies of  the current Auditing 
Standards Board and the American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants. 
The standards were formally  adopted by the profession  at its annual meeting in 
September 1948.* These standards have remained in place since that time with 
numerous statements interpreting them adopted by the Auditing Standards 
Board or its predecessors. These familiar  standards are organized into two 
general classes: (1) personal or general standards and (2) procedural stand-
ards. The procedural standards have two categories: the conduct of  the 
fieldwork  and reporting. The objective of  this paper is to focus  on the 
procedural standards, in particular, the second standard of  fieldwork: 
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of  the existing internal 
control as a basis for  reliance thereon and for  the determination of  the 
resultant extent of  the test to which auditing procedures are to be 
restricted.1 
This second standard of  field  work pertaining to the evaluation of  internal 
control is interposed between the first  which covers planning and supervision 
of  the work and the third which requires evidential matter to be obtained as a 
reasonable basis for  an opinion regarding the financial  statements being 
examined. Its mandate has been subject to considerable interpretations in 
formal  statements which include: 
Special Report by the Committee November 1948 
on Auditing Procedure 
Internal  Control—Elements  of  a Coordinated 
System  and  its Importance  to Management 
and  the Independent  Public Accountant 
Statement on Auditing Procedure 29 October 1958 
Scope of  the Independent  Auditor's 
Review of  Internal  Control 
* The fourth  reporting standard was subsequently added and approved by the membership of  the 
AIA (AICPA) in 1949. 
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Statement on Auditing Procedure 33 
Auditing  Standards  and  Procedures: 
Chapter 5—Evaluation of  Internal Control 
Statement on Auditing Procedure 54 
The  Auditor's  Study  and  Evaluation  of 
Internal  Control 
Statement on Auditing Standard 43 
Omnibus Statement  on Auditing  Standards: 
Section 2—The Auditor's Study and Evaluation 
of  Internal Control 
The profession  has issued restatements and codifications  in 1954 and 1972 
in addition to the SAP 33 codification.  These were derived from  the pronounce-
ments, including the above, reflecting  the development of  the auditors' actions. 
The significance  of  the system of  internal control has transcended auditor's 
and management's interest when Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of  1977 which requires "devis(ing) and maintain(ing) a system of 
internal accounting controls"2 for  objectives that the auditing profession 
articulated in Statement on Auditing Procedure 54. Again, in the Report, 
Conclusion  and  Recommendations 3 of  the Commission on Auditor's Responsi-
bilities, the subject of  internal control and its evaluation was extensively 
commented upon. 
In addition, the standard has been the subject of  considerable discussion as 
to whether its requirements are contained in the first  and third standards of 
fieldwork,  and thus its listing as an independent standard is confusing  to those 
in practice. This paper will examine the evolution of  the second standard as 
interpreted in the auditing statements and consider whether the intent of  the 
original authors has been changed in the context of  providing more precise 
guidance. Articles and papers exist on the subject, but the discussion 
developed herein is primarily based upon the officially  issued statements of  the 
profession  itself. 
Tentative Statement of  Auditing Standards—Special Report— 
October 1947 
In the introduction to the Tentative  Statement  of  Auditing  Standards 
(Tentative  Statement),  the Committee said: 
Auditing standards may be set to be differentiated  from  auditing 
procedures in that the latter relate to acts to be performed  whereas the 
former  deal with measures of  quality of  the performance  of  those acts 
and the objectives to be obtained in the employment of  the procedures 
undertaken. Auditing standards as thus distinct from  auditing pro-
cedures concern themselves not only with the auditor's professional 
qualities but also with his judgment exercised in the conduct of  his 
examination and in his reporting thereon.4 
This distinction has been maintained in the various reissuances of  the 
standards, and may be the reason that the profession  has a reluctance to modify 
or change the original standards. While not entirely comparable, it is interesting 





Standards Board and the Accounting and Review Services Committee, that the 
fieldwork  standards have been reduced to two by absorbing the internal control 
concept into an element of  the evidence standard.5 
In the Tentative  Statement,  the introductory remarks applying to all 
procedural standards include a discussion on materiality and relative risk. In 
particular, the comment upon relative risk on internal check and control is 
significant  as it states that, "The effect  of  internal check and control on the 
scope of  an examination is the outstanding example of  the influence  on auditing 
procedures of  a greater or lesser degree of  risk of  error. The primary purpose 
of  internal check and control is to minimize the risks of  errors and irreg-
ularities. . . . " 6 The Committee appeared to use this stated purpose as the 
underlying reason for  the second standard. The Committee referred  to the 
Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 1 issued in 1939 which states that, "It is 
the duty of  the independent auditor to review the system of  internal check and 
accounting control so as to determine the extent to which he considers that he 
is entitled to rely upon it."7 
The Committee also stated that, "The review of  internal control is one of 
the most important steps in proper planning of  the audit. . . . " 8 The Commit-
tee recognized that the study and evaluation is to help plan the approach to 
evidential matter; yet it did not see fit  to include it under the planning standard. 
I believe it is particularly significant  to note the words chosen by the 
Committee to describe the process envisioned by the second standard: words 
such as outstanding, primary, duty, one of  the most important. These words all 
indicate a standard that the Committee believed to be extremely significant. 
The Committee also identified  the documentation requirements that should 
be employed in the procedures to evidence the second standard of  fieldwork: 
"A systematic and clear record should be made of  the facts  developed by the 
review."9 This documentation requirement imposed by the discussion on the 
standard itself  again seems to emphasize the importance as to which the 
Committee attached to the review. 
Internal Control—Special Report—November 1948 
A year later, the Committee issued its special report entitled Internal 
Control—Elements  of  a Coordinated  System  and  Its  Importance  to Management 
and  the Independent  Public Accountant  (hereafter  referred  to as the Report). I 
believe it is worth noting that the Tentative  Statement  and the Report were 
issued not as releases under the Statements on Auditing Procedure but as 
special reports. While the former  was directed to the auditing profession,  the 
latter was directed to the public accountant and management due to "the 
complementary nature of  their respective responsibilities and of  their interde-
pendence upon each other in discharging those responsibilities."10 
The Report indicates that the public accountant's review of  the system of 
internal control serves two purposes: 
First, it enables him to formulate  an opinion as to the reliance he may 
place on the system to the end that, by adjusting his audit procedures 
accordingly, he may express an opinion as to the fairness  of  manage-
ment's financial  statements; and, secondly, where the review indicates 
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apparent weaknesses, recommendations for  possible corrective meas-
ures may be conveyed to management.11 
This section continues with its advice which indicates that: 
This secondary aspect of  his review frequently  enables the public 
accountant to render broader services than those generally associated 
with his capacity as an independent reporter to stockholders upon 
management's conduct of  stewardship responsibilities. His aid to 
management in attaining more efficient  operation can and should be an 
equally important function. 12 
This duality of  purpose, while not stated precisely in the second standard, 
was, I believe, framed  in the Report in the broader context of  the profession 
and its clients for  whom services were rendered. 
In the introduction to the Report, a statement is made, "In earlier periods 
the independent accountant frequently  had to examine practically all transac-
tions and make dozens of  journal entries before  reasonably accurate financial 
statements could be prepared."13 This statement was made to establish how 
internal control had served to impact the audit in producing financial  state-
ments, and also assist management in fulfilling  its responsibilities. Howard 
Stettler, in his auditing textbook, observed that Robert H. Montgomery, in his 
work, felt  it necessary to prepare an American treatise on auditing as he had 
observed in professional  practices in the United States, a growing departure 
from  the principles and procedures expounded by Dicksee.14 Dicksee's  Audit-
ing was largely directed to the balance sheet and a determination of  the amount 
of  surplus legally available to serve as the basis for  the payment of  dividends. 
Montgomery had observed that more was expected of  the auditor, and a 
broader extension of  the services of  practitioners over the entire field  of 
business activity had resulted. These comments emphasized the broader 
relationship that the engagement of  an auditor by an enterprise had become. 
The Tentative  Statement  and the Report represent the culmination of  a thought 
process on the profession's  responsibilities to its clients and to society. 
In The  Accounting Profession—Where  Is  It  Headed?,  edited by John L. 
Carey, the role of  the auditor is expressed in this context: 
The auditor, whether internal or external, plays a strategic role in the 
discharge of  the accounting function.  By tests and observation, he 
ascertains the manner in which the economic data are being measured, 
recorded, summarized and communicated, and whether all this is in 
conformity  with the established plan. He passes judgment upon rec-
ords, reports, and the performance  of  people, all to the end that the 
output of  economic data be sustained at a high level of  quality. Without 
auditing, degeneration of  the accounting process sets in. 
The auditor also performs  another important task—he looks beyond the 
presently established plan for  carrying out the accounting function  to 
determine whether some different  or modified  plan is called for  by 
changed conditions. Organizations, methods, people, and economic 
environments are constantly changing; the equivalent changes occur in 
the actual or potential contribution of  the accounting function  and in the 
methods of  discharging it. Without auditing, any accounting process is 
exposed to the risks of  losing effectiveness  because of  obsolescence.15 
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Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 33—December 1963 
The Tentative  Statement  and the Report remained in place as authoritative 
auditing pronouncements until the codification  in Statements on Auditing 
Procedure No. 33 (SAP 33) which combined the standards, the Report and the 
previous Statements on Auditing Procedure into a single document. Therefore, 
the official  position of  the profession  was contained in these documents for  a 
15-year-period until 1963. 
Chapter 5 of  SAP 33, "Evaluation of  Internal Control," became the 
interpretive section for  the second standard of  fieldwork.  The difficulty  of  the 
profession's  dual role of  attest for  third party and services to the engaging 
client caused a significant  rewording of  the auditor's responsibility for  internal 
control. 
This codification  now stated, "[a]sa by-product of  this study and evaluation 
(of  internal control), the independent auditor is frequently  able to offer 
constructive suggestions to his client on ways in which internal control may be 
improved."16 This wording arose in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 29 
which was issued in 1958. The concept outlined in the Report of  equality of 
purpose was now stated as a by-product. 
This evolution may have been influenced  by a movement that was occurring 
within the profession:  the concept of  specialization, and in particular, the 
concept of  management services. In the aforementioned  The  Accounting 
Profession—Where  Is  It  Headed?,  Carey includes an article by Robert M. 
Trueblood, "The Management Service Function in Public Accounting" which 
appeared in the July 1961 Journal  of  Accountancy. Mr. Trueblood makes the 
statement: 
Independent auditing results in the expression of  an expert opinion on 
financial  representations made by management. The CPA bases his 
opinion, in large part, on a comprehensive understanding and evaluation 
of  management's system of  internal control—the systems and pro-
cedures used to generate the financial  information  under evaluation. 
This expert knowledge of  financial  information  systems and controls is 
requisite for  the CPA's performance  of  a professional  audit. The same 
expertness that is applied to sound audit performance  may also be 
logically applied by the CPA to management consulting activities. 
Over the years, the performance  of  both the audit and management 
consulting, or management service, function  has been an accepted 
practice of  CPAs. Largely because of  the clear connection between the 
knowledge required to perform  a professional  audit and the knowledge 
useful  in management consulting activities, the staff  performing  both 
activities was frequently  the same. Today, however, developments are 
taking place that tend to force  a more explicit delineation of  audit and 
management services activity.17 
This statement indicating the thrust of  the forces  of  the profession,  I 
believe, has caused the second standard of  fieldwork's  requirements to move 
into the area of  specialization, and thus, narrow the role of  the CPA in his 
position as auditor of  financial  statements. This delineation of  activity obviously 
has been much more pronounced as firms  grew in size. While the wording of 
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the second standard remained the same, its interpretation had significantly 
changed. 
Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 54—November 1972 
The Committee on Auditing Procedure felt  it necessary to "Amplify  and 
clarify  the application of  (the second standard) in the light of  subsequent 
developments in business and in the profession." 18 Accordingly, it issued 
Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 54, "The  Auditor's  Study  and  Evalua-
tion of  Internal  Control"  (SAP 54). This statement reflects  the continuing 
difficulty  faced  by the profession  with respect to specialization and the 
furnishing  of  advisory services and audit services directed to the examination of 
financial  statements. Paragraph 2 of  SAP 54 clearly states this issue: 
The increasing trend for  certified  public accountants to provide manage-
ment advisory or consulting services involving the study, evaluation, 
and improvement of  management information  systems increases the 
need to clearly distinguish between these special services and those 
audit services required for  compliance with the auditing standard for 
study and evaluation of  internal control incident to an examination of 
financial  statements.19 
Apparently, the profession's  need to compartmentalize activities with a client 
was a significant  driving force  to restate the requirements of  the second 
standard. The certified  public accountant was engaged as auditor of  financial 
statements or as consultant on systems, and the two functions  could not be 
delivered at the same time. The reasons for  this delineation may be subject to 
considerable speculation. These may include the difficulty  of  complying with the 
increasing requirements for  financial  statement disclosures and information;  the 
difficulty  of  increasing litigation; or controlling fees.  The purpose of  this paper 
is not to reflect  on these causes, but they might be the subject of  additional 
research. 
SAP 54 stated, "The purpose of  the auditor's study and evaluation of 
internal control... is to establish a basis for  reliance . . . in determining the 
nature, extent and timing of  audit tests to be applied in his examination of 
financial  statements."20 It went on to indicate: 
The study and evaluation made for  this purpose frequently  provide a 
basis for  constructive suggestions to clients concerning improvements 
in internal control. . . . Although constructive suggestions to clients for 
improvements in internal control incident to an audit engagement are 
desirable, the scope of  any additional study made to develop such 
suggestions is not covered by generally accepted auditing standards.21 
Thus the concept of  the second standard embracing two primary purposes 
as articulated in the Report and then redefined  in SAP 33 as a by-product was 
further  reduced in SAP 54 as incidental and suggesting that a special 
engagement should result for  the study. 
SAP 54 also undertook a discussion of  how the evaluation mandated by the 
second standard interfaced  with other standards. The other standard which 
was specifically  considered was the third standard of  fieldwork  covering 
evidential matter. It is interesting to observe that in the Tentative  Statement, 
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the framers  of  the second standard noted planning as significant,  and as time 
has passed, it has been interpreted that the study and evaluation of  internal 
control is significantly  associated with the evidence standard. Thus, SAP 54 
continued the narrowing of  effort  to the first  purpose of  the review suggested 
by the Report and disregarded the second. 
Statement on Auditing Standards 43—August 1982 
In August 1982, the Auditing Standards Board issued SAS No. 43, 
Omnibus Statement  on Auditing  Standards  with a section entitled "The 
Auditors Study and Evaluation of  Internal Control." In SAS No. 43, the Board 
clarifies  its position on "the minimum study and evaluation of  the system of 
internal accounting control contemplated by the second standard of  field  work'' 
and "[t]he minimum documentation required."22 In brief,  if  the auditor does 
not plan to rely on the system, he need not document his understanding of  the 
system but only record his reasons for  not reviewing. Thus, the most basic 
sequence is a minimum understanding which need not be documented, but 
requiring documentation as to the reasons why he did not extend his review 
past the minimum level which was not documented. The thrust of  SAS 43 
represents, again, a significant  reduction from  the original adoption of  the 
standard which indicated that a systematic and clear record be made. In 
addition, it appears to significantly  diminish the second standard's application in 
the audit process. 
Conclusion 
The second standard of  fieldwork  appears to have embodied a broader 
concept of  engagement of  an auditor. This is evidenced in the Report where it 
stated: 
Determining the effectiveness  of  the organization plan, division of 
responsibilities, and such special control procedures as budgetary 
controls, reports, analyses, and cost systems are among the areas 
which the public accountant should cover in his review. It is not 
anticipated that the independent auditor will be able to review all the 
control procedures within the course of  any one audit. The review may 
very well be so arranged as to entail complete coverage over a period of 
several years. However, the review of  those controls which relate 
directly to the accounting records should, if  practicable, be conducted 
each year.23 
The evolution of  the interpretations of  the second standard was to focus  solely 
upon the purpose of  financial  statement examination and substantially diminish 
the purpose of  communicating with management. While the profession  in SAS 
No. 20, Required  Communication  of  Material  Weaknesses  in Internal  Account-
ing Control,  did require communication of  material weaknesses in internal 
accounting control24 and evidence a continuing responsibility, it continues to 
move in the direction of  a secondary role of  communication at best. 
In the Studies  in Accounting Research No.  6, a Statement  of  Basic Auditing 
Concepts  published by the American Accounting Association, the statement is 
made: 
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An information  system is a necessary subject matter attribute because it 
is needed to record assertions. Such a system provides a record of  the 
actions or events which is essential to the preparer of  accounting 
information  and to the auditor for  verification.  The reliability of  this 
record is enhanced if  it is generated within a system of  adequate internal 
controls. Without such controls, the verifiability  standard could be 
tenuous, indeed.25 
In a later section, it is noted that "[t]he system of  internal control (is) of 
paramount importance to the auditor."26 This is another articulation of  the 
significance  of  internal control to the audit process as well as the management 
process. 
In the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities Report, a conclusion is 
reached that the, "Traditional association of  independent auditors with annual 
financial  statements is an obsolete, limited concept."27 This statement is made 
in the context of  expanding the responsibility of  the audit function.  The 
Commission would "require the auditor to expand his study and evaluation of 
the controls over the accounting system to form  a conclusion on the functioning 
of  the internal control system."28 Looking back to the Report, such an 
admonition appears to be a call to return to basics. The formulation  of  the 
auditing standards as originally stated seems to me to embody this requirement 
and only the subsequent interpretations have undertaken to restrict its 
application. While these restrictions may have arisen from  events such as the 
evolution of  specialization in the profession  and the impact of  litigation as 
alluded to previously, it still appears that this narrowing diminishes the 
significance  of  the audit process and its relevancy to not only third parties, but 
also the client who has engaged us. 
The Statement  on Auditing  Standards  No.  30 states that: 
The study and evaluation of  the system of  internal accounting control in 
an audit is generally more limited than that made in connection with an 
engagement to express an opinion on the system of  internal accounting 
control. Nevertheless, an accountant's opinion on a system of  internal 
accounting control does not increase the reliability of  financial  state-
ments that have been audited.29 
The financial  statement report stands on its own at any given point in time. 
However, as the time frame  moves forward,  the significance  of  internal control 
is increased and management has the right to receive the considered opinion of 
its auditors. The question of  reporting to users other than management has 
received considerable guidance, but it is independent of  the responsibility of 
reporting to management. 
While the second standard of  fieldwork  gives guidance on the conduct of  the 
"current" audit of  the financial  statements, it also is giving guidance in 
reporting to management so that "future"  audits would be able to be 
conducted. Thus, the second standard of  fieldwork  is necessary to the 
articulation of  our profession's  judgment of  this significance,  and it should be 
reemphasized in our professional  statements and engagements. 
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Discussant's Response to 
"Is the Second Standard of  Fieldwork 
Necessary" 
Andrew D. Bailey, Jr. 
The Ohio State University 
Introduction 
Mr. Bintinger's paper is very interesting reading. The historical perspec-
tive it brings to the topic is a useful  one and one often  forgotten  by many of  us 
who have a tendency to treat extant practice as if  it has always been and ever 
will be. I found  the evolution suggested by this scenario intriguing. We seem to 
have come nearly full  circle in Mr. Bintinger's mind, beginning with a limited 
view of  the control system where audits were very much balance sheet 
oriented, progressing to a broad business and management orientation to client 
service and now to a narrower focus  which Mr. Bintinger believes . . 
diminishes the significance  of  the audit process and its relevancy to not only 
third parties, but also the client who has engaged us." Mr. Bintinger's position 
is that 
[w]hile the second standard of  fieldwork  gives guidance in the conduct 
of  the 'current' audit of  the financial  statements, it also is giving 
guidance to management so that 'future'  audits would be able to be 
conducted. Thus the second standard of  fieldwork  is necessary to the 
articulation of  our profession's  judgment of  this significance,  and it 
should be reemphasized in our professional  statements and engage-
ments. 
The Policy Approach and Precedence 
The approach taken in Mr. Bintinger's paper can be characterized as 
historical or constitutional/precedence oriented [Danos, et al. 1986]. By this I 
mean that the argument flows  by the development of  the historical role of  the 
framers  of  the "constitutional" elements of  the auditing standards related to 
the study and evaluation of  internal controls. This is quite clear in the statement 
of  objectives put forth  by the author: 
This paper will examine the evolution of  the second standard as 
interpreted in the auditing statements, and consider whether the intent 
of  the original authors has been changed in the context of  providing 
more precise guidance. . . . [T]he discussion developed herein is 
primariy based upon the officially  issued documents of  the profession 
itself. 
If  my interpretation of  Mr. Bintinger's basis of  argument is correct, Mr. 
Bintinger's attitude towards the newly promulgated Statement on Standards 
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for  Attestation Engagements [AICPA, 1986] is of  interest. While noting the 
continuity of  the standard setters focus  on internal controls as a fundamental 
aspect of  the audit, Mr. Bintinger introduces comments on the newly adopted 
Attestation  Standards  indicating that "[w]hile not entirely comparable, it is 
interesting to observe in the Attestation  Standards  recently issued by the 
Auditing Standards Board and the Accounting and Review Services Committee 
that the fieldwork  standards have been reduced to two by absorbing the internal 
control concept to an element of  the evidence standard." Mr. Bintinger is quite 
correct in noting the lack of  total comparability. This point is made in the 
standard itself  where it is stated that: 
The second standard of  fieldwork  in GAAS is not included in the 
attestation standards for  a number of  reasons. That standard calls for  'a 
proper study and evaluation of  the existing internal control as a basis for 
reliance thereon and for  the determination of  the resultant extent of  the 
tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.' The most 
important reason for  not including this standard is that the second 
standard of  fieldwork  of  the attestation standards encompasses the 
study and evaluation of  internal controls because, when performed,  it is 
an element of  accumulating sufficient  evidence. A second reason is that 
the concept of  internal control may not be relevant for  certain 
assertions (for  example, aspects of  information  about computer soft-
ware) on which a practitioner may be engaged to report [AICPA, 1986, 
pp. 24-25]. 
The anomaly in Mr. Bintinger's observation is that he ignores its position in 
his historical argument. The issuers view "[t]he attestation standards [as] a 
natural extension of  the ten generally accepted auditing standards," and 
indicate clearly that "[t]he attestation standards do not supersede any of  the 
existing standards . . . " [AICPA, 1986, p. 3]. As a natural extension of  the 
historical and/or constitutional/precedence process the attestation standards 
should have the same weight as prior legislative action or amendment 
processes. In that sense they reflect  the nature of  the constituent desires or 
beliefs  either as to the framers'  original intent or their likely "intent" under 
the new environmental conditions. To oppose this line is to suggest that Mr. 
Bintinger intended not to call upon the historical process to support his 
conclusion, but to call for  a strict constitutional interpretation of  a past position 
as he sees it. Recall his comment as to ". . . whether the intent of  the original 
authors has been changed . . . in the context of  providing more precise 
guidance." This will leave Mr. Bintinger in the awkward position of  having to 
decide upon which past period to focus  on, those with which he agrees or those 
with which he does not agree. This is always the danger of  a call for  strict 
constitutional interpretations where interpretations vary over time as they 
seem to in this case. If  he wants to use historic precedent  to support his opinion, 
he must, or for  the sake of  consistency should,  accept the continuing evolution of 
that precedent. 
The Normative Service Approach 
While generally taking what appears to be a strict constitutionalist ap-
proach, including citations suggesting the framers'  original intent " . . . [using] 
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words such as outstanding, primary, duty, one of  the most important" in 
describing the second standard of  fieldwork,  Mr. Bintinger also offers  a more 
normative service oriented argument as well. He clearly sees the profession's 
responsibility to the client as running beyond the audit to a support and service 
activity. He also perceives that during the audit activity one of  the primary 
means of  meeting this client service function  is through a broader interpretation 
of  field  standard two than he perceives as currently in place or likely to be in 
place given the trends evidenced by the newly promulgated Attestation 
Standards. 
The  difficulty  with this position is not in asserting  a broader  role, but in using 
the audit  as a means of  implementing  that role.  As Mr. Bintinger points out, 
public accounting firms  have specialized by creating large and diverse consult-
ing practices including substantial practices in tax consultation. The profession 
clearly desires a broader business role than represented by auditing. The 
question is not in the breadth of  the role, but in the means of  implementation. 
By proposing that the second standard of  fieldwork  be retained to enhance that 
role, Mr. Bintinger proposes to use audits as a feed  to the other specialized 
areas of  consulting. Unless he can propose a criteria by which it is necessary to 
adhere to field  standard two in order to perform  a viable financial  audit or attest 
engagement, his proposal stands as a feeder  line to consulting. Mr. Bintinger 
did not provide such a justification  in the body of  his paper although his 
conclusion does suggest that future  auditability is conditional on the implemen-
tation of  the second field  standard. 
Auditor Incentives 
The feeder  orientation noted above is implicit but not developed by Mr. 
Bintinger except in several references  to auditor incentives such as those that 
follow.  Midway through the paper Mr. Bintinger notes that: 
[t]he reasons for  this [separation of  consulting on internal control from 
the auditing function]  delineation may be subject to considerable 
speculation. These may include the difficulty  of  complying with the 
increasing requirements for  financial  statement disclosures and informa-
tion; the difficulty  of  increasing litigation; or controlling fees.  The 
purpose of  this paper is not to reflect  on these causes, but they might 
be the subject of  additional research. 
Again in the conclusion he notes that: 
. . . these restrictions may have arisen from  events such as the 
evolution of  specialization in the profession  and the impact of  litigation as 
alluded to previously, it still appears that this narrowing diminishes the 
significance  of  the audit process and its relevancy to not only third 
parties, but also the client who has engaged us. 
I quite agree with Mr. Bintinger that the various forces  that led to the 
current evolution of  attitudes toward internal control study and evaluation may 
be the topic of  future  research. It is unfortunate  that he did not focus  on these 
issues to a greater extent in that it may be among these ideas that a normative 
justification  for  field  standard two could be developed. The economics of 
auditing and risk sharing may provide grounds for  the second standard. 
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It seems that Mr. Bintinger's motives are the laudatory ones of  service to 
clients and third parties. However, a less charitable interpretation might be that 
his motives are for  the stature and profitability  of  the profession  to which he 
belongs, i.e., his special interest group. After  all, his argument for  retention of 
the field  standard is that the . . narrowing diminishes the significance  of  the 
audit process and its relevancy . . . " and thus by extension the stature and 
likely future  profitability  of  the profession  and professionals.  The only way to 
counter this motivation observation, one rampant in the Dingle Commission 
Hearings, is to offer  arguments that support the conceptual need for  the study 
and evaluation of  internal controls beyond the level implied or suggested by the 
elimination of  field  standard two. Mr. Bintinger has offered  no such arguments 
in the body of  his paper, although as noted earlier, his conclusion alludes to the 
conditional nature of  future  auditability and the implementation of  the second 
standard of  fieldwork.  He clearly believes that this service is desirable to 
clients and third party users. 
If  the service is desirable, presumably clients will pay for  it when it is 
offered  as a distinct activity. Also, presumably, if  the public accounting 
profession  is uniquely capable of  offering  the service at a higher value added 
than other consulting organizations, then public accountants will get the work 
and the stature and profitability  of  the profession  will be maintained and 
enhanced. Whether field  standard two is maintained as a separate standard or 
merged into the evidence field  standard will have little or no impact if  this is the 
case. 
A Quality Control Argument 
I was surprised that Mr. Bintinger did not offer  up the quality control 
argument as an additional reason for  maintaining field  standard two. This 
argument would require some development of  the position that a study and 
evaluation is essential to the audit. However, he could basically rely on existing 
pronouncements on this matter as none of  them, including the new Attestation 
Standards,  explicitly argue the contrary. Given that the need for  some level of 
study and evaluation is established, it can be argued that without the explicit 
standard some auditors will be tempted to ignore the study and evaluation of 
internal controls even to the minimum required level. On this basis, guidance of 
an explicit nature is necessary to maintain a minimal quality level throughout 
the profession.  This basic regulatory argument has been used successfully  in 
many arenas, including the auditing arena. 
A Normative Argument 
This argument proceeds from  the position that any audit must consider 
internal accounting controls, not as a feed  to other service oriented matters but 
as a necessary condition for  efficient  and effective  audits. I believe this to be 
the case in any complex organization where the computer is an integral part of 
the system and have elaborated on this point elsewhere [Bailey, et.al., 1984]. 
Mr. Bintinger does not develop this argument in the paper but does include it in 
his conclusion. Perhaps he has also developed this point elsewhere. 
However, the fact  that internal controls need consideration does not mean 
that the external auditor requires a specific  field  standard such as that under 
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discussion. A collapsing of  this standard into the general evidential standard will 
in no way alter the need to consider internal controls. The consideration may be 
tailored to the needs of  the particular audit and could involve only a very limited 
auditor effort  in small companies or where an independent and effective  internal 
audit function  exists and can be relied upon. Much more extensive special 
consideration by the external auditor may be required under other circum-
stances. I do believe that, whatever the extent of  consideration, the external 
auditor's role should proceed no further  than necessary for  audit purposes 
unless specifically  contracted. 
Conclusion 
I believe that auditor involvement in the design of  systems is essential to 
system auditability. The design for  auditability function  can be done by external 
consultants who might be a part of  a public accounting firm,  however, the 
economics of  the situation alone is likely to be sufficient  to cause this activity to 
become a part of  the internal audit function  in larger firms.  Further, the testing 
of  systems for  compliance and reliability is necessary if  these systems are to be 
relied upon in establishing the nature, extent and timing of  substantive audit 
tests. Reliance on such systems becomes a more important part of  the audit as 
systems become larger and more complex, e.g., in large organizations with 
highly integrated computer processing systems. Again, I believe that the 
economics of  auditing will cause much of  the testing on such systems to be 
done by internal auditors. 
Despite the increasing role of  the internal auditor, the external auditor's 
role will also expand in these areas and in the use of  computers to support audit 
activity. External auditors will continue to develop design and testing criteria as 
well as searching for  effective  means of  reliance on the work of  internal 
auditors. I cannot foresee  how this relationship will develop in such areas as 
risk sharing and litigation, but I believe that these matters will receive 
substantial attention in the near future. 
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Interim Report on the Development of  an Expert 
System for  the Auditor's Loan Loss Evaluation 
Kirk P. Kelly 
Gary S. Ribar 
John J. Willingham 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Introduction 
The Audit Research Group at Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. has been 
interested in Artificial  Intelligence (AI) and Expert Systems for  a number of 
years. Under the auspices of  the Research Opportunities in Auditing program, 
we have funded  a number of  academic research projects on the application of  AI 
to the audit task. With the growing interest in the field  and the advances in 
technology, it was decided to undertake a project oriented toward the 
development of  an application model. The initial thrust was to build a prototype 
model for  test and evaluation with the implicit intent that the model would 
eventually be developed into a useful  audit tool for  field  work. This paper 
reports on that project in terms of  the rationale for  the project, the current 
status of  the project, and the future  directions for  this project. 
Rationale for  Expert Systems 
The rapid advances in computer technology and ensuing applications 
require that those engaged in the accounting and auditing profession  be 
involved in exploring new application opportunities. Artificial  intelligence and 
expert systems are clearly in the forefront  of  these technologies; however the 
conventional wisdom of  expert system developers suggests that considered 
applications ought to be limited to environments that exhibit certain character-
istics. For example, it is suggested that there should be clearly definable 
experts in the problem task, that there should be appropriate measures of 
correct vs incorrect judgments, and problems should be small yet have a high 
payoff. 
The auditing environment has some unique characteristics that tend to 
make it a less likely candidate for  successful  deployment of  expert systems. 
For example, many areas of  auditing do not have a feedback  mechanism that 
allows for  determination of  correct vs incorrect decisions. Auditing is more 
process oriented than results oriented, wherein the quality of  work is judged 
not by results, but by traces of  process to be found  in the work papers. 
Moreover, auditors learn acceptance of  processes that may diverge signifi-
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cantly from  their own as long as they "appear reasonable.'' A side effect  of  this 
is that we do not have a set of  clearly defined  "experts" whose technical skills 
find  "material errors" in an audit with a significantly  higher frequency  than 
other auditors. 
While these factors  may mitigate against using expert systems, we do not 
believe they are fatal.  The issue surrounding the feedback  and correctness of 
judgments in the audit environment is, we believe, a knowledge representation 
issue that will clarify  itself  through the knowledge engineering tasks. We also 
believe that there is expertise, albeit spread out, and that the professed  need 
for  a singular expert is a knowledge engineering problem that can and will be 
addressed pragmatically as the art of  knowledge engineering advances. 
We believe that AI technology offers  the following  significant  benefits: 
1) Support  of  Field  Work:  There are any number of  applications for  the AI 
technology that, when harnessed, can be used as tools in the support of 
auditing field  work, thereby freeing  the auditor from  many of  the more 
mundane tasks and making the work of  the auditor significantly  more interest-
ing. At the same time, the technology can lead to a greater consistency in the 
quality of  field  work, and hopefully  reduce the time requirements for  the field 
work. 
2) Diffusion  of  knowledge:  The complexity of  modern auditing, as dictated 
by the complexity of  modern business, leads to areas of  audit specialization. 
Expertise relates to certain industries, such as banking or oil and gas, and 
across industries as in EDP auditing. Even within industries, there are pockets 
of  expertise, e.g., in the banking industry there are those who are expert in 
auditing community banks, moderate size banks and the extremely large banks. 
Additionally, many banks themselves perform  in specialized industries, e.g., 
agricultural banks, oil and gas, etc. The data or information  available in these 
varying circumstances require varying types of  expertise. It is very difficult  if 
not impossible for  one auditor to be an expert in all these areas. By capturing 
the expertise in specialized areas, however, we can provide knowledge where 
the expert is not available. 
3) Uniformity  of  documentation:  Through the proper design of  an expert 
system, the required documentation to support a given judgment can be 
automatically provided as the output of  the judgment exercise and included in 
the working papers of  the audit. The expert system not only provides 
uniformity  of  documentation, but also frees  the auditor from  another time 
consuming and costly chore. 
4) Staff  Training  Aids:  Training is an extremely costly investment in a 
large public accounting firm.  Technological advances are providing the potential 
vehicles for  both increasing the effectiveness  of  training while concurrently 
reducing the huge costs involved. 
5) Research: We should not forget  the role of  research in the design of 
expert systems. Designing expert systems is research oriented, in that 
problems chosen are seldom well enough understood to be solved al-
gorithmically. The knowledge engineering process can and should lead us to a 
greater understanding of  the problems, thereby advancing our knowledge. 
Based on the above reasoning, a decision was made to embark on the 
development of  an expert system that would at once provide insights into the 
development process, provide knowledge about resource requirements, and 
produce a useful  audit tool. 
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Selecting a Project 
Since the project to be developed had multiple objectives, it was agreed 
that the project should be of  a very limited scope and nature, yet have the 
potential for  a very high payoff.  Additionally, since we were not overly 
committed to the expert system technology, we wanted to attempt the 
development at a minimal investment. The decision was therefore  made to 
develop the model in a microcomputer environment using commercially 
available development shells. 
Hoping for  the potentially high payoff,  we wanted to focus  on a problem that 
was meaningful  to our firm's  audit practice and yet might be successful  given 
the constraints we were imposing. Since bank audits are a large part of  our 
audit practice, it was decided to focus  on a problem in that area. We found  that 
there was significant  support from  bank audit partners in the form  of 
enthusiasm and willingness to invest expert bank auditors' time and coopera-
tion. This was considered important, since we knew the development work 
would require a considerable amount of  time and effort  from  bank experts at no 
small cost. 
The next issue was to settle on a specific  problem. We were guided by two 
considerations: 1) the problem had to be small enough to accomplish within a 
reasonable time, and 2) it had to be sufficiently  important within the context of  a 
bank audit. An area of  bank audits that filled  both of  these requirements was the 
loan loss evaluation, the process of  estimating the dollar amount of  the reserve 
for  the bank's portfolio  of  loans. This problem is basically a classification 
problem, which is a type of  problem that has been successfully  attacked by rule 
based systems before.  (Most commercially available development tools for 
microcomputers are rule based.) 
Project Description 
Since we did not have an in-house AI capability for  the development of  such 
a system, we contracted the project to an outside consultant. The consultant's 
project proposal suggested the following  stages of  development: 
1) Review current literature. 
2) Develop a preliminary model of  the loan loss evaluation process. 
3) Implement the preliminary model as a computer program. 
4) Extend knowledge acquisition to include the process of  expert loan 
evaluation. 
5) Combine knowledge into a final  task expertise model and complete 
prototype expert system. 
The proposal initially indicated that the above stages would require nine months 
to complete, employing one full-time  consultant with the availability of  audit 
experts in the loan loss evaluation task. To date we are somewhere in the 
fourth  stage. What follows  is a description of  our model and how the system 
works. 
Description of  Model 
For ease of  reference,  we have named the model CFILE, for  credit file 
analysis. The current working model is based on the conceptual model shown in 
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Figure 1. The model is modularized and illustrates the various factors 
considered when making the reserve judgment. The first  column of  factors  to 
the left  of  the reserve conclusions are 'level one subgoals' and the second 
column of  factors  are 'level two subgoals' which affect  the level one subgoals. 
For example, the conclusion on the current financial  condition of  the borrower 
is based on conclusions concerning the borrower's short term liquidity, finanical 
risk, and business risk. These judgments are reached internally by the model 
with the exception of  the industry profitability  and volatility, which temporarily 
are user inputs. 
The consideration underlying the control structure of  CFILE is efficiency. 
Efficiency  is often  considered one of  the hallmarks of  the expert. Like an 
expert, the model is designed to arrive at a conclusion as soon as possible with 
the minimum amount of  information. 
A session with CFILE begins with screens explaining the purpose of 
CFILE and what it will do. Immediately following  this explanation, the user is 
asked for  some basic information  about the loan including its size, due date, and 
what kind of  collateral and/or guarantees exist relating to the loan. 
What CFILE asks next depends on the answers to the initial questions. If, 
for  example, it is indicated that there are bank deposits pledged as collateral, 
CFILE will ask a series of  questions about those bank deposits. These include 
questions about both access and financial  strength, which are the two 'level two 
subgoals' relating to collateral. CFILE will want to know whether or not the 
bank has the legal right to dispose of  the collateral in the event of  a default.  It 
Figure 1 
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might also ask if  those bank deposits were pledged as security for  another loan. 
If  the model concludes that there is adequate access to those deposits and their 
strength is sufficient  to cover the loan, the analysis would stop with a no-
reserve decision. 
If  the bank deposits were not sufficient,  the model would start dealing with 
the three 'level one subgoals' that are needed to perform  an analysis on an 
unsecured loan: current financial  condition, overall loan history, and expected 
net cash flow.  The model would ask the usual questions about hard data such as 
the current ratio of  the borrower and would also ask about soft  information, 
such as whether or not the borrower is planning any major projects that are 
going to be financed  through the use of  current assets. Again, how many of 
these subgoals would be pursued and to what extent would depend on the 
situation. For example, if  the loan were due in the next 12 months and the 
borrower had a very strong current financial  condition, no reserve would be 
necessary and the system would conclude without asking any questions about 
loan history or expected cash flow. 
The system has some other interesting features.  In general the questions 
are asked in abbreviated form.  This is useful  for  the experienced user who will 
be familiar  with the system. For example, the question about major projects 
alluded to above would appear as illustrated in Figure 2. However, help screens 
are available to provide more details and guidance to understand the question. 
The help screen for  the same question as shown previously appears in Figure 
3. 
Another feature  of  the system is the ability to do limited sensitivity analysis. 
It is possible for  the user to see how sensitive the conclusion is to a particular 
question. For example, one might be interested in determining the impact of 
the loan officer's  opinion of  the borrower's liquidity (see Figure 4), given an 
otherwise constant set of  input judgments. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the conclusion reports provided by the model. 
Both conclusions came from  identical information  except for  the response to 
the question noted in Figure 4. One can see that, in this case, the answer to the 
question had a fairly  substantial impact. There is a difference  in the evaluation 
of  current financial  condition which leads to different  conclusions. In one case, 
we find  an evaluation of  the current financial  condition of  the borrower as weak 
and a conclusion of  a 25 to 34 percent reserve before  considering collateral. In 
Figure 2 
PMM—CFILE Preliminary version 2.02 November 25, 1985 
Select what describes: 
current assets used for  new commitments 
MMM  no 
yes 




Based on your judgment, is there a significant  chance the borrower will use a 
substantial amount (i.e., at least 25 percent) of  current cash, accounts 
receivable and marketable securities or incur a significant  amount of  new short 
term liabilities for  commitments to finance  a major new project? 
A major new project could be an acquisition, stock repurchase, an expanded 
advertising campaign or plant expansion program. A yes response would also 
be appropriate here if  the borrower is involved in a continuing problem situation 
(e.g., a legal dispute) such that it is possible (FASB #5) that a new significant 
liability will emerge for  the borrower. 
enter no if  any new commitments will not use significant  current assets or 
generate significant  new current liabilities. 
enter yes if  new commitments will use significant  current assets or generate 
significant  new current liabilities. 
2 RESTART 5 GO BACK 6 HELP 7 EXIT 
Figure 4 
PMM—CFILE 
Based on your judgment, if  a set of  financial  statements were to be generated 
as of  today, do the comments provided by the loan officer  suggest to you that 
the loan officer,  based on his/her knowledge of  the borrower's current financial 
condition, believes the borrower is in a strong, moderate or weak short term 
liquidity condition? 
enter 
strong if  the loan officer  believes the short term liquidity condition of  the 
borrower is strong 
moderate if  the loan officer  believes the short term liquidity condition of  the 
borrower is moderate 
weak if  the loan officer  believes the short term liquidity condition of  the 
borrower is weak 




Client Name: ABC BankCorp 
Audit Period: 12-31-85 
Borrower: XYZ Company 
Analysis prepared by Joe Auditor on 12-1-85 
Extent of  available information  is adequate. 
Based on the available information,  the following  factors  are indicated: 
Industry prospects: expected profitability  = moderate. 
expected profit  volatility = high. 
Intermediate conclusions (scaled from  very weak to very strong): 
Current financial  condition is weak. 
Future cash flow  potential is weak. 
Borrower's past loan performance  is moderate. 
The amount of  the loan is $150,000. 
The loan is covered by bank deposits having an accessible value of  $100,000. 
Of  this, $90,000 is considered available to cover the loan. 
No guarantee is available for  this loan. 
A reserve of  25 to 34 percent of  the loan would appear appropriate, if  it were 
unsecured. After  considering the collateral available, no reserve would appear 
to be required. 






Client Name: ABC BankCorp 
Audit Period: 12-31-85 
Borrower: XYZ Company 
Analysis prepared by Joe Auditor on 12-1-85 
Extent of  available information  is adequate. 
Based on the available information,  the following  factors  are indicated: 
Industry prospects: expected profitability  = moderate. 
expected profit  volatility = high. 
Intermediate conclusions (scaled from  very weak to very strong): 
Current financial  condition is moderate. 
Future cash flow  potential is weak. 
Borrower's past loan performance  is moderate. 
The amount of  the loan is $150,000. 
The loan is covered by bank deposits having an accessible value of  $100,000. 
Of  this, $90,000 is considered available to cover the loan. 
No guarantee is available for  this loan. 
No reserve appears to be required. 
I agree with the conclusion suggested by the system and the underlying 
reasoning. 
preparer. 
the other we find  a moderate evaluation leading to a no-reserve conclusion even 
before  the collateral is considered. 
This facility  is useful  to both user and developer. It gives the user, who is 
uncertain about the appropriate response, the ability to see the impact of 
alternatives without repeating a lot of  data entry. It gives the developer a tool 
for  testing the reasonableness of  the rules in the system. 
Perhaps the most important feature  in this system is the user's ability to 
find  out why a question is being asked. Through function  key, one can look at 
the rule that has caused a specific  question to be asked, and in turn ask about 
that rule. Figure 7 illustrates the screen that would appear asking about the loan 
officer's  view of  the borrower's liquidity. In this way it is always possible for  the 
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Figure 
PMM—CFILE Preliminary version 2.02 November 25, 1985 
The highlighted fields  indicate the antecedent 
and conclusion being pursued. 
The rule currently being pursued is: 
RULE 3850 
IF 
MMM  quick ratio is (are) weak 
AND current ratio is (are) moderate 
AND current ratio trend is (are) decreasing 
AND loan officer  liquidity judgment is (are) strong 
THEN 
stliquid is (are) very strong CF 0 
AND stliquid is (are) strong CF 0 
AND stliquid is (are) moderate CF 100 
AND stliquid is (are) weak CF 0 
AND stliquid is (are) very weak CF 0 
2 ALL RULE 3 OR CLASS 4 FORWARD 
5 GO BACK 6 HELP 7 EXIT 
user to understand the line of  reasoning that the system is using. This not only 
allows the user to understand the basis for  the conclusion the system reached 
but facilitates  review and avoids the blanket acceptance or rejection that is 
common with algorithmic systems. The model becomes a transparent box 
which is essential to the audit review process and it places the user in a position 
to be able to make constructive criticism, which may aid in further  system 
development. 
Limitations of  Current Model 
The current model has limited capabilities that have resulted from  design 
decisions intended to keep the project manageable. CFILE applies only to loans 
due on demand or within one year and are either unsecured or secured by bank 
deposits or marketable securities. The model requires two years of  audited 
financial  information  or three years of  unaudited financial  information  from  the 
borrower and is limited in its ability to perform  and integrate cash flow  analysis 
into its decision process. The model is further  limited by its inability to deal 
with situations involving bankruptcy and liquidation analysis. 
These limitations resulted from  design decisions made early in the project 
and compose a major portion of  the work yet to be performed.  Again, our intent 
was to build a working prototype model that we hoped would be easily 
expanded to cover situations through the addition of  modules to the knowledge 
base. It is envisioned that the prototype will then be of  assistance in future 
knowledge engineering work. 
With the prototype model working, it was decided that we should test the 
system against the modeled 'expert' to determine how well we captured the 
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experts' decision model. A field  test of  CFILE was carried out in late February 
and early March of  1986. 
Field Test of  CFILE 
For a number of  reasons dealing with logistics, time constraints and 
purpose, the field  test was not set up as an experimental design but rather as a 
pilot test to determine if  we were on the right path with our model. It provided 
the opportunity to deal with actual loan files  in bank audit environments and to 
compare how different  auditors performed  the tasks in process as well as 
judgment. 
The testing was carried out at four  of  our client banks. Two of  the banks are 
large regional banks and the other two are smaller community banks. A total of 
16 cases were chosen either from  client's listings of  unsecured loans or with 
the assistance of  the local audit team. First priority was given to loans which 
had a reserve allocated to them either by the audit team or by the bank's 
internal loan review department. 
Each case was reviewed by three subjects, two at the partner level and one 
at the senior accountant level. The partners chosen were from  our bank audit 
practice. One of  the partners was the 'expert' employed in the development of 
the model. The other partner had only a cursory understanding of  the model. 
The senior accountant had neither bank audit experience nor knowledge of  the 
model to be tested. Our intent here was to see how much the model might 
assist the novice in the field  and the senior accountant level is the appropriate 
level for  performing  this task during an actual audit. 
Cases were reviewed first  without the use of  the model and then with the 
use of  the model by each of  the three people. Unfortunately,  one of  our partner 
subjects, the 'expert', was unable to participate at the first  bank setting due to 
illness and therefore  only evaluated ten of  the 16 cases. 
The results of  the test are summarized in Figure 8. By way of  explanation, 
CFILE uses nine reserve classifications  expressed in percentage: no reserve, 
1 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 59, 60 to 74, and 75 to 100 
percent. All analyses of  the data were made using these ranges. If  the reserve 
suggested by the subject fell  into the same range or on the border, the 
comparison was marked OK. If  the reserves fell  in different  ranges, the 
number of  ranges by which they are different  is noted. Starred entries indicate 
that one party suggested a reserve and the others did not. In addition the cases 
were analyzed for  a comparison of  the reserve vs. no reserve decision. 
Comparisons were made between individual judgments with and without 
the use of  the model. This comparison allowed us to consider how closely the 
unaided partner's judgments agreed on the same loan and how closely the non-
expert's judgment agreed with the partners. Additional comparisons were 
made between the partner's judgments without the model and between the 
senior's judgments with and without the model in order to determine if  the 
system was moving the non-expert judgment closer to the partner judgment. 
The loans were also analyzed according to whether no reserve or some 
reserve was required without respect to the reserve amount in order to test 













Summary of  Results 
The following  table summarizes the results of  the individuals' judgments 
compared to the model's judgments when the model is used by that individual. 
All Cases Res vs. No Res Reserve Cases 
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
Expert partner 90% 10% 90% 10% 100% 0% 
Second partner 69% 31% 81% 19% 33% 67% 
Senior 62% 38% 88% 12% 20% 80% 
In terms of  the test's first  objective, i.e., determining whether the system 
is consistent with the judgments of  the designated expert, the results are very 
positive. On ten loans, the model's judgment is consistent with the expert 
partner's judgment nine times. Reserve vs. no reserve decisions were 
consistent in 90 percent or nine out of  ten loans. In three cases where the 
expert and the model both suggested a reserve, the reserve amounts are in 
agreement. On the one disagreement, the model suggested a reserve of  11-15 
percent while the partner suggested no reserve. We interpret these results as 
very positive and we intend to expand the scope of  the model to produce a 
significant  audit tool. 
The second partner's percentages do not look quite so good in terms of 
agreement with the model. The second partner evaluated 16 loans and agreed 
with the model 11 times while disagreeing on five  of  those loans. These results 
become much more positive, however, when viewed in relation to other data. 
First of  all, the percentages improve when looking at the agreement between a 
reserve vs no-reserve judgment. Here the model disagreed on only three 
loans. If  we then scrutinize the degree of  disagreements we note the model 
was never more than two classifications  away from  the second partner. 
In attempting to explain the disagreement we note that the two partners' 
judgments, independent of  the model, agree in nine of  ten or 90 percent of  the 
cases, (with only one classification  separating them on the one disagreement). 
Since the use of  the model is the only variable, and we know that the model is 
constant when given the same inputs, we hypothesize that the problem is not in 
the model itself,  but in the user/model interface.  We explain this as follows. 
The expert partner, who was instrumental in the design of  the model, fully 
understands the questions and the impact of  the responses on the model since 
he essentially wrote the questions. The other users of  the system only had the 
cryptic wording of  the questions and the help screens to indicate what the 
questions intended to ask. To support this hypothesis, we looked at the 
model's consistency of  performance  across users. We have 42 runs of  the 
model which consisted of  running ten cases three times, once by each subject 
and six cases two times by the subjects which we designate as partner-2 and 
senior. This provides us with 36 two-way comparisons. Of  these 36, 20 runs 
involving ten of  the 16 cases had complete three-way agreement. All of  these 
agreed on zero reserve. In the additional 16 comparisons, involving only six of 
the cases, the consistency of  the model was significantly  different,  agreeing 
with itself  only five  times or 31 percent of  the time when a reserve is indicated. 
Based on this it appears that the model performs  well on the easy cases that 
require no reserve, but struggles when the case becomes more difficult  and 
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where more user judgment comes into play. While one reason for  the 
degradation may be the user interface,  we also suspect that the depth of  the 
knowledge base may be inappropriate, thereby requiring too much user 
judgment in interpreting what the model is asking for.  If  the model were 
sufficiently  robust to deal with facts  rather than user judgments about, for 
example, the strength of  the current ratio, we would expect that a good deal of 
the inconsistency would disappear. Yet another cause may be the attempt to be 
too specific  about the amount of  the reserve. In attempting to specify  the 
ranges, it is possible that we have overrefined  by attempting to be more 
specific  than the experts themselves. While this may be a cause, we tend to 
discount it somewhat since there was no definable  pattern to the disagreements 
between the model and the users. The model was not consistently higher or 
lower nor off  by one or two classifications.  The differences  appeared to be 
more random, leading us to believe that the shallowness of  the model's 
knowledge coupled with the user/model interface  are the major problems. 
We could apply the same analysis to the figures  associated with the senior 
subject performing  the task; however, in this case, we are not primarily 
interested in whether the model agreed with the senior. Since one of  the 
objectives of  the model is to improve the inexperienced decision maker's ability 
to emulate the partner decision, the more important data deal with how the 
senior's judgment independent of  the model compared to the partners' 
judgment independent of  the model, and then how the model altered the 
senior's judgment in relation to the partners'. 
The data indicate that the senior's unaided judgments agreed with the 
partners' unaided judgments in only 69 percent of  the cases. This, of  course, is 
expected based on experience and knowledge of  the senior. Ideally, when using 
the model, the senior's judgments should be closer to the partners' decisions. 
The data show that the model did alter the senior's decision in four  of  the 
cases; however, the model moved toward the partners' decision on only two 
loans and moved further  away from  the partners' decisions on the other two 
loans. While these results are inconclusive, we again hypothesize that the 
interface  or communication problem cited above is the major culprit. In any 
event, negative conclusions should not be drawn on the basis of  this test. 
Further testing with improved user interface  will provide more insight in this 
matter. 
Summary of  Field Test Results 
Based on the results obtained from  the field  test, we conclude that the 
model performs  very well within the stated limitations of  the design and when 
used by the expert who was involved in the design of  the model. We must also 
conclude that the model performs  less well in the hands of  others. 
This problem can be thought of  as an interface  or communication problem 
that may be very simple to rectify,  or may require a considerable amount of 
effort.  The solution lies in determining how to structure the questions in such a 
manner that, given a specific  loan, user responses to the model's questions will 
be consistent. To obtain the solution, existing questions may need to be 
restructured and/or users may need more training in the use of  the model. A 
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third and more time consuming solution is to enhance the model's knowledge 
base to a depth that allows the model to work from  more basic information. 
Additional Insights from  Field Testing 
Through observation and recording verbalized protocols of  certain cases, 
we were able to gather additional knowledge that a) lends more support to our 
hypotheses above and b) provides a focus  for  the immediate development work 
that is required. Since the analysis of  the protocols is not yet complete, we will 
informally  discuss these in the following  paragraphs. 
We are pleasantly surprised in finding  that our bank partner's unaided 
judgments agreed in nine of  ten loans and disagreed by only one reserve 
classification  on the tenth. We are fortunate  that this one case is included in the 
six cases for  which we have protocols, and these protocols provide a plausible 
explanation for  the partner's disagreement. 
The second partner made reference  in the protocol to having just recently 
read an article in a leading business journal concerning the borrower's history 
of  problems, actions taken, and forecast  for  their survival. (In a later discussion 
we found  he had read the article on the airplane in route to the lending bank's 
city.) The expert partner made no such reference  to any additional outside 
information.  The article provided an optimistic outlook for  the company's ability 
to turn its problems around and survive in its market. While both partners 
recommended a rather high reserve (75 and 50 percent), the second partner 
was lower, perhaps indicating the impact of  the article on the amount of  his 
reserve judgment. This would indicate the need for  the model to account for 
more soft  data in greater detail than currently available. This is further 
supported in other parts of  the various transcripts. 
While we have not yet completed our analysis of  the protocols, they appear 
to provide clear evidence of  a significant  weighting differential  based on two 
primary characteristics of  data: the recency of  the data in relation to the date of 
evaluation, and the independence of  the source of  the information.  While this is 
not terribly surprising, it is surprising in that the degree of  change in the 
weighting appears to be significant.  While we have not yet drawn any 
conclusion, it appears at this point that the model will have to account for  these 
information  characteristics. 
Another fact  that is becoming increasingly evident is the need for  the model 
to deal with cash flow.  It was originally thought that cash flow  projections would 
not be a significant  factor  until we expanded the scope of  the model to longer 
time horizons. Our protocols clearly indicate otherwise. In fact,  as soon as a 
loan is considered to be a candidate for  a reserve, the cash flow  model comes 
into play. Furthermore, as the loans become increasingly suspect, there is a 
point when the partners change to a liquidation model, attempting to determine 
how much the bank may salvage from  a liquidation and/or bankruptcy 
proceeding. These are important considerations even within our limited scope 
model. 
Conclusions 
We are basically pleased with the results of  our field  test not only because 
they indicate the model provides results consistent with the expert, but also 
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because we believe that the model will provide significant  assistance to the 
senior in the field.  While we are aware that in the longer term the model's 
knowledge base must be expanded depthwise, we also believe that many of  the 
user/model communication problems can be rectified  through a restructuring of 
questions and help screens, as well as training of  the intended users. 
Our intention is to pursue the development of  this model in three 
directions: a) to improve the interface  to the point we can release the model to 
the bank practice personnel for  more extensive field  tests, b) to improve the 
model's current scope by increasing the depth of  its knowledge and provide the 
ability to deal with the cash flow  and liquidation requirements, and c) to begin 
expanding the scope of  the model to handle other types of  security and time 
horizons. 
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Discussant's Response to 
"Interim Report on the Development 
of  An Expert System for  the 
Auditor's Loan Loss Evaluation" 
William F. Messier, Jr. 
University of  Florida 
It is a pleasure for  me to comment on the paper by Kelly, Ribar and 
Willingham. As someone who has spent a major part of  the last five  years in 
expert systems research, it is good to see this technology begin to impact audit 
practice. I will make one caveat before  I proceed. There are times in my 
discussion where I raise questions about or criticize this work. In those 
instances, please recognize that I am fully  cognizant of  the difficulties  of  doing 
this type of  research and, more importantly, sympathetic with those difficulties. 
Before  discussing the specifics  of  the paper, I would like to make a few 
overall comments on this work. The research by Kelly, et al. is noteworthy for 
three reasons. First, it demonstrates the application of  expert systems 
technology to an important audit problem, the assessment of  loan loss 
reserves. Application of  this technology to auditing is important because public 
accounting firms  are facing  a more competitive environment that will require 
audits to be conducted with the same level of  effectiveness  but with increased 
efficiency.  Relatedly, the types of  decisions auditors face  today are more 
complex (e.g., EDP auditing) and require more expertise. Expert systems are 
intended to assist with such complex decisions. 
Second, since this is a proprietary system, it is especially noteworthy that 
Peat Marwick is willing to share the details of  the system with academics and 
practitioners. Until recently, many public accounting firms  were unwilling to 
share these types of  developments with the public. I make a point of  this 
because I believe that it is important to our profession  to disseminate research 
and that it should be a two-way street. 
Finally, this paper shows that public accounting firms  are willing and able to 
build expert systems. This realization was also brought home to me at the 
recent expert systems conference  at the University of  Southern California 
where Coopers & Lybrand demonstrated an expert system for  deferred  taxes 
[Shpilberg and Graham, 1986]. For that project, Coopers & Lybrand hired a 
full-time  computer scientist to assist in developing their system. By bringing 
their enormous resources to bear on the problem, they were able to construct 
the system in approximately a year. Peat Marwick has been able to do a similar 
sort of  thing with CFILE. In spite of  the generous support from  Peat 
Marwick's Research Opportunities in Auditing grants, most academics who are 
developing expert systems have faced  much longer development times. This 
raises a question about whether academics any longer have a competitive 
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advantage in developing these systems or whether some type of  joint 
collaboration is necessary. If  the second alternative is the most appropriate, 
then academics have to ask themselves whether this work is research or 
consulting. My thoughts on this question are that as long as sound research 
issues are addressed and no limitations are placed on the dissemination of  those 
results, the work qualifies  as research. 
My specific  comments on the paper will center on three topics: the 
rationale for  expert systems, the CFILE model, and the field  testing. 
Rationale for  Expert Systems 
Successful  development of  expert systems requires that certain character-
istics be present in the problem domain. These include acknowledged experts, 
an ability to extract their knowledge, some measure of  the correctness of  the 
decision, and manageable problems with high payoffs.  Kelly, et al. properly 
point out that auditing does not have all of  these characteristics. For example, 
in auditing it is very difficult  to state specific  criteria by which to label someone 
an expert. This is unlike domains such as chess or certain specialities in 
medicine. Thus, there is some difficulty  with identifying  an expert(s) to assist in 
designing a particular system. This is further  compounded by the fact  that 
auditing is "process oriented" and two experts may solve the problem 
differently.  Hansen and I [Hansen and Messier, 1986a, b] have encountered 
some of  these problems in developing and testing EDP-XPERT. 
In addition, the ability to extract the necessary knowledge from  the expert 
is perhaps the most difficult  and time consuming part of  constructing an expert 
system. Given that in auditing we have difficulty  identifying  an expert and the 
fact  that two experts may solve the problem in different  ways, knowledge 
acquisition poses a major hurdle for  constructing expert systems. 
Finally, the fact  that many audit judgments do not have outcome feedback 
about the correctness of  the decision is an important characteristic for  expert 
system development in auditing. Kelly, et al. argue that this is "a knowledge 
representation issue that will clarify  itself  through knowledge engineering 
tasks." I am not convinced that this is true in all instances. In the loan loss 
reserve situation, the auditor will get feedback  (not immediately, of  course) 
about the collectibility of  this short term loan. This situation is probably not true 
for  areas such as the reliability of  internal controls (manual or EDP), evaluation 
of  inherent risk, analytical review, or similar areas where expert systems are 
currently being developed. The absence of  a true criterion value by which to 
evaluate the goodness of  the expert system's decision poses the greatest 
difficulty  in validating expert systems in auditing. Note that in validating CFILE, 
the system's judgments were compared against the expert or the user's 
unaided judgment rather than against the true outcome of  the loan. 
The comments just made should not be interpreted as an indictment of  the 
use of  expert systems in auditing. They are intended to point out that 
construction of  an expert system is not an easy task. Individuals and firms  who 
decide to build such systems must recognize that this process is long and costly 
in terms of  both time and money1. However, I agree with Kelly, et al. that 
expert systems technology does offer  some significant  benefits  for  public 
accounting firms. 
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In that vein, I would like to discuss the benefits  that Kelly, et al. believe will 
result from  the application of  expert systems. They suggest five  potential 
benefits:  support of  field  work, diffusion  of  knowledge, uniformity  of  documen-
tation, staff  training aids, and research. I will limit my comments to diffusion  of 
knowledge and research. 
Expertise in any discipline is usually a scarce commodity. The complexity of 
auditing today requires individuals within firms  to develop expertise in specific 
areas. Kelly, et al. mention this in the area of  banking. Most of  my expert 
systems research has involved the work of  computer audit specialists. I am 
sure we could identify  a long list of  audit areas where experts exist, and I am 
fairly  certain that future  development in auditing will only increase this trend. 
My point here is that perhaps the greatest potential benefit  of  expert systems 
is the ability to provide the expert's knowledge to novices. In auditing, most of 
the expert's knowledge is not textbook knowledge. Most of  it is experiential 
knowledge accumulated over many years. If  firms  are able to capture this type 
of  knowledge and make it available throughout the firm,  there may be cost 
savings and improvements in audit effectiveness  and efficiency. 
Kelly, et al. underplay the role of  research in designing expert systems. As 
they point out, the problems chosen for  expert systems development are 
generally not well understood and the knowledge engineering process can 
contribute to our understanding. My experiences indicate that the process of 
developing the knowledge base can provide a major contribution to our 
understanding of  the specific  problem and auditor decision-making in general. 
For example, a number of  audit researchers have used a Bayesian formulation 
for  modeling auditor judgment. However, two recent studies by Biggs, 
Messier and Hansen [1987] and Biggs, Mock and Watkins [1986] that were 
conducted to develop a knowledge base for  expert systems seem to indicate 
that expert auditors do not follow  a Bayesian revision process. Instead they 
seem to use "reasoned assumptions" and "analogies" to arrive at decisions. 
This finding  not only has implications for  modeling auditor judgment but also the 
type of  model used in the inference  engines of  expert systems. So from  a 
research perspective, I think that construction of  an expert system for  a 
complex problem will contribute immensely to our understanding. 
The CFILE Model 
The section of  the paper which describes the CFILE model leaves a 
number of  important questions unanswered. For example, what expert system 
shell was used to develop CFILE? On what basis was this shell chosen? What 
type of  evidence accumulation model is contained in the inference  engine? Is 
this evidence accumulation model appropriate for  auditing? How many rules are 
contained in the system? Additionally, there is little discussion of  how the 
knowledge was captured from  the expert. 
The answers to these questions would be helpful  to our understanding of 
the system. For example, the answer to the question concerning the type of 
model used in the inference  engine. It is not clear in the expert systems 
literature [Gordon and Shortliffe,  1985; Shafer  and Srivastava, 1986] which 
type of  model should be used to accumulate evidence in problem domains 
where some degree of  uncertainty exists. Information  about the model would 
184 
provide insight into the reliability of  the system's reasoning process. Based on 
the presence of  "CF'' factors  in the rule shown in Figure 7, I can speculate that 
the inference  engine contains some type of  Bayesian process. This is exactly 
the model that has come under recent criticism in the expert systems 
literature. However, I am sympathetic with the authors. When expert system 
developers decide to use an expert system shell, their choice of  models is 
severely limited. 
Similarly, if  we knew how many rules were present in the current prototype 
we would have an idea about the number of  questions the system asks the user. 
This question is important because if  the system contains a large number of 
rules there is always some question concerning the consistency of  the rule 
base. The rule contained in Figure 7 is numbered 3850. I am quite certain that 
the system does not contain that many rules. Obviously, there is some 
numbering convention within the system. However, a close examination of  the 
rule contained in Figure 7 would suggest that the system does contain a large 
number of  rules. Rule 3850 contains four  antecendent conditions and there 
appears to be five  possible categories (e.g., very strong, strong, etc.) for  each 
antecedent. This would suggest that there are 625 possible combinations of  this 
rule. 
The system does appear to have some important capabilities. The ques-
tions posed by the system are asked in an abbreviated form  for  users familiar 
with the system. The less experienced user is assisted by help screens which 
provide more information  on the question. This feature  should improve usage 
of  the system. It should also increase consensus in the way the questions are 
answered since there will be less chance that two users will misinterpret the 
question and respond differently  even though the circumstances are similar. 
Two other features  appear quite interesting. The ability to do limited 
sensitivity analysis should prove very useful.  Since expert systems are 
intended to support rather than replace experts, the ability to do this type of 
analysis should lead to improvements in decision making. I also found  the final 
report generated by CFILE to be very comprehensive. The report not only 
contains the conclusions about the reserve but it also contains important 
information  on the variables that led to that conclusion. Thus, the report can be 
used for  audit documentation. 
I am a little disappointed with the system's explanation capability. Early 
research demonstrated that experts were interested not only in a system's 
conclusion but how the system arrived at the conclusion. I suspect that expert 
auditors will require a similar capability.2 CFILE's ability to respond to why a 
question is asked is typical of  most expert system shells. The response is a 
limited parse (see Figure 7) of  the rule that led to the question. It would be 
more helpful  to the user if  the system could provide an explanation in a more 
user-friendly  manner. 
Field Test of  CFILE 
As I mentioned earlier, the validation of  expert systems in auditing will 
represent one of  the major challenges for  implementation of  such systems. 
Before  expert systems will be adopted for  use in the field,  public accounting 
firms  will have to be sure of  the system's reliability (i.e., ability to yield a 
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correct answer a high percentage of  the time). The difficulties  with validating 
expert systems were alluded to earlier. In many auditing areas, the outcome to 
a particular problem is not immediately known with certainty or may not be 
known for  some time in the future  (usually after  the audit report has been 
issued). As a result, it is not possible in many audit settings to test the 
correctness of  the expert system's decision. The alternative in these situations 
is to compare the system's conclusions with those of  the expert. Note that this 
testing is similar to earlier behavioral research on consensus. 
I will not take exception with the fact  that the field  test of  CFILE did not use 
a formal  experimental design. Buchanan and Shortliffe  [1984] have suggested 
that the validation process must be undertaken throughout the life  of  the 
system and that the evaluations should get more formal  as the expert system is 
developed further.  The authors admit that the system is still in the early stages 
of  development. 
My comments are first  directed at some relatively simple changes that 
could have been made or added to the testing. First, it would have been 
interesting to compare the results from  the three subjects (expert partner, 
second partner, and senior) with the conclusions reached by the audit teams on 
each of  these clients. Second, it should have been possible to use loans from 
previous years where the client had already determined the amount collectible. 
In this instance, the subjects' aided judgments could have been compared to a 
known criterion. Both of  these extensions would have provided increased 
external validity for  CFILE's performance. 
In terms of  the results of  the field  testing, the system does an excellent job 
of  replicating the expert's judgments. CFILE agreed with the expert in nine of 
the ten cases. However, performance  decreased with the second partner (69 
percent) and the senior accountant (62 percent). Additionally, most of  the 
favorable  performance  is found  on cases where no reserve is the suggested 
answer. Seven of  the ten cases evaluated by the expert without CFILE result 
in a no reserve answer and the second partner agreed with all of  those cases. 
I am not sure how valid it is to look at the reserve versus no reserve 
results. It seems to me that differences  in the size of  the reserve is an 
important criterion to measure because it relates to materiality. Certainly, the 
results that examine only the cases with reserves are not very encouraging. 
However, these results are quite limited since they only include three cases for 
the partners. 
Kelly, et al. contend that the differences  in the performance  of  CFILE can 
be attributed to two possible causes: (1) interface  or communication problems 
and/or (2) the depth of  the knowledge base. The first  cause is correctable but 
may be more difficult  than the authors speculate. Hansen and I have encoun-
tered this problem in some of  the recent field  testing of  EDP-XPERT. 
Sometimes the wording of  the question (and its explanation) can cause the user 
to misinterpret what is being asked or cause the user to make an incorrect 
assumption. We might expect this type of  problem in an area such as auditing 
where there are no "natural laws.'' I do not know if  there is an easy solution to 
this problem. Adequate training with the system may be one alternative. 
The second cause, depth of  the knowledge base, is an even more difficult 
problem. The authors acknowledge that the current prototype has a number of 
limitations (e.g., cash flow  and bankruptcy analysis) and that there is a need to 
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refine  the knowledge base to handle more basic information.  However, the 
results indicate that the system handles easy cases (i.e., no reserve) quite well. 
The difficulty  occurs when the system encounters a case where more judgment 
is required (i.e., the situation where a reserve for  the loan is required). It is 
such loans that are of  real interest to the auditor. From my perspective, it 
appears that it will be necessary to do some detailed refinements  to handle the 
more difficult  cases. As a suggestion for  future  testing, it would seem 
appropriate to add more cases where a reserve is necessary. It is important to 
test the boundaries of  the system's capabilities. 
It is unfortunate  that we do not have more detail on the protocol data. It 
would be interesting to compare the decision processes of  the two partners, 
both with and without the use of  CFILE. Such an analysis might provide 
important insights into expert auditor decision-making. 
This last comment raises an important area for  future  research: auditor 
expertise. While a lot of  effort  has been devoted to developing expert systems, 
relatively little research has examined expertise. There are a number of 
questions that we are unable to answer at this time. For example, how does an 
expert become an expert? We know very little about this process. How do 
expert auditors categorize their specialized knowledge? Do experts use 
different  types of  memory structures than novices? Answers to these types of 
questions will improve our understanding of  expert decision-making and may 
contribute to building better expert systems3. 
Summary 
Kelly, Riber and Willingham should be commended on this work. Construc-
tion of  an expert system is a long process full  of  many ups and downs. I look 
forward  to seeing the results of  the ongoing development of  CFILE. 
End Notes 
1. It should be recognized that there will also be ongoing maintenance costs for  updating the 
knowledge base after  the system is introduced into the field. 
2. In the questionnaire used in Hansen and Messier [1986b], the question "An expert system 
when fully  developed should  be able to explain decisions to auditors" received the second highest 
agreement score: 1.59 on a - 2 (disagree) to + 2 (agree) scale, out of  13 questions. 
3. There is a growing recognition in the expert systems literature [Buchanan and Shortliffe, 
1984] that a better understanding of  how experts solve problems may be necessary before  expert 
systems achieve expert level performance. 
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The Work of  the Special Investigations 
Committee 
R. K. Mautz 
In describing the work of  the Special Investigations Committee, I must 
assume that you already have some understanding of  the SEC Practice Section 
of  the American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants, its purpose, 
structure, and self-regulatory  program. If  that is a false  assumption, there will 
be time for  questions during the evening. I warn you, however, that you ask at 
your own peril. My interest in this remarkable effort  is such that you may learn 
a great deal more than you ever wanted to know about the profession's  self-
regulatory program. 
Initiation of  the Special Investigations Committee 
When the AICPA's Division for  CPA Firms was first  created by resolution 
of  Council in 1977 with an SEC Practice Section and a Private Companies 
Practice Section, the organization of  the former  Section did not include the 
Special Investigations Committee. The self-regulatory  program relied com-
pletely on peer review for  the improvement of  audit practice, supplemented, of 
course, by the Section's membership requirements. Peer review was an 
adaptation of  the internal inspection programs utilized within many firms  to 
assist them in maintaining a uniformly  high quality of  audit work throughout 
what, in some cases, was a dispersed and decentralized practice. 
One of  the first  matters identified  by the Section's Executive Committee 
for  consultation with its Public Oversight Board related to the action to be taken 
by the Section with respect to an alleged or possible audit failure  by a member 
firm.  What investigative activity might or should the Section undertake and 
what possible disciplinary action should be imposed? To provide you with a 
basis for  appreciating the sensitivity of  this issue, let me take a few  minutes to 
discuss litigation from  the viewpoint of  a CPA firm. 
The Litigation Problem 
With exceptions so rare as to be nearly nonexistent, no one sets out to do a 
bad audit. Professional  opinions differ  as to the amount of  audit work required 
under varying sets of  conditions, judgments with respect to the propriety of 
accounting methods, provisions, and estimates are not always the same, and 
the work is often  performed,  unavoidably, under pressures of  time, client 
concern, and plain old uncertainty. Consequently, there is almost no audit that is 
189 
completely secure from  criticism, no matter how diligent and professional  the 
effort. 
Combine these facts  with a legal system that permits class action suits 
proposing damages of  staggering amounts, and assessing joint and several 
liability so that the CPA firm  may be charged not only with the share of  any loss 
that its activities may have caused but with the entire loss, whoever was 
primarily at fault,  and accountants' concerns increase. Now recognize that 
litigation under our present legal system is an extremely complex undertaking 
with many factors  besides professional  performance  of  audit work in com-
pliance with established standards bearing on the outcome, and you can begin 
to comprehend in some small degree why CPA firms  resist every and any 
action, however otherwise desirable, that they believe will weaken their ability 
to defend  themselves in the face  of  litigation. 
Historically, the AICPA has taken the position that it should keep clear of 
litigation involving members unless the suit was perceived as a threat to the 
profession  as a whole. The rationale justifying  its position is that the legal 
system is fully  equipped to determine the validity of  allegations of  audit failure, 
and certainly far  better provided with mechanisms and means to protect the 
rights of  all parties to such a contest than could be any organization not 
possessing equal authority and means. Hence, possible charges of  ethical 
misconduct against members for  alleged audit failures  are held in abeyance as 
long as the member is involved in litigation. 
One more factor  requires consideration. At the time the SEC Practice 
Section was faced  with this problem, litigation against major CPA firms  was 
increasing in number and in financial  importance to the point where such actions 
were considered highly newsworthy. The financial  press, which had for  many 
years shown little interest in accounting, was then featuring  stories alleging 
audit failure  accompanied by substantial losses to investors and others, and 
some critics of  the profession  were crying for  stern reprisals. 
The POB Recommendation 
In brief,  these were the realities facing  the new SEC Practice Section and 
the Public Oversight Board when the Section addressed its question to the 
Board. What should the Section do in the way of  self-regulatory  measures when 
charges alleging audit failure  were filed  either in civil litigation or by a regulatory 
agency? The POB's response was prompt and to the point. The following 
words are taken from  the POB's annual report for  1979-80. 
After  extended study, the Board concluded that protection of  users of 
audited financial  statements should be the dominant consideration in any 
action taken by the Section with respect to a possible audit failure.  The 
Board recommended that a permanent committee be established to 
monitor, and to determine what action, if  any, should be taken with 
respect to alleged or possible audit failures  involving member firms. 
The principal purposes of  the committee and its monitoring efforts 
would be to determine whether facts  relating to any audit failure  indicate 
that auditing standards are inadequate or that the quality controls of  the 
member firm  need strengthening. In developing these primary pur-
poses, the Board concluded that disciplinary proceedings directed 
toward the punishment of  a member firm  were of  less immediate 
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importance, particularly in view of  the fact  that the firm  and individuals 
involved in an audit failure  would be facing  punitive and compensatory 
actions by governmental and regulatory bodies and by private litigants. 
Nonetheless, the Board recommended that the Section have the 
authority to institute formal  disciplinary proceedings in those circum-
stances where such action is deemed appropriate, notwithstanding the 
pendancy of  litigation or governmental action. 
The SIC—Composition and Operation 
The Section accepted the recommendation of  the Public Oversight Board 
and appointed a nine-member committee composed of  active and retired 
partners, all with extensive audit experience. By the rules of  the Section, 
member firms  are required to report litigation charging deficient  audit perfor-
mance to the Section within 30 days of  receiving notice of  such litigation. 
Accompanying this notice is a copy of  the official  complaint. Staff  members 
assigned to the Special Investigations Committee forward  copies of  the 
complaint to the members of  the committee and proceed to prepare a summary 
of  the case including the staffs  recommendations for  action by the Committee. 
Though few  in number, some cases are so without merit that no investiga-
tion is required. Rather the case is closed on staff  recommendation plus a 
reading of  the allegations and financial  statements by committee members. 
For most cases, the chairman of  the SIC at the next meeting assigns the 
case to a one or two-person task force  to work with the staff  in formulating  a 
recommendation to the committee. Working with the staff,  task force  members 
read the complaint, the relevant financial  statements and any press notices and, 
in case of  an investigation by a regulatory body, any available releases. They 
may also and frequently  do meet with representatives of  the firm  to learn how 
the firm  has responded to the charges, read the most recent peer review 
report on the firm's  quality controls, and may meet with members of  the peer 
review team to obtain additional information.  The task force  does not have the 
right under normal conditions to see the working papers or interview the staff 
members involved in the audit in question. In a few  instances, firms  have made 
personnel who participated in audits that are the subject of  litigation available to 
a task force,  but this is the exception rather than the rule. At the date of  this 
presentation, SIC members have no authority to "investigate" the case in 
litigation. Their concern is with the subject firm's  quality control system only. 
The Confidentiality  Requirement 
Two points deserve attention here. When the SIC was first  established, the 
profession's  concern for  litigation resulted in a requirement for  complete 
confidentiality  for  SIC activities. Members of  the committee are not to discuss 
matters under investigation with anyone other than committee members and 
members of  the staff  who serve the committee. No one attends committee 
meetings but its members' staff  and representatives of  the POB. Within a 
meeting, discussions are free  and open. The POB staff  keeps itself  and the 
POB members fully  informed  on developments as SIC inquiries proceed. Once 
the SIC has completed its work on a "case," all working papers and notes are 
destroyed. 
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Recall that the purpose of  the SIC investigation is not to try the case; that is 
left  to the judicial system. Its purpose is to determine, first,  whether the 
professional  literature is lacking in instructional material to aid professionals  in 
responding to similar circumstances; second, to discover whether weaknesses 
exist in the design of  or compliance with the quality control system of  the firm 
involved. Neither of  these purposes, at this time, is considered to require 
access to the audit work papers of  the case under litigation or to the personnel 
involved in that audit. 
Confidentiality  and SEC Oversight 
The Securities and Exchange Commission is charged by the Congress with 
responsibility for  oversight of  the CPA profession.  In meeting that responsibil-
ity, the SEC staff  has access on a stratified  random sample basis to selected 
peer review working papers and to the working papers of  the POB staff 
resulting from  its peer review oversight activities. The SEC does not have 
access to SIC working papers nor to the working papers of  the POB staff  in the 
performance  of  its oversight with respect to the activities of  the SIC. The SEC 
staff  takes the position that without some access to SIC activities, it is 
foreclosed  from  formulating  any valid conclusion as to the effectiveness  of  that 
committee. The SEC staff  has refused  to accept unsupported statements from 
the POB that the SIC is functioning  effectively  and well. Time after  time we 
have been told that if  the SIC is ever to be accepted as an effective  part of  the 
self-regulatory  program, some way must be found  to provide the SEC with 
more access than it now has. That would constitute a breach of  confidentiality 
that the member firms  have not as yet been willing to accept. Negotiations are 
still in process. It seems inevitable that a solution to this impasse be found  if  the 
self-regulatory  program is to be fully  accepted. 
SIC Courses of  Action 
In the original organization document for  the Special Investigations Commit-
tee, provision was made for  an initial investigation of  the implications of  the case 
that could be followed  by (a) a continuing monitoring of  the case for  subsequent 
developments, (b) an investigation of  the firm,  or (c) an investigation of  the 
case. Monitoring was utilized when it appeared that the investigations of  a 
regulatory body of  some kind might produce information  relevant to the 
committee's final  decision and not otherwise available to the SIC. When the 
information  available to the committee was such that there appeared a strong 
likelihood that the firm's  quality control system had not been effective,  the 
committee could call for  a special investigation of  the firm's  quality controls. 
This might run to a review of  the firm's  quality controls with respect to a given 
industry, a given office  or offices,  or the work of  specific  professional 
personnel. Just what an "investigation of  a case" might entail was not clear. 
Not long after  it began operation, the committee found  it necessary to 
undertake a limited number of  investigations of  firms  (which soon came to be 
referred  to as "special reviews"). A number of  these have now occurred. 
Needless to say, no firm  desired to be the first  one investigated by the SIC and 
to this day, no firm  seems to welcome a special review. They do occur, 
however, and I will describe their results in a moment. 
192 
No investigation of  a case took place, however, and none has to date. As the 
committee acquired experience with these matters and as the philosophy of 
self-regulation  developed, the members of  the SIC became convinced that they 
could perform  their function  satisfactorily  without ever undertaking an investi-
gation of  a case. That is, their purposes, as stated above, could be met with 
special reviews directed at the firm's  activities in a given industry, or at the 
functioning  of  specific  offices  or personnel, without going directly to a case in 
litigation. That is where the matter stands at this time. 
Effect  of  a Special Review 
What results from  a special review? First, consider the obvious fact  that the 
self-interest  of  any firm  is best served by bringing damage control to bear on a 
problem as rapidly as possible. Contrary to the apparent expectations of  some 
critics, this does not consist solely of  employing the best legal talent available, 
although that may be necessary. If  there is a weakness in a firm's  quality 
control, it must be repaired immediately or additional damage may occur. If  that 
weakness is one of  personnel rather than system, repairs are still necessary. 
This may involve transfers  of  personnel, other changes of  assignment, 
remedial training, improved supervision, or, in some cases, termination of 
employment. 
In most cases, by the time an SIC review of  a firm  has been mounted, the 
firm  has already taken measures to shore up its system of  quality control. 
Where this has not yet occurred, recommendations by the SIC are unequivocal 
and are followed  up to assure that whatever the deficiency  in quality control 
was, it no longer constitutes a threat to the public that relies on the firm's  audit 
opinions. 
Professional  Acceptance of  the SIC 
How has the work of  the Special Investigations Committee been accepted 
by the members of  the SEC Practice Section? At the beginning, it met with 
very mixed enthusiasm. There was general recognition among the member 
firms  that something of  the sort was needed. The attention being given to 
allegedly unsatisfactory  audits demanded that the profession  have a mechanism 
for  dealing with them, and there was more than a suspicion within the 
profession  that strengthened audit procedures were both possible and needed. 
But when your own firm  is the one threatened with the need for  and the cost of 
a special review, then the "dedication" of  the SIC bordered on "over-
zealousness." With time, however, and the necessity of  responding in writing 
to the findings  and recommendations of  a special review, there has come a 
reluctant but general recognition that the SIC is a necessary and useful  part of 
the self-regulatory  program. 
SIC Procedures 
What happens at a meeting of  that committee? After  some preliminaries by 
the chairman and the senior staff  member present, generally designed to bring 
the committee members up to date on developments within the Institute and 
the Section that bear on the work of  the Committee, the chairman leads into an 
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organized discussion of  the cases on the committee's agenda. Each member 
assigned to serve as or on a task force  reports on activities concerning that 
case since the last meeting. That activity may have been a discussion with firm 
representatives, with the leader of  the team for  the most recent peer review, 
or, in the case of  a special review, a visit to an office  to supervise the review of 
quality controls and audit work papers. The intent in reporting is to convey to 
the rest of  the committee the understanding acquired by the committee 
member so that when he offers  a motion either to close the case, to monitor it, 
or to initiate a special review, the rest of  the committee will be in agreement. 
Some cases are closed rather quickly because the allegations are so general 
as to have no real meaning and the review of  the financial  statements in 
question shows no deficiencies  related in any way to the allegations. Others 
remain open for  some time while a variety of  inquiries take place and the 
committee member assigned satisfies  himself  that he has learned everything 
necessary to make a reasonable and supportable recommendation to the 
committee. 
Quality of  SIC Activity 
How satisfactory  is the work of  the committee as an essential part of  the 
self-regulatory  program? Overall, I regard it as an essential feature  of  that 
program. SIC work is generally of  very high quality. The astuteness and 
dedication of  the chairman, the quality of  the staff,  and the support of  the 
section's membership are all important. Ultimately, however, the work is done 
and the recommendations are made by the members of  the committee. Any 
committee of  nine members selected from  different  firms  and possessing 
different  backgrounds of  experience and authority will experience some 
unevenness in its work as those members undertake their assignments. The 
chairman and the staff  can do much to overcome shortfalls  in diligence and 
pursuit, but not all. 
The committee has been blessed with high quality members and with some 
whose concern for  the profession  is genuine and apparently limitless. I continue 
to be impressed at what people who love and respect their profession  and have 
high standards can accomplish in making others aware of  the necessity and the 
opportunity to bring about change. 
A Personal Evaluation 
I attend almost all SIC meetings and occasionally participate in task force 
meetings with firm  representatives. I think of  SIC members as secret heroes. 
Questioning fellow  practitioners from  other firms  about the quality of  their 
work is seldom pleasant and can be very difficult.  Refusing  to accept ready 
answers, penetrating to the heart of  possible failures,  hanging on to a line of 
questioning until satisfactory  answers are received are far  from  easy. And all 
this must be done with the utmost confidentiality.  There is no discussing one's 
work with one's partners. SIC members received few  plaudits; there is no fan 
club. But those who have served a term on that committee and have performed 
to the best of  their ability have made an important contribution to the well being 
and to the environment of  the profession,  and they have strengthened the self-
regulatory progam immeasurably. 
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